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ABSTRACT
During tlie recent years, the world has experienced severe human rights abuses and 
many conflicts that turned into violence, which consequently produced massive 
refugee flows. As the numbers increased to crisis levels, the international community 
started to adopt a new approach to refugee issues. Today, refugees are no longer 
considered as a humanitarian concern, but as a global problem with legal and political 
implications As well as presenting a historical overview of the existing international 
refugee regime, and pointing out to the challenges facing the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as the core organization in this regime, this 
thesis aims to underline the nature of the refugee problem in the post-Cold War era 
and its implications on international politics.
ÖZET
Son yıllarda, dünya ciddi insan haklan ihlalleri ve şiddet boyutuna ulaşan 
anlaşmazlıklara sahne olmuş ve bunun sonucunda da kitlesel mülteci akınlanyla
I
karşılaşmıştır. Mülteci sayıları kriz noktalarına ulaştıkça, uluslararası topluluk bu 
konuya başka bir yaklaşımla bakmaya başlamıştır. Günümüzde, mülteciler sadece 
insani bir kaygı olarak değil, aynı zamanda hukuki ve siyasi etkileri olan uluslararası 
bir sorun olarak görülmektedir. Bu tezin amacı, şu anda varolan uluslararası mülteci 
sorununu düzenleyen sistemin tarihsel sürecini incelemenin ve bu sistemin temel 
örgütü olan Birleşmiş Milletler Mülteciler Yüksek Komiserliği’nin (BMMYK) 
karşılaştığı sorunları ortaya koymanın yanı sıra, Soğuk Savaş sonrası mülteci 
sorununun niteliğini ve uluslararası siyasetteki etkilerini vurgulamaktır.
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INTRODUCTION
It has not been infrequent that we came across headlines in the newspapers
such as “Fresh wave of displaced people arrives in Afghan capital”; ‘Rwandan
refugees dying in Kisangani”; ‘Thousands displaced by violence in Colombia”;
“Violence drives Bosnians out”; ‘Millions of Iraqi Kurds streamed towards the
furkish and the Iranian borders”; and recently we have read about the flight of
Kosovars due to the conflict and instability in their region. As these headlines suggest,
the problem of forced displacement now affects many parts of the world and has
attained increased attention both publicly and politically.*
As a scholar on refugee issues remarks, ‘Refugees are living reminders of the
conflict and injustice present in the world today”.^  In the same line. United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) states.
Refugee movements and other forms of forced displacement 
provide a useful barometer of human security and insecurity. As a 
rule, people do not abandon their homes and flee from their own 
country or community unless they are confronted with serious 
threats to their life or liberty. Flight is the ultimate survival strategy, 
the one employed when all other coping mechanisms have been 
exhausted.^
Refligeehood is not a new phenomenon. Throughout centuries, people have 
been obliged to flee from their countries as a result of persecution, armed conflict and 
violence. Also, in every part of the world, governments, armies and rebel movements 
have implemented the policy of moving people out by force in order to reach their 
political and military objectives.'* It was in fact the religious pressures in Europe that
' UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees: A Humanitarian Agenda. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997, p. 1.
" Claudena M. Skran, Refugees in Inter-War Europe: The Emergence of a Regime. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995, p.l.
’ UNHCR, The State, op. cit., p. 11.
' ibid., p.l
1
had caused the movement of nearly 50 million migrants out of the continent who 
later founded America.^ At the beginning of the twentieth century, the dissolution of 
Ihe ancient empires after the First World War and the revolution in Russia had 
npiooted millions of people. Likewise, one of the most important consequences of 
the Second World War had been the movement of millions of people across borders. 
Later on, the formation of newly independent and ethnically heterogeneous states out 
of colonial empires have also left the stage for new refugee flows. These 
independence mo/ements in the Third World and the violent ethnic conflicts 
experienced during the process of the determination of new boundaries, and the
emerging authoritarian regimes produced millions of refugees especially in Africa and
Asia. ’^
While it may be an old problem, the issue of forced displacement has taken 
some particularly important and some new dimensions in recent years with the start 
of a new era in international relations after the end of the Cold War. First of all, the 
numbers have been rising considerably. In 1951, when the UNHCR was established, 
there were about 1.5 million refugees by the strict international definition; by 1980, 
there were 8.2 million.’ In the aftermath of the Cold War, the re-birth of the ancient 
communal and regional conflicts which had been suppressed before has multiplied the 
number of refugees fleeing persecution based on ethnic, political or class affiliation.* 
Today, UNHCR is responsible for about 22 million people around the world. There is 
additionally the existence of a very large number of uprooted people who remain 
within the borders of their own country and who do not receive any form of
5 »
Ihsan D. Dağı, “İnsaa Haklan, Sığınmacılar Sorunu ve Uluslararası Güvenlik,” Yeni Türkiye, C. 4, 
S. 22, July-August 1998, s. 1252 
" ibid.
Alan Dowty and Gil Loescher, “Refugee Flows as Grounds for International Action,” International 
Security, Vol.21, No.l, Summer 1996, p.46.
o f International Affairs, Vol.47, No.2, Winter 1994, p. i.
2
international protection or assistance. In total, some 50 million people around the 
world can be described as victims of forced displacement.^
The post-Cold.War era started with large and dramatic refugee movements 
involving nearly 2-3 million Iraqi Kurds and Shiites building up at the borders of Iran 
and Turkey following Saddam Hussein’s genocidal attacks; about 2.5 million ex- 
Yugoslavs expelled from their homes as a result of “ethnic cleansing”; millions of 
starving Somalis forcibly displaced as a result of violent communal warfare and food 
insufficiency,'’’ and about 2 million Rwandan refugees escaping from ethnic violence.
In fact, refugee movements have constituted and continue to constitute one of 
the most important and difficult problems facing the international community. It has 
become evide i^t that in today’s world, fundamental political and economic changes in 
the international system result in large-scale movements of people. It has also become 
evident that mass migrations themselves affect political, economic and strategic 
developments worldwide. Indeed, a scholar argues that it was the movement of 
refugees from East to West Germany in late 1989 that had led to the collapse of the 
Berlin Wall, and assisted the unification of the two Germanies, and brought about the 
most significant transformation in international relations since the Second World 
War."
In this new era, the international community has started to recognize the 
implications .of these changes, the most important of which is that the refugee crisis in 
today’s world is no longer a national or a regional problem, but a global one which 
necessitates increased international cooperation.'" In fact, the refugee problem clearly
UNHCR, The State, op. cit., p.2
Gii Loescher, Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and tlie Global Refugee Crisis. New 
York: Oxford Uniyersity Press, 1993, p.3.
" ibid, p. 11.
' ' Jounwl of Inlernalionnl A ffairs, op. cit., pp.i-ii.
sets forth an example of the interdependence of the international community. That is, 
it fully displays how the problems of one country can have immediate consequences
for other countries. 13
Until recently, it was not the practice of policy makers to classify refugee 
flows as a significant factor affecting local, regional and international stability. The 
common understanding was that these issues were humanitarian and therefore, they 
demanded a humanitarian response.Indeed, after the Second World War, and as 
recently as the late 1980s, scholars and policy makers had concentrated on a rather 
short list of issues often described as matters of ‘high politics”. Among these issues 
were ‘the search for military security, the prevention of nuclear proliferation, and the 
establishment of a dynamic international trading system”. It was asserted that if these 
and other similar strategic issues of high politics could be resolved, global stability 
would be achieved since threats to state security would have been diminished.*^ Being 
a matter of ‘low politics”, migration is.sues were seen as part of the work of social 
affairs ministries, nongovernmental organizations dealing with human rights issues, 
church groups, international hunianilarian organizations, and the like.'** However, 
new and unprecedented developments in the world gave signals that previous matters 
of ‘low politics” would pose potential or actual threats to state security and global 
stability. Among these issues which were previously considered to be low politics, the 
problem of international migration was on top of the list.'^ With its new connotations, 
it started to appear on the agendas of presidents, prime ministers, finance ministers.
13 'Mimian Rights and Refugees,” Human Rights Fact Sheet, No.20, June 1993, p.2.
Locscher, Beyond, op. cit., p.I2.
Gerald E. Dirks, “International Migration in the 1990s: Causes and Conseqnmces," International 
Journal, Vol.48, No.2, Spring 1993, p.l91.
Sharon Stanton Russell, “International Migration: Global Trends and National Responses,” The 
Fletcher Forum o f World Affairs, Vol.20, No.2, Summer-Fall 1996, p.l.
”  Dirks, “International”, op. cit., pp.191-192.
parliamentarians and other participants in high politics issues.'* Evidently, the 
movement of refugees as a form of international migration was one that raised the 
highest concern with its-humanitarian dimension.
However, refugees are not only a humanitarian concern. Millions of people 
escaping from their countries and seeking refuge across borders is indeed a heavy 
burden for the international community. As it will be examined throughout this study, 
refugee movements have important political and security repercussions. To count a 
few, it would be apt to say that the arrival of large groups of refugees may disrupt an 
established pattern in a host country, such as a fragile ethnic balance or a stable 
economy. The financial costs of refugee relief, maintenance and resettlement can be 
very high, and this economic burden may lead to xenophobic feelings and attitudes 
towards refugees by the native population, fhe presence of refugees in a host country 
can also complicate its relations with the refugee-producing country.Loescher 
remarks that ‘Today, peace is no longer threatened primarily by aggressors marching 
across the borders of sovereign stales.” "^ In the post-Cold War world, factors leading 
to instability are more complex, and they definitely include refugee and mass 
migration movements. Although it is true that refugee protection and assistance 
around the world still depend on the generosity of states, the refugee problem itself is 
political, which therefore calls for political solutions at the international level.
In light of the above-mentioned points stressing the significance of the refugee 
problem in today’s world, the purpose of this study is to present an examination of 
the historical context and the implications of the refugee problem that faces us today. 
The study examines the scope and nature of the global refugee problem in the
"* Russell, “Internalional”, op. cil., p.l. 
’’ Skran, Refugees, op. cit., p.2. 
Loescher, Beyond, op. cit., p.l2. 
ibid., p.l2.
twentieth century, and the national and the international responses to it. Another 
issue addressed by the study is whether the contemporary refugee regime is capable 
of dealing efl'ectively with the new global refugee crisis, based on the argument that 
in the post-Cold war era, it is no longer sufTicient to respond to the refiigee crisis 
solely as a humanitarian problem which requires humanitarian solutions, but that 
theie exists a strong need for a more comprehensive political response to the 
pressures of refugee flows;^^
fhe first chapter of the study will present a historical overview of the refugee 
problem starting from -after a short discussion on refugees in the previous centuries 
and in the early twentieth century- the emergence of a refugee regime during the 
inter-war period and pointing out to the legacy of that regime on the formation of the 
contemporary international refugee regime established under the 1951 Geneva
I
Convention. The evolution of the regime in the following decades until the late 
1980s, namely the Cold War period, is also covered within this chapter with special 
emphasis on what kind of refugee movements characterized each decade. As the 
historical evolution of the regime is examined, the definition of the term ‘Vefugee” 
and the expansion of its meaning are also referred to.
In the following chapter, the emphasis will be on the post-Cold War era 
which is characterized by changing dimensions of the refugee problem. Important 
aspects of the refugee problem, such as concern of the international community with 
the root causes of the refugee flows and shifting attention from the country of asylum 
to the country of origin in order to prevent further flows, the threat that the refugee 
movements pose for local, regional and international stability and security, and the
ibid., p. 10,
policy responses of the receiving states are addressed in this chapter as well as the 
causes that have generated refugee flows.
Having explained the dimensions of the refugee problem in the post-Cold War 
world and the causes that underlie it, a third chapter will follow which will focus on 
issues of concern and challenges to UNHCR, in this new era. A discussion on the 
newly emerging concept of humanitarian intervention in the face of massive refugee 
flows, the problem of internally displaced people, challenges such as the inadequacy 
of UNHCR’s resource base and mandate will be dwelt upon in this chapter. Finally, 
in the concluding section, the need for international cooperation and the 
responsibility of states in dealing with refugee matters will be emphasized in order to 
be able (o successfully cope with this problem which has transcended the 
humanitarian aiena and which now has a significant place on the political agenda.
CHAPTER I
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM
I.l. r e f u g e e s  in  t h e  p r e v io u s  c e n t u r ie s
As it lias been staled before, lefugees have been present in all eras; they are 
not a new phenomenon. The concept of asylum has existed for at least 3500 years 
and is found, in one form or another, in the texts and traditions of many ancient 
societies. In the middle of the second millennium B.C., as clearly defined borders 
began to develop throughout the Near East between state-like entities, several treaties 
were concluded between rulers which contained provisions for the protection of 
international fugitives. The examples of this tradition are quite numerous in the 
ancient era. This practice has also been evident in the tradition of Christianity, 
Judaism and Islam.'
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, refugees from religious persecution 
had prolifcialed throughout Euro|)C. Protestants, Catholics and Jews were expelled 
by some regimes and admitted by others according to their beliefs, ideologies, and 
economic necessity. By the late seventeenth century, a higher degree of religious 
homogeneity was accomplished in most parts of Europe, and the era of religious 
persecution was replaced by an era of political upheaval and revolution during which 
individuals were persecuted for their political opinions and their opposition to new 
revolutionary regimes. The nineteenth century produced relatively small refugee 
flows, mostly from revolutionary and nationalist movements in Poland, Germany, 
France and Russia. During this period, Europeans who feared persecution could
' UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees: The Challenge of Protection. Harmondsvvorth-
Middlesex: 1993, p.33.
move to one of the many immigrant countries in the New World.^ In the acceptance 
of most refugees to the territories of other states before the twentieth century, an 
important factor played a role: refugees were regarded as assets rather than liabilities; 
countries granted refuge to people of similar political, religious or ideological views 
of their own; and control over large populations was viewed as an indicator of power 
and national greatness for rulers.^
Under the conditions of the period before this century, there was no 
international protection for refugees as we know it today; in a way, they were 
expected to take care of themselves without any international assistance. Asylum was 
a gift of the rulers, the church and municipalities; and individuals and groups who had 
escaped from their own countries could present no claims of asylum or protection 
based on the violation of their human or political rights.'* It would be right to state 
that the protection of refugees was not viewed as a legal matter, but most of the time 
as a social and moral responsibility.^
1.2. REFUGEES IN HIE EARLY I VVENTIETII CENTURY
(\mipared with the characteristics of forced displacement in earlier periods, 
the twentieth century refugee movements have significant differences. Most 
importantly, it was in this century that they started to attract the attention of political 
leaders and became international issues. One factor that caused this change was the 
fact that refugees started to number millions, not thousands as it had been previously.®
 ^Gil Ivocsclter, Beyond Charity: Iiitcrnalioiial Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis. New 
York-Oxford: Oxford Uniyersily Press, 1993, pp.33-34.
’ Michael Marnis, The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century. New York; Oxford 
University Press, 1985; cited in Loescher, Beyond, op. cil., p.32.
’ Loescher, Beyond, op. cit., p. 33.
' T evfik Odinan, Mülteci Hukuku. Ankara: A.Ü. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi, İnsan Haklan Merkezi 
Yayınları, No. 15, 1995, p.l9.
(^landcna M. Skran, Refugees in lntcr-War Europe - The Emergence of a Regime. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 1995, p. 13.
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The rise in numbers was the result of a radical change in both the causes and 
dimensions of the refugee problem since the beginning of this century. The new 
nature of intefnational warfare which was unprecedentedly violent, the dissolution of 
the old empires, namely Austria-IIungarian, Ottoman, German and Russian empires, 
after the First World War, and the following formation of nation-states were 
accompanied by upheavals, persecution of minority and stateless groups, and 
elimination of the former ruling classes and political opposition groups. During this 
process, millions of uprooted people were excluded from citizenship in the new 
nation-states on the grounds that their language, ethnicity and religious affiliation 
were different.’ Consequently, these people were left without any official documents, 
that is, without any identification or protection.* This change in political and social 
circumstances after the First World War was the immediate cause of most refugee 
movements during the first several decades of this century.^ Inherently, these causes 
made it very unlikely that the refugees would be able to return to their home 
countries easily. For instance, for the Jews, Armenians and other refugees from 
minority groups, the desire of the Buroiiean countries to form ethnically 
homogeneous nation-states meant that they would never again be welcomed as 
citizens in the lands where they had been born.''’ In addition to the chaos in Europe 
and Asia Minor, huge refugee movements were generated due to the collapse of 
czaiist Russia. The Russian refugees mostly included people whom the Communist 
Party perceived as being obstacles in the way of establishing their revolutionary 
regime in the new Soviet Union.''
 ^ t.ocsclicr. Beyond, op. ci!., p.34.
” Gil Locscher, “The International Refugee Regime; Stretched to the Limit?”, Journal o f  
Iniernotional Affairs, Vol.47, No.2, Winter 1994. p.35T 
’ Locschcr, Beyond, op. cit,, p.34.
Skran, Refugees, op. cit., p.60.
Locschcr, Beyond, op. cit., p.35.
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It is a fact that war has always generated some refugees. However, the 
uniqueness of the twentieth century was that international conflict started to affect 
entire populations. With the advent of wider technological, economic and social 
changes, the scale and the destructiveness of military conflict increased enormously. 
Besides the armed forces of the opposite side, civilians also became military targets. 
In other words, discarding the distinction between combatants and non-combatants 
produced vast numbers of refugees, escaping from indiscriminate violence against 
which they had no protection.'^ Given the circumstances, the fact that there was no 
international organization except for the International Committee of the Red Cross to 
assist and support these millions of uprooted people increased the severity of the 
problem on the humanitarian side.'^
Besides the humanitarian aspect of the problem, the refugees of inter-war 
Europe formed an important part of the political, economic and social history of the 
period. It can be said that they came from or went to nearly every country in Europe 
and many others world-wide. Moreover, the period experienced frequent emergence 
of new refugee groups. Their presence also significantly affected both refugee- 
producing and host countries. Consequently, the refugee problem became a 
permanent characteristic of the domestic and international politics of the inter-war 
period.''
In fact, the emergence of refugees as an international issue during the fust 
decades of the twentieth century was related to the growth of interdependence which 
was a wider process affecting the world as a whole. Stemming from the view that 
countries are no longer isolated in an interdependent world and that what happens in
’’ ibid., p .t4.
Odmaii, Mülteci, op, cit.. p.l5.
" Skran. Refugees, op, cil., pp,60-6l.
It
one country has its effects on others, and vice versa*\ it followed that refugee flows 
from one country potentially threatened the economic and social stability, and even 
the national security of a host country.'^
Consequently, fearing huge flows of refugees across their borders, European 
governments started to establish protective barriers and to close their borders. Most 
responded to the plight of refugees simply by expelling them. Besides the fact that 
this response caused misery for the refugees, it also led to tension between European 
states due to the fact that governments were in fact violating the territorial 
sovereignty of neighboring states by pushing refugees across their frontiers to the 
other side. In addition, refugee movements significantly affected domestic politics and 
local economies of the host countries, and negatively affected bilateral relations 
between sending and receiving states.’^  Another problem was that the New World 
was no longer willing to accept the forced migrants of Europe and was in the process 
of imposing immigration restrictions. Consequently, the fact that the refugees had to 
be re-e.slablished in Europe added to the severity of the problem.'*' Furthermore, by 
1921, the resources of voluntaiy agencies lliat assisted refugees were exhausted. 
Under these circumstances, the principal humanitarian organizations of the period, 
headed by the International Committee of the Red Cross, pressured the League of 
Nations to create an international mechanism to deal with at least some of the 
refugees.'*’ Within this context, the international refugee regime came into existence 
to promote the protection and resettlement of refugees in Europe.
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence. Boston; Little, Brown, 1977; 
cited in Skran, Refugees, op. cit., p.65.
Skran, Refugees, op. cit., p.65.
Loescher, Beyond, op. cit., p.36.
Skran, Refugees, op. cit., p.29,
”  Loescher. Beyond, op. cit., p.36.
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1.3. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTER-WAR REFUGEE REGIME
In international relations theory, the term “international regime” refers to the 
governing arrangements created by a group of countries to deal with a particular 
issue in world politics. “These arrangements reflect shared principles and norms, and 
have established rules and decision-making procedures”.^ ® Because the emerging 
cooperation among the Western states on the issue of refugees reflected common 
principles and norms, and led to the creation of rules which occupied a place in 
international law, it is commonly found to be appropriate to speak of this cooperation 
as an international refugee regime.^*
As a first step in the creation of this regime, Western governments established 
»
the first multilateral institution for refugees in 1921, which was called the “High 
Commissioner for Refugees”, with the aim to regularize the status and control of 
stateless people in Europe. “Since then, international laws specifying refugees as a 
unique category of human rights victims to whom special protection and benefits 
should be accorded have been signed and ratified by over a hundred states and 
enforced for several decades.”^^  Evidently, states had a significant, self-serving 
interest in resolving the refugee crisis of the period as soon as possible. By then, it 
was obvious that refiigee movements were prone to create domestic instability, 
generate inter-state tension and threaten international security. Thus, “states created 
the international refugee regime not by purely altruistic motives, but by a desire to 
promote regional and international stability and to support functions which would 
serve the interests of governments”.^ '’
2 \ : 
72
Skrnn, Refugees, op. cil., p.65. 
ibid., p.66.
Locschcr, ‘The Intcrnationar’, op. cit., p.351. 
ibid.
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The first High Commissioner appointed in 1921 was Fridtjof Nansen of 
Norway. In the beginning, he had specific responsibilities for Russian refugees only. 
His responsibilities were then extended to cover Greek, Turkish, Bulgarian and 
Armenian réfugees. '^* The League established strict guidelines within which refugee 
work had to take place. Financially, the League provided only for administrative 
costs, and aid to refugees and host governments depended on direct financial 
assistance from individual states or voluntary agencies. There was no understanding 
that refugee aid should be institutionalized or that it should be administered through 
one permanent international agency,
Initially, Nansen was concerned with the practical problems of Russian 
refugees, and in particular with the problems of refugee travel. Nansen dealt with the 
problem by persuading fifty-one governments to recognize travel documents termed 
“Nansen passports” for stateless Russians in 1922. With these documents, not only 
Russian refugees but also others could legally move from areas where they had 
originally found refuge, but where their stays were temporary and often illegal, to 
more welcoming areas in Europe and elsewhere.^^ In fact, the Nansen Passport 
enabled thousands of refugees to return to their homes or to settle in other countries, 
and it represented the first chain in a series of international legal measures designed to 
protect stateless people and refUgees.^’
In the same year, with the generation of new refugees due to a war between 
Greece and Turkey, Nansen proposed a population exchange.^* As a result, half a
ibid., p.354.
Loeschcr, Beyond, op. cit., p;37. 
ibid,
27 UNHCR, The State, op. cit., p.4.
The efforts of Nansen in regard of the population exchange between Greece and Turkey had led to 
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Yüksel İnan “Aren’t There Any Turks in Western Thrace?’’, Foreign Policy, Vol.XIV, No. 1-2, 
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million Turks moved from Greece to Turkey and several hundred thousand Greeks 
moved from Turkey to Greece. The League of Nations provided compensation to 
help both groups to reintegrate.
During the following years, the number of activities that Nansen undertook 
on behalf of refugees increased and the functions of the High Commissioner 
expanded. The international refugee regime grew to cover issues such as refugee 
settlement, employment opportunities for refugees, and the linkage between refugee 
assistance and economic developm ent.In  addition to developing a more 
comprehensive set of provisions covering employment and social services for 
refugees, governments reached agreements to create a more stable and secure legal 
status for refugees.^" Yet, it should be noted that the international refugee regime did 
not develop according to a comprehensive plan. Instead, it turned out to be a series 
of ad hoc responses by governments to successive refugee crises, which had begun 
with the exodus of more than one million Rus.sian refugees after the Bolshevik 
revolution.’’
a. Restrictions Upon the Inter-War Refugee Regime
As it has been stated before, a significant characteristic of the inter-war period 
was that the emerging international refugee regime operated within a highly 
politicized context in which governments supported refugee assistance programs for 
security and foreign policy reasons as much as out of humanitarian concern. 
Although the High Commissioner for Refugees was formally independent, Nansen 
always depended on governments for donations. With his lack of any official funding
Claudena M. Skran, The International Refugee Regime and the Refugee Problem in the Inter-War 
Period. Oxford University Press, (no date); cited in Loescher, Beyond, op. cit., p.38.
Loescher, Beyond, op. cit., p.38 
’’ Skran, Refugees, op. cit., p.84.
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body to undertake his relief programs, Nansen’s ability to intervene actively in 
situations which raised the concern of his office was largely determined by his ability 
to find funds and to convince governments that they should increase refugee aid, be 
softer on immigration barriers and provide further legal protection for refugees within 
their borders. The significance of this issue is comprehended much more when it is 
remembered that it was a period when assistance and protection of refugees was 
intensely political and thus was influenced by the foreign policy interests of 
governments.^^
The refugee assistance programs of the 1920s especially depended on the 
financing of the two great powers, Britain and France, and on the support of smaller 
pAiropean countries. Decisions as to which refugees qualified for aid were political 
made by the Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations. Governments were 
more likely to offer aid to refugees fleeing from enemy states than from their friends. 
For instance, the League members would prefer to avoid facing refugees fleeing from 
important states and from criticizing their human rights records so as not to arise their 
hostility. As a consequence, some major refugee groups -such as refugees from fascist 
Italy and Spain- were excluded from League assistance. Such political considerations 
evidently underlined the limitations of humanitarian work.^^
b. 1930s: The Emergence of New Refugee Groups
In the 1930s, Europe was flooded with new groups of refugees, this time 
escaping from fascism in Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Perceiving ethnic and 
minority groups as threats to their rule, these fascist regimes embarked upon policies 
to force out those whom they considered to be unassimilable. Their main targets were
”  Loescher. Beyond, p.39. 
”  ibid., pp.39-40.
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not only political opponents, but also members of “racially inferior” population 
groups -mainly Jews, Slavs and Gypsies. '^*
Fridtjof Nansen died in 1930. During the next ten years, the international 
refugee regime which owed a great deal to his personal initiatives, proved to be 
totally incapable of dealing with the problem of Jewish refugees. In 1930, duties 
involving protection of refugees were placed under the aegis of the League 
Secretariat, while responsibility for administrating the remaining assistance programs 
was transferred to an agency that became to be known as the International Nansen 
Office.^^
In 1933, the Convention on the International Status of Refugees was drafted. 
A number of rights to which refugees were entitled were specified, including 
education, employment in the receiving country and travel documents.^* However, 
the Convention was ratified by only eight states and of those eight, half undermined 
their commitment to the convention by putting various reservations and issuing 
declarations.^’ Nevertheless, the Convention was important because it set the first 
universal standard oh the treatment of refugees, a standard with which refugees were 
better treated in the host countries than they had been before.^* A similar convention 
was adopted in 1938 for the refugees coming from Germany which was extended in 
1939 to cover those fleeing from Austria. Although it was true that “these 
conventions were purposely limited to benefit narrowly defined national groups and 
provided only minimal protection for the members of these groups, they were a step 
toward the formulation of more permanent international laws and institutions.”^^
ibid., p.40. 
ibid., p.42. 
ibid, p.38.
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However, it should also be noted that the measures adopted in the 
conventions were only partly successful. For instance, providing identity documents 
allowed refugees to cross international borders legally, but it did not guarantee that a 
foreign government would actually grant them entry visas. That is, the right to grant 
or deny admission to refugees remained under the jurisdiction of sovereign states.“*® 
Furthermore, these agreements did not commit states to give financial assistance to 
the refugees. Nor did states commit themselves to provide documented refugees with 
residence and work permits. “Each government remained at liberty to determine the 
targets and the extent of its philanthropy.”“*' In addition to these shortcomings, it was 
also a fact that many refugees were not covered under these international 
arrangements and continued to lack any travel and identity system.“*^
Again in 1933, in response to the first outflow of Jewish refugees following 
Hitler’s accession to power in Germany, the League established another refugee 
organization called the “High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany.” To avoid 
the hostility of Germany at a time when it was still a member of the League, this 
organization was set up outside the formal structure of the League of Nations; and it 
did not even receive funding for its administrative expenses from the League.“*^
c. The Incapability of the Regime in Dealing with the New Refugee
Groups
»
The incapability of the international refugee regime was not totally the result 
of the weakness of the League, but there was also a far more important factor. 
During this decade, the ruling atmosphere was characterized by the absence of any
ibid., pp.38-39.
Farer, “How”, op. cit., pp.76-77. 
Loescher, Beyond, op. cit., p.39. 
Loescher. Beyond, op. cit., pp.42-43.
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consistent or coherent international coinniitinent to resolving refugee problems.
Instead, there was a common perception in almost every industrialized state,
particulai ly during the years of the (Jreat Depression, that
national interests were best served by imposing and maintaining 
rigid limits on immigration; that humanitarian initiatives on behalf 
of refugees had to be limited by tight fiscal constraints and the 
need to enijiloy the nation’s own citizens; and that no particular 
foreign policy benefits would accrue from putting political and 
moral pressure on refuge-generating countries or from accepting 
their unwanted dissidents and niinorily groups.'*''
t hese views jirevailed in the United States, Canada and Australia, although 
each of these countries had accepted a substantial majority of the world’s emigrants, 
and had been areas of safety for the forced migrants of Europe until the First World 
War
riustrated with the international reluctance to accept .lews or to confront the 
(leiman government on the refugee issue, the High Commissioner for German 
Refugees, .lames G. McDonald, resigned from his post in 1936 with a letter in which 
he undeilined the political roots of the refugee problem and the limitations of the 
intcinational lesponse. He believed that simply assisting those who had lied from 
Geimany was not a suiricient response. Initiatives had to be taken to face the causes 
that created the refugees and to negotiate with the country that was responsible for 
the How He pointed to the I.eague of Nations who would be the body to deal with 
the political aspect of this inoblem which could not be addressed within the 
framework of the humanitarian work of the High Commissioner.'"’ However, the 
High (!ommissioner’s effort in trying to draw attention to the human rights abuses of 
Germany as the immediate cause of the Jewish refugee problem did not lead to any
ihid.. p.tl.
I.ocsclicr, “ F tic Intcrnalionar. op. cit.. p.35.S. 
I.ocschci. Heyond. oji.cit. p.d.t.
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international action against the Nazis. In fact, Western governments viewed the 
refugee problem as an internal matter of the German government, particularly since 
Gertnany was still a member of the League. Even after Germany withdrew from the 
League in 1938, France and Britain attempted to appease it and, therefore, were not 
willing to criticize its persecution of the Jews.'*’
After Germany quit the League, the two offices for refugees, the International 
Nansen Office and the High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany, were 
merged under the title “High Commissioner for Refugees”, which functioned until 
after the end of the Second World War in 1946. The powers of the new High 
Commissioner were even more limited than they had been in the past. As political 
conditions deteriorated in the late 1930s and as an increasingly restrictive political 
environment emerged, the influence of the High Commissioner on governments was 
fiirther undermined.'**
d. The Evian Conference
The only significant international effort to address the problem of Jewish 
refugees was the international conference held at Evian, France, in 1938 convened by 
the call of Franklin Roosevelt, as a result of the pressure from Jewish groups and 
private voluntary agencies. However, the conference did not offer any solution, and it 
served to display the reluctance of the United States and the rest of the world to come 
up with any resettlement alternatives for Jewish refugees.
The only concrete outcome of the Evian Conference was the creation of a 
new refugee mechanism outside the League of Nations structure, which was called
ibid., pp.43-44. 
ibid., p.44. 
ibid., pp.44-45.
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the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR) with the purpose to negotiate 
with Germany about Jewish migration. For the next eight years (until 1946), the 
IGCR existed alongside the League of Nations’ Office of the High Commissioner for 
Refugees, However, the negotiations between Germany and IGCR were fruitless and 
Germany regarded Evian and the Western nations’ policy of closing their doors 
against refugees as shifting the blame away from itself, and it began to implement 
even harsher measures to get rid of the Jewish population on its territory. In 1943, 
the United States and Great Britain convened another conference in Bermuda to 
voice their concerns for European Jews, but no effective steps were taken to change 
the policy of the Western states towards refugees which was based on “rigid barriers
to immigration. »50
e. The Impact of the Inter-War Refugee Regime
In light of the above-mentioned points relating to the characteristics of the 
inter-war refugee regime, it would not be incorrect to state that it failed to constitute 
an effective regime. Throughout this period, governments, fearing pressure from a 
supragovernmental authority to recognize political dissidents of other countries, 
avoided adopting a universal definition of the term “refugee”. Instead, they defined 
only specific national groups as refugees, providing them with only minimal 
protection and keeping the mandate of the High Commissioner deliberately narrow. 
As the League’s political effectiveness and credibility declined -“particularly after the 
withdrawal of Germany, Japan and Italy from its membership and after its failure to 
resolve the Manchurian and Ethiopian conflicts during the 1930s”- its competence to 
deal with refugee problems also decreased.’’ Ultimately, the inter-war refugee regime
50 ibid., p.45.
Locscher, “The International”, op. cit., p.354.
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proved to be totally ineffective in responding to the Holocaust prior to the Second 
World War.’^  It would be a mistake, however, to make an assessment of the 
international refugee regime solely on the experience of one refugee group in the last 
year before the outbreak of the Second World War. There is also the other side of the 
coin. Taken as a whole, the inter-war period is “remarkable for the very large 
numbers of refugees not in fact sent back to their countries of origin, whether they 
fled Russia after the revolution, Spain, Germany or the Ottoman Empire.”^^  During 
this period, over 1 million Russians, 350,000 Armenians, 2 million Greeks and 
Bulgars, and 400,000 Turks could find refuge as a result of the efforts of the refugee 
regime. In addition, France alone granted refuge for about 10,000 Italians and
400.000 Spanish Republicans. Even in the case of refugees from Germany, about
400.000 Jews escaped and were able to find refuge elsewhere.*''
Moreover, the institutions created to respond to the refugee problems during 
the inter-war period did leave one lasting and important legacy. Twenty years of 
organizational growth and inter-state cooperation firmly established the idea that 
refugees were· a group of people who were victims of human rights abuses and for 
whom the international community had a special responsibility.** Legal norms on the 
protection of refugees were developed and it was established that refugees were a 
special category of migrants within domestic and international law who deserved 
preferential treatment.*® Such norms, whose foundations could be traced to the 
Nansen passport system, and to the 1933 and 1938 Refugee Conventions*’, governed 
issues like refugee identity and travel, economic and social well-being, physical
”  ibid., p.355.
”  Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983, p.71; 
quoted in Skran, Refugees, op. cit., p.223,
Skran, Refugees, op. cit., p.223.
”  Loescher, BeVond. op. cit., p.46. 
ibid., p.37.
’’ Skran, Refugees, op. cit., p.261.
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protection and protection from expulsion. In addition, the understanding that 
international organizations could defend refugees and could intervene on their behalf 
was established, which was in fact a unique tradition in the field of human rights.*® 
Finally, the establishment and evolution of the international refugee agencies of the 
period provided the foundations on which successor institutions would build.
1.4. REFUGEES IN THE POST-SECOND WORLD WAR
a. The First Initiatives to Deal with Post-War Refugee Problem
The Second World War displaced millions of people. At first, international 
efforts to resolve the post-war refugee problem followed the pattern that was 
established during the inter-war period. Temporary measures were taken to resolve 
the emergency situations. To this end, an intergovernmental body, the United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA) was set up in 1943, whose principal 
function was to promote and oversee the repatriation of millions of displaced 
people.*” Working directly under the command of Allied forces, UNRRA was given a 
very limited mandate. It was to extend aid to civilian populations in the Allied nations 
and to displaced persons in countries liberated by the Allied armies. UNRRA had no 
power to resettle refugees to third countries; its aim was simply to repatriate, as soon 
as possible, all the people who had been displaced by the war.**
The contemporary international approach to the refugee problem emerged 
fully only after UNRRA was abolished in 1945. Despite opposition from the Soviet 
Union, Western governments undertook new initiatives to resettle Eastern European 
refugees. In 1947, the Western powers established the International Refiigee
ibid., pp. 144-145.
’’ Loescher, Beyond, op. cit., p.46
60 Loescher, “The International”, op. cit., p.355. 
Loescher, Beyond, op. cit., p.47.
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Organization (IRO), which had as its chief function not repatriation, but resettlement 
of refugees created by the war and its aftermath. With the establishment of IRO, the 
international community adopted, for the first time, a universal definition of refugee 
based on “persecution or fear of persecution” on the grounds of race, religion, 
nationality or political opinion.*’^  Previously, international organizations had dealt 
only with specific groups of refugees, such as Russian or German refugees, and 
governments had never attempted to adopt a general definition of the term refugee. 
In other words, the international community, for the first time, made refugee 
eligibility depend on the individual rather than on the group, and accepted the 
individual's right to flee from political persecution and to choose where he wanted to 
live. The Soviet Union was against this new approach and it saw the IRO as a tool of 
the West and criticized the organization for preventing displaced persons from
repatriating. 63
b. The Establishment of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees
When IRO completed its mandate in 1951, the establishment of a new 
international framework for assisting refugees was necessary. The United States and 
the other Western states in the General Assembly addressed the international 
problems of refugees by establishing an ad hoc body, which was supposedly 
independent within the administrative and financial framework of the United Nations, 
riiiis, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
was established on 1 January 1951 as a “non-political” and “humanitarian and social”
“  Loescher, “The International”, op. cit., p.356. 
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24
agency devoted to protecting and assisting the world’s refugees.*^ ·* Simultaneously, 
the emphasis began to shift from relief to all war victims, to assistance and protection 
for a narrower category of people designated as refugees from persecution - a shift 
codified in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees which defined 
persons who would be considered as falling within the mandate of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees/’^
The tense state of East-West relations in the post-war period was also 
reflected on the refugee question, which became centered on the ideological 
opposition between capitalism and socialism. Both the United States and the Soviet 
Union resisted participation in this emerging UN refugee regime. To the Russians, the 
UNHCR was an instrument of the ‘untrustworthy’ Western states. Thus, the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe, who were in fact the source of most refugee movements 
during this period, did not participate in UN refugee programs, while the United 
States chose to implement an independent (and principally anticommunist) refugee 
policy through the agencies created outside the UN system.®*’
Besides the doubtful positions of the United States and the Soviet Union 
towards the newly emerging refugee regime, even those states who had become 
parties to the Convention had some hesitations due to their concern over territorial 
sovereignty. As a result, UNHCR mandate and the Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees adopted by the General Assembly in July 1951 reflected a philosophy of 
“cautious liberality”. On the one hand, there was the influence of a general 
philosophy of ‘Western liberalism’ which perceived refugees as a European problem 
within the Cold War. On the other hand, there were xenophobic pressures for the
’ Alex CunlifTe, “The Refugee Crises: A Study of the United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees,” Polilical Sludics. Vol.43, No.2, June 1995, p.280.
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maintenance of ‘nationhood’. Consequently, the 46 articles of the Convention 
establishing minimal rights for refugees, reflected a dichotomy between the 
recognition of the basic right to seek asylum, and of the fact that nation states had no 
obligation to grant asylum to refugees; that the ultimate decision on who may cross 
their borders lied with them.'^^
American attitude towards UNHCR changed fundamentally during the first 
major Cold War refugee crisis when the 1956 Hungarian Revolution erupted and 
when 200,000 Hungarians sought refuge in Austria and Yugoslavia. This was the first 
major occasion where the agency was authorized to respond to large scale 
movements of people without referring to the limited guidelines of the 1951 
Convention. UNHCR’s management of the crisis demonstrated that it was the only 
international refugee agency capable of dealing with a humanitarian problem which at 
the same time involved high political issues between the East and the West. With the 
Hungarian operation, the funding capacities and operational services of UNHCR 
grew; the High Commissioner managed to win the confidence of both the United 
States and the communist states for his repatriation efforts and UNHCR became the 
centerpiece of the emerging post-war international refugee regime.^*
As the core of this international refugee regime, UNHCR has a unique and a 
special role: it provides international protection to refugees under the auspices of the 
UN and together with governments, it seeks permanent solutions to their problems in 
the form of voluntary repatriation, integration in the country of first asylum or third 
country resettlement. It is the agency to provide “substitute protection” of the 
international community for those who lack national protection as a result of their 
states’ practice of persecution and who succeed in crossing an international border. In
CmilifTc. “The Refugee", op. cit., p.281.
CnnlifTc. “The Refugee”, op. cit., p.283; and Locscher, “The International”, op. cit., p.358-359.
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fact, no other international agency enjoys quite the same authority and quite the same 
responsibility, and no other agency would find itself in the frontline of “conflict, 
violence, persecution and deprivation”/’’
7 0 .i. The 1951 Convention
The current international refugee regime is primarily based on the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the first international document “to
set out the rights of refugees as well as the responsibilities of the world community to
refugees” and on the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees/*
The Convention, in Article 1A(2), provides a general definition of the term
“refugee”. The term applies to any person who,
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and 
being outside the country of his habitual residence as a result of 
such events, is unable or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return 
to it."*^
Guy S. Good\vin-Gill, “Editorial,” IiUernatinualJournal o f Refugee Law, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1993, p.2. 
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In section B of the same Article, the following provisions have been adopted;
“(1) For the purposes of this Convention, the words ‘events occurring before 1 January 1951’ in 
Article 1, Section A, shall be understood to mean either 
(a) ‘events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951’; or
(h) ‘events occurring in Europe or elsewhere before 1 January 1951’, and each Contracting State 
shall make a declaration at the time of signature, ratification or accession, specifying which of 
these meanings it applies for the purpose of its obligations under this Convention.
(2) Any Contracting State which has adopted alternative (a) may at any time extend its obligations 
by adopting alternative {h) by means of a notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations.”
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Although sponsored by a global organization, i.e. the United Nations, the 
refugee definition in the Convention had two additional criteria in the determination 
of the eligibility of individuals to receive refugee status: firstly, the Convention 
considered only “events occurring before 1 January 1951”, thereby introducing a 
temporal limitation (ra//o temporis), and secondly, it took into account only “events 
occurring in Europe” before 1 January 1951, which accordingly introduced a 
geographical limitation (ratio loci)^^ These limits meant that the Convention applied 
largely to refugees from Soviet bloc countries, which was, in fact, an outcome clearly, 
intended by the United States and its allies.’“*
The most fundamental right protected under international refugee law is the 
right of a refugee not to be returned to a place where he or she may face persecution. 
Referred to as iionrefönlemeni, this principle stipulates that even before the receiving 
country grants formal recognition as a refugee, “No Contracting State shall expel or 
return (refouler) a refugee in a manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories 
where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion” (Article 33). 
The Convention also protects arriving refugees from “penalties” on account of their 
illegal entry, provided that they present themselves without delay to the authorities 
and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence. Moreover, the Convention
”  Ucarcr, “The Globar, op. cit., p. 12.
' ’ Tarer, “How'’, op. cit., p.78.
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requires signatories to abide by obligations regarding various civil, economic and 
social rights of refugees. Most importantly, states must not prevent asylum seekers 
from gaining access to asylum procedures and from enjoying equal treatment and 
fundamental human rights confirmed in the UN Charter and in the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights accorded to its citizens or non-citizens.’*
II. A Critical Approach to the 1951 Convention:
There are certain criticisms that are directed to the Convention and the 
refugee definition that it provided. One of the most significant factors causing 
criticism of the Convention is the changing nature of the refugee phenomenon since 
the dialling of the Convention in 1951. Whereas the refugees of concern to the 
drafters of the Convention in 1951 were racial and religious minorities in Europe and 
dissidents from the Soviet bloc, the contemporary refugee problem is vastly different 
in scope and nature. Rather than originating solely in Europe, the majority of 
refugees today flee from the poor nations of the South, and have needs that differ 
substantially from those of the typical refugees of the Cold War era. For example, the 
European refugees for whom the Convention was drafted were considered to be 
primarily in need of legal protection, rather than material assistance. The Convention, 
therefore, provides rights in such areas as personal status and intellectual property, 
while failing to address the contemporary problems of physical security and the 
fulfilment of basic .survival needs in the context of large-scale refugee influxes. In
t
other words, “the Convention’s focus on individual rights does not translate easily 
into actual protection of large numbers of refugees, whose basic needs include food.
Arthur C. Helton and Pamela Birchenough, “Forced Migration in Europe,” The Fletcher Forum 
of World Affairs, Vol.20, No.2, Summer/Fall 1996, p.9(); and UNHCR, The State, op. cit., p.53.
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slielter, clean water, sanitation, group rights and protection from cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment.” '^'
Another major.change since tlie Convention came into force is that whereas 
refugees of concern to its drafters were usually moving from a European country to 
another Western state, the vast majority of contemporary refugees originate in and 
are protected by the poor countries of the South. Assumptions during the drafting of 
the Convention about the prosperity of countries of asylum, and the kinds of rights 
typically enjoyed within them, are therefore no longer valid. That is, the regime 
foreseen in the Convention as a whole is too expensive for a poor country, with 
employment rights and welfare rights being the most costly. In fact, it is very difficult 
for a less developed state to provide for the economic needs of a large refugee 
population when the needs of its own citizens even cannot be rnet.’^
fhe refugee definition’s rather limited scope is also criticized. The definition 
only covers those individual refugees who can present a well-founded fear of 
persecution. In fact, this was a reflection of the ideology that dominated the thinking 
of the Western states who had piepared the Convention. The persecution-based 
standard could be interpreted to include most of the dissidents who emigrated from 
the Eastern bloc, and leading to the immigration of Eastern Europeans to Western 
states, this would meet the needs of the latter who were then experiencing shortage of 
manpower. Moreover, since finding that an asylum applicant faces the possibility of 
persecution would imply negative things on the part of the country of origin, each
' .lames Untliaway and J.A. Dent. Refugee Rights: Report on a (^ inparat^ ^^ ^^  ^ North York:
York l anes Press, tnc.. 19').S. pp.38-.T9. 
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recognition of refugee status would simultaneously support efforts to present the 
political systems in the communist countries of origin as evil/*
Furthermore, the Convention did not specify that the grant of asylum was a 
basic human right, but rather it implied that it was a sovereign area of discretion for 
governments.Indeed, the procedures governing the determination of refugee status 
are not covered by the Convention, and they fall wholly within the purview of 
national sovereignty. While contracting states are expected to cooperate with 
UNHCR and provide it with information on measures taken to implement the 
Convention, the organization has no role in either the formulation or the 
implementation of the state protection systems. The lack of any concrete international 
examination of the procedural dimensions of refugee protection has resulted in a wide 
range of protection practices and interpretations of the Convention definition.
It is argued that the lack of uniformity in the application of the refugee 
definition leads to its being subject to national interests. Indeed, different definitions 
exist for different interest groups, and in practice, governments, lawyers, and others 
are often able to manipulate the interpretation within their complicated legal systems 
which provide such an opportunity.*'
As has been emphasized, there are many perspectives on the issue of who 
exactly merits protection under international refugee law. Some argue that the 1951 
Convention refugee definition is too rigid to encompass all those fleeing to the West 
in need of protection and, therefore, that various other categories, such as ‘de facto’ 
or ‘humanitarian’ refugees, are necessary. Others believe that the definition is
Jnincs C. Hathaway, “Fear of Persecution and the Law of Human Rights,” Bulletin o f Human 
Rights, No:91/l, 1992, p.98.
’ Cuuliffc, “The Refugee", op. cit., p.282; and Hatliarvay & Dent. Refugee, op. cit., p.35. 
Hathaway and Dent, Refugee, op. cit.. p.36.
n. Arbolcda and I. Hoy, “The Convention Refugee Definition in the West; Disharmony of 
Interpretation and Application,” Internationa! Journal o f Refugee Law, Vol.5, No.l, 1993, p.77.
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sufficiently flexible, and that it can be applied in such a way as to provide 
international protection to those who really need it. Whatever the approach is 
towards the refugee definition provided in the 1951 Convention, the important thing, 
it is argued, is that discussion of the asylum issue in the Western states often discards 
the basic starting point on the definitional problems. It is stated that unless the 
problems of definition and application are resolved, both the Convention refugee 
definition and international asylum law may become manipulated in the domestic 
arena, and they may lose their relevance.*^
The greatest controversy in the definition revolves around the meaning of the 
key criterion of the Convention refugee definition: ‘persecution’. In fact, leaving the 
term ‘persecution’ undefined led to different rates of acceptance for people fleeing 
the same conflict. As Gallagher concluded in his consideration of the formative years 
of UNHCR, ‘these restrictive definitional efforts were motivated, of course, to keep 
the numbers down”.*^  There was also the fact that the drafters of the Convention 
realized the impossibility of enumerating in advance all of the forms of persecution 
which might entitle persons to benefit from the protection of the international 
community,*''
Both UNHCR and academic and other commentators have pointed out that 
no universally accepted definition of persecution exists. Usually, any threat to life or 
freedom on account of one of the five Convention reasons is accepted as persecution, 
and generally serious violations of human rights on account of such reasons would 
also be sufficient. However, not everyone actually or potentially suffering human 
rights violations can be considered to have a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’.*’
ibid,, pp.75-76.
CunlilTc, “The Refugee”, op. cit., p.282.
Hathaway, “Fear”, op. cit., p.99.
Arbolcda and'Hoy, “The Convention”, op. cil., p,77.
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I’he refugee .recognition would be restricted to situations in which there was a risk 
that is inconsistent with the basic duty of protection owed by the state to its citizens. 
That is, the drafters were not concerned to respond to certain forms of harm, but 
were rather motivated to intervene only where the persecution was a consequence Of 
a breakdown of national protection. The existence of past or anticipated suffering 
alone, therefore, does not make one a refugee, unless the state has failed in relation to 
some duty to defend its citizens against the particular form of harm.®* In other words, 
refugee law is designed to provide the protection of the international community only 
in situations where there is no reasonable expectation that adequate national 
protection of basic human rights will be forthcoming. It is, therefore, a “substitute 
protection” in the sense that it is a response to the lack of the usual benefits of 
nationality.®’
Governments are left with a wide margin in interpreting the concept of 
persecution and, to date, coherent or consistent jurisprudence is lacking. Various 
attempts to formulate a universal definition of persecution have met with little 
success. The trend today is to interpret and apply the concept of persecution 
restrictively. Many governments and refugee advocacy groups criticize the ambiguity 
of the refugee definition, but no constructive and realistic proposals have been made 
to resolve the problem. At one extreme, some point out to the over-burdened and 
often abused refugee determination systems of Western countries to justify a 
restrictive definition of persecution, hoping to resolve the international migration of 
non-refugees. As a matter of principle, large scale international migration should not 
be dealt with at the expense of the integrity of the Convention refugee definition, 
even though it is increasingly mixed in with the refugee issue. At the other extreme.
Hathaway, “Fear”, op. cil., pp.99-10(). 
ibid , pp. 101-102.
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some refuse to admit any abuse of the asylum procedures in the West and exaggerate 
the scope of the Convention refugee definition. Advocates of this approach also want 
to resolve the international migration issue within the context of asylum law, 
primarily by trying to interpret the concept of persecution in a rather open-ended 
way. This is also mistaken because it is prone to abuse and may destroy the integrity 
of any refugee determination system. A good faith effort is required by both sides of 
the argument, as well as by all other interested parties, in order to establish some 
tangible criteria for interpreting “persecution” in the context of today’s world.**
Although this definitional problem occupies an important place in 
discussions over refugee law, there are also others who point out that the attention 
should be focused on bringing refugees to the attention of policy-makers and 
assistance organizations instead of worrying over definitions. That is, while it is 
recognized that there are valid concerns about the boundaries of definitions, there is 
also a clear recognition that improving the definitions alone will not resolve the 
problem of protecting and assisting refugees. In fact, solutions require essentially 
more of “political will” of states acting in the international refugee regime more than 
anything else.*^
Hi. Refugees versus Economic Migrants:
It would be appropriate in this context to discuss to some extent the 
differences that distinguish refugees from economic migrants since such a question 
occupies an important place in the determination procedures of eligibility for refugee 
status.
Arbolcda and Hoy, “The Convention”, op. cil., pp.77-79.
Emily Copeland, “Global Refugee Policy”, Internadonal Migration Review, Vol.26, No.3, Fall
1992. p.994.
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Basically and quite obviously, refugees are those people who leave their 
countries of origin against their own will, who move to a new environment 
reluctantly and who lack any kind of positive motivation to settle elsewhere, as 
distinguished from voluntary migrants^” who flee from their country to improve their 
living standards. In other words, their need for international protection sets refugees 
apart from economic migrants. Refugees leave their countries because their 
governments are unwilling or unable to protect them from persecution on reasons 
denoted in the 1951 Convention refugee definition or from the brutal effects of civil 
conflict and violence. Economic migrants on the other hand, move in search of 
improved employment opportunities or with other motivations for personal
convenience 91
However, from a human rights perspective, it will not always be possible to 
distinguish, with certainty, between a refugee and an economic migrant. For instance, 
it may be argued that if the emphasis is placed on threats to life and freedom, there is 
little to distinguish between a person facing death through starvation and another 
threatened with arbitrary execution because of political beliefs.^  ^However, there is, in 
fact, a quite sensible basis for not including in the refugee regime victims of famine 
and extreme poverty. The argument is that since their situation results from the mere 
indifference or inability of public authority, not its deliberate hostility, assistance can 
be brought to them by other governments and private groups. In other words, the
E. KunI/., “ I'lie Refugee in Flight: Kinetic Models and Forms of Displavcemcnt,” International 
Migration Review, Vol.7, No.2, 1973, pp. 12.3- ■ :i(cd in A. Bariagabcr, “Linking Political 
Violence and Refugee Situations in the Horn ol , itica: An Empirical Approach,” International 
Migration, Vol.33, No.2, 199.3, p.209.
” Sadako Ogata, “Mixed Migration: Strategy for Refugees and Economic Migrants,” Harvard 
International Review, Vol.l7, No.2, Spring 1993, p.3().
“Human Rights and Refugees”, Human Rights Vact Sheet, No.20, June 1993, pp. 14-15.
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danger can be alleviated by uncoercive means which do not challenge the authority of 
governments or the sovereignty of states.’^
In addition, since there exists a close relationship between political conflict 
and economic and social problems in most contexts, it again makes it difficult to draw 
a line between refligees and migrants. Indeed, there are people who flee from 
countries where poverty is the direct consequence of the political system .In  other 
words, it is ollen the poorest members of the society who are discriminated against 
and people flee from economic conditions which are the direct results of a political 
failure to provide a fair distribution of the economic resources of the countiy.^’ For 
example, in Haiti, the state has served as a tool for the enrichment of a small elite at 
the expense of the majority of the population. Thus, the Haitians who have fled from 
their country in numbers reaching to tens of thousands in the past decades had in fact 
escaped poverty caused by political exploitation.’*’
In this context, it would be apt to underline the relevance of economic, social 
and cultural rights with respect to accession to refugee status. In principle, just as the 
serious risk of violation of civil and political rights of an individual indicates a lack of 
state protection on the part of that person, so too does the failure to respect the basic 
economic, social and cultural rights. However, this principle often leads to 
misunderstandings such that it is assumed to be implying that everyone who leads a 
life with material disadvantages, can successfully attain refugee status. What is 
misperceived in this line of thinking is that unlike the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights does not
” Farer, “Flow", op. cil., p.98. 
Locscher, Beyond, op. cit., p.6.
Sadniddin Aga Khan, “Population Movement: Its F.fTect on European Stability", in The Living 
L.a\v of Nations bv G. Alfrcdsson and P. Macalislcr-Sinilh (cds.), Arlington: N.P.Engel, 1996, p.4. 
Focschcr, Beyond, op. cil.. p. 16.
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create obligations that states are required to fulfil immediately upon accession to the 
Covenant. Rather, the duty of each state party is “to take steps, individually and 
through international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, 
to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the 
full realization of the rights recognized and to guarantee that the rights will be 
exercised without discrimination of any kind.” Accordingly, states must oversee that 
such rights are implemented on a non-discriminatory basis. However, persistence of 
non-discriminatory poverty and economic difficulties do not constitute violation of 
the Covenant per se. Therefore, it can be deduced from the Covenant that an absence 
of state protection exists only when a government fails to ensure the non- 
discriminatory distribution of available resources. It is in this context that refugee 
protection becomes relevant, not as a means of providing a “good life” but rather to 
guarantee those basic economic, social and cultural rights that are essential to human 
dignity. In other words, people whose only motivation for leaving their country is to 
escape the general difficult economic conditions are economic migrants, whereas 
those individuals for whom economic sulTering has a political, racial or a similar 
reason may qualify as refugees.^^
c. Late 1950s to Late 1970s: Expansion of UNHCR to the Third World
The narrowly European orientation of the international refugee regime 
established in the aftermath of the Second World War was not seriously challenged 
until the late 1950s.^* The era of refugee crises in Europe (except for exodus of 
Czechs in 1968 and Poles in 1980) had mostly ended and the problem would not re-
”  James C. Hathaway, “Labelling the Boat People,” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 15, No.4, Nov. 
1993, pp.694-696.
Astri Suhrke, “A Crisis Diminished: Refugees in the Developing World,” International Journal, 
Vol,48, No.2, Spring 1993, p.217.
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appear until the late 1980s. Although political oppression in Eastern European 
countries and the Soviet Union continued to produce refugees, fewer and fewer of 
them were able to flee to the West, due to the fact that once these countries 
consolidated their rule, they imposed strict exit controls and closed their borders.^^
Then, suddenly, Africa moved to the fore with many, nearly simultaneous 
outflow of millions of displaced people which was the result of the decolonization 
struggles and post-independence civil strife and wars on the continent. Refugees fled 
political repression and ethnic conflict in these newly independent states. Many of 
these states had very weak civil societies and economies, and governments were 
unrepresentative and ineffective. There was also the fact that the former colonial 
powers had established the bordéis between the African countries in such an arbitrary 
fashion that “tribes and ethnic groups were split up across state boundaries creating 
dual loyalties in the systems of most of the newly independent countries.” '^’* The 
tension generated by these unstable conditions usually turned into violence. Indeed, 
communal conflict became a basic characteristic of most African societies and created 
large number of refugees.
In the following decade, for the first time, large flows of refugees also 
appeared in Central and South America. Repressive military regimes in Chile, 
Uruguay, and Argentina compelled about one million people to flee, though most 
never acquired official refugee status. In addition, a steady stream of refugees from 
Cuba suddenly peaked with the Marielito flow of about 125,000 people in 1980. The 
refugee crisis of the 1970s reached a peak with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
which eventually led to the exodus of nearly 5 million.'®*
^  Loescher, Beyond, op. cil., p.75. 
ibid., p.78.mi Sulirke. “A Crisis”, op. cit., p.218.
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In the face of such newly emerging refugee movements, UNHCR underwent 
a period of sustained growth; and its functions, operations, and geographical 
outreach expanded to meet the increasing demands being placed on it in Africa, Asia 
and Latin America.’’  ^As it will be explained in the following sections, the extension 
of the rules and the expansion of the activities of the international refugee regime 
occurred through a series of resolutions, conventions and declarations, i.e. through 
the introduction of the concept of “good offices”, through the adoption of the 1967 
Protocol to the UN Convention on Refugees, the 1969 OAU Convention, and 
continued with the adoption of the 1984 Cartagena Declaration in the following 
decade.'”^
I. rite J067 Protocor\·
The 1951 Convention only comprises persons who had become refugees as a 
result of events which occurred prior to 1 January 1951. However, the years 
following 1951 showed that the circumstances of the new refugee movements could 
not be related to the events prior to 1951. I ’hroughout the late 1950s and 1960s, new 
refugee groups emerged, particularly in Africa. With rapid decolonization, the 
character of refugee problems changed, and the regime came under increasing 
pressure to adapt its programs and policies to give greater priority to Third World
Loesdier, Beyond, op. cit., p.76.
Loescher, “The International”, op. cit., p.361.
The Protocol was signed by the President of the General Assembly and by the Secretary-General 
on 31 January 1967 in line with the text of the General Assembly Resolution 2198 (XXI) of 16 
December 1966. It entered into force on 4 October 1967. For the text of the Protocol, please refer to 
Jean-Pierre Colombey (ed.), Collection of International Instruments and Other Legal Texts 
Concerning Refugees and Displaced Persons. Vol.I, Geneva; Division of International Protection of 
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1995. A full text of the Protocol 
is also provided in the Appendix.
Turkey maintained the geographical limitation in the 1951 Convention by putting the reservation on 
the Protocol that “The instrument of accession stipulated that the Government of Turkey maintains 
the provisions of the declaration made under section B of Article 1 of the Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, made at Geneva on 28 July 1951 according to which it applies the Convention 
only to persons who have become refugees as a result of events occurring in Europe...”
refugees. Anticolonial struggles, coupled with post-independence civil conflict and 
wars in Africa generated vast numbers of refugees. The central problem regarding the 
international refugee regime was its inability to respond effectively to these new kinds 
of refugees.'*'  ^ While General Assembly resolutions made many new refugee groups 
the concern o f  UNHCR with the practice of the extension of the “good offices” of 
the High Commissioner, the measures were only recommendations and could not 
impose greater obligations on sovereign states.'”*' These new refugees were in need of 
protection which could not be granted to them under the limited time-frame of the 
1951 Convention, In an attempt to respond effectively to these new refugee groups, 
signatories to the international refugee instruments were compelled to adjust the 
geographical and time limits of the refugee definition in the 1951 Convention, expand 
the assistance capacities of the High Commissioner and reorient the programs and 
priorities of the l egime from Europe to the Third World'”’ by means of a “protocol”, 
fhe 1967 Protocol extended the application of the Convention to the situation of 
“new refugees”, i.e. persons who, while meeting the Convention definition, had 
become refugees as a result of events that took place after 1 January 1951, by 
asserting that “equal status should be enjoyed by all refugees covered by the definition 
in the Convention irrespective of the dateline 1 January 1951” because “new refugee 
situations have arisen since the Convention was adopted and ...the refugees 
concerned may therefore not fall within the scope of the Convention.” The 1967 
Pi otocol further redefined the refugee by lifting the geographic limitation stipulated in 
the 1951 Convention. Aside from these distinctions, the Protocol was fashioned after
the 1951 (Convention, 108
Locsclicr, “ flic Internationar, op. cit., p.359; and “Human Rights”, op. cit., p.9.
Loeschcr, Beyond, op. cit., p.80.
l.ocschcr, “The International”, op. cit., p.360.
Hearer, “The Global”, op. cit.. p.l3.
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The new Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees was drafted in such a 
way that a government signing it would in effect agree to undertake all the 
obligations of the original Convention. The High Commissioner was able to 
guarantee ratification by a number of governments, including the United States, who 
had not signed the original Convention. The most important effect of the 1967 
Protocol was that it brought the 1951 Convention on Refugees into line with the 
universal mandate of the Statute of UNHCR.
a. Extended Refugee Definitions:
While the refugee definition contained in the 1951 Convention is important so 
far as the principle of legal responsibility and international commitment to protect 
refugees, increasingly large numbers of displaced people do not fall within the 
boundaries of the Convention’s strict definition. As a result, people who flee from 
insecure circumstances, such as generalized violence like civil war, ethnic conflicts 
and massive human rights violations, but who do not face individualized persecution 
on reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a 
particular social group have not been widely accepted as refugees, although many 
have been provided with humanitarian assistance and treated on an ad hoc basis as de 
facto or non-Convention refugees."'’ In terms of numbers, non-Convention refugees 
fleeing civil wars, ethnic conflicts and generalized violence in the Third World are, in 
fact, a bigger problem for the international community than Convention refugees and 
they are not adequately protected by the existing international norms."'
l.ocschcr, Beyond, op. cit., p.8().
Loescher, Beyond, op. cit., p.6; and Janina W. Dacyl, “Europe Needs a New Protection System 
for ‘Non-Conyention’ Refugees,” International Journal o f Refugee Law, Vol.7, No.4, October 1995, 
np. 579-80.
" l.oeschcr. Beyond, op. cit., p.6.
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In order to provide some protective measures to these new categories of 
refugees, the mandate of the High Commissioner has from time to time, and in a 
rather ad hoc manner, been broadened tlirough a series of resolutions by the United 
Nations General Assembly, the UN Security Council or the Economic and the Social 
Council. Eventually, the so-called “good offices” of UNHCR emerged as an 
operational means in order to legitimize the provision of temporary legal protection 
and material assistance to specially categorized groups, referred to as non- 
Convention refugees. The first occasion in which the General Assembly authorized 
UNHCR to use its good offices in dealing with a refugee problem that was outside its 
mandate was in 1957 when a series of UN resolutions enabled UNHCR to assist 
Chinese refugees in Hong Kong. Over the years, the General Assembly included 
within UNHCR’s sphere of competence large groups of refugees such as those from 
Algeria in Morocco and Tunisia and others who had similarly fled violent struggle for 
national liberation."^
Indeed, these growing trend in the number of refugees fleeing wars and civil 
strife, especially in Africa, starting in the late 1950s, led to the adoption of a 
convention which is generally considered as the most comprehensive and significant 
regional arrangement dealing with refugees. On September 10, 1969, the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted the OAU Convention Governing the 
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. The primary importance of this 
Convention is its expanded definition of the term refugee. African states recognized 
that “well-founded fear of persecution” was not a sufficiently wide criterion to cover 
all the refugee situations in Africa. The second paragraph of Article 1 of the African 
Convention provides that “the term ‘refugee’ shall also apply to eveiy person who.
112 Goodwin-Gill, “Editorial”, op. cit., pp.3-4; and Locsclicr, “the International”, op. cit., p.361.
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owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously 
disturbing public order in either part or whole of his country of origin or nationality, 
is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another 
place outside his country of origin or nationality.” It can be deduced from this 
definition that the OAU Convention was a complementary instrument to the 1951 
Convention.
In the 1980s, the outbreak of civil strife in Central America resulted in 
massive refugee flows consisting of close to a million people, who posed serious 
economic and social problems for the countries in which they sought refuge. In 1984, 
these “host” countries adopted the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees which laid 
down the legal foundations for the treatment of Central American refugees. The 
definition of “refugee” in the Declaration is similar to that of the OAU Convention. It 
includes those “persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or 
freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal 
conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have 
seriously disturbed public order”."'*
The United Nations respects the OAU and Cartagena definitions when 
working in these regions, and some argue that the enlarged definitions have achieved 
some status in customary international law. The UN General Assembly and the 
Secretary-General have, on an ad hoc basis, frequently asked the UNHCR to concern 
itself with groups of people who are not covered by the narrower definition of the 
1951 Convention, including even some groups who have not left their own countries, 
but are internally displaced.*"
“Unman Rights'’, op. cil., p.9. 
" ' ibid., pp. 10-11.
Kathleen Newland, “Ethnic Conflict and Refugees.’’ Survival, Vol.35, No. 1, Spring 1993, p.82.
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Nevertheless, it would be unrealistic to believe that the definition of the term 
refugee as contained in Article 1 of the 1951 Convention could be amended in the 
near future for the purpose of including such additional categories of people. Neither 
the OAU Convention nor the Cartagena Declaration nor any other instrument could 
serve as an example for such an extension. On the contrary, in view of the continuing 
influx of illegal immigrants and of people abusing the right of asylum, national 
policies and practices in the West tend to be more restrictive than ever. 
Administrative authorities in the countries of asylum hold the suspicion that any 
extension of the definition of refugee as defined in the Convention, would encourage 
even more people to emigrate for whatever reason. Thus, for the time being. Western 
states are by no means prepared to accept any proposal to amend the definition of 
refugee as stipulated in the 1951 Convention.*'^
d. 198()s: The Reflection of Superpower Rivalry on the Refugee Problem
The intensification of the Cold War during the 1980s shifted the structure of 
the bipolar conflict. Both of the powers established Third World governments and 
provided them with relatively easy access to weapons. As a result, internal wars with 
external involvement in Indochina, Afghanistan, Central America, the Horn of Africa 
and Southern Africa became protracted and more violent which, in turn, generated 
large flows of refugees."’
Another dimension of the refugee issue during this period was that the 
refugees from these struggles became an important element in the conflicts 
themselves. When fleeing from the territory of the opponent, the refugees would
F.rich Kussbach, “European Challenge: East-West Migration,” International Migration Review, 
Vol.26, No.2, Summer 1992,
Loescher, “ The Inlernalionar, op. cit,, pp.362-26.1.
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represent a victory in terms of propaganda for the other side, who claimed that such 
people were “voting with their feet.”''*
In such an atmosphere of intense Cold War politics, refugee policy issues in 
Western countries, especially in the United States, focussed on those who fled from 
communism, a policy that fit their ideological and strategic interests. Important 
operations and funding focussed on resettling ‘victims’ of communism. The 
additional burdens of resettlement were accepted because the flows were welcome 
evidence of the failure of the communist system. The United States was the leading 
state in the encouragement and resettlement of those who escaped from
communism 119
In a similar way, Germany received all Germans from any communist 
country. Obviously, it was a demonstration that post-war Germany was a legitimate 
and a desirable slate; that it was not any more a “bad” Germany which had produced 
refugees in the past. In that sense, receiving refugees was part of German foreign 
policy.'^"
In 1980, the United States passed the Refugee Act which “perpetuated the 
Cold War mentality that foreign policy considerations should control refugee 
determinations”. The Foreign Operations Act of 1990 and the Immigration Act of 
1990 continued the politization of the American Refugee Law. The Foreign 
Operations Act established that Soviet Jews, Evangelical Christians, Ukrainian 
Catholics and certain Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians would qualify as 
refugees if they could prove a “credible fear” as opposed to the more cautious
Suhrke, “A Crisis”, op. cit., p.223.
Charles B. Keely, “How Nalion-Stalcs Create and Respond to Refugee Flows,” International 
Migration Review, Vol.3(), No.4, Winter 1996, p.l058.
Aristide Zolberg, “Commentary,” Journal o f International Affairs, Vol.47, No.2, Winter 1994,
p.»9.
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standard of “well-founded fear”. In the same manner, the Immigration Act favored 
Polish, Hungarian, Panaman and Nicaraguans, which was a clear bias towards those 
fleeing communist regimes.*^* Indeed, determining who is a refugee turned out to be 
a political decision. This preferential treatment was most obvious in the United 
States’ reluctance to admit applicants from “friendly” countries such as El Salvador 
or Guatemala during the late 1980s, while unconditionally admitting all Nicaraguans 
who sought asylum.
United States’ refugee admission policy towards communist states was guided 
by the belief that refugee flows serve to embarrass another country and discredit their 
political systems. The decision to grant refugee status to citizens of a particular state 
usually implies condemnation of the sending state for persecuting its citizens. On the 
contrary, a decision not to grant refugee status to people from certain nationalities 
often implies that such countries enjoy the support of the potential asylum countiy. 
Thus, whether or not real refugees receive official recognition may, in some 
instances, depend more on the particular asylum country in which they arrive, rather 
than on the strength of their cases. Such foreign policy considerations explain, for 
example, the different treatment by the United States to Salvadorans, Guatemalans 
and Haitians Who had a very low rate of recognition as refugees, and Cubans, 
Indochinese and Nicaraguans who were easily accepted as refugees. For instance, of 
the 711,303 refugees admitted to the USA during the Reagan administration, 96 % 
were from communist countries.
In conclusion, during the Cold War years and especially in the 1980s when 
superpower rivalry reached its climax. Western States granted refugee status to
Colleen V. Tliouez, “New Directions in Refugee Protection,” The Fletcher Forum o f World 
Affairs, Vol.22, No.2, Summer/Fall 1998, p.93.
'  ^Rosemarie Rogers, “The Future of Refugee Flows and Policies,” International Migration Review, 
Vol.26, No.4, Winter 1992, p. 1123; and Thouez, “New”, op. cit., p.93.
4 6
anyone who fled from communist regimes without any question and without close 
investigation into their motives; thus, witliout determining whether or not they met 
the requirement of the 1951 Convention. The fact that they were seeking asylum in 
the West, whatever their motives, was generally viewed as a sufficient basis for 
granting them refugee status. If the restrictive interpretation of the definition of 
refligee currently being applied by the Western states had been implemented then, it is 
questionable how many would have been recognized as “genuine refugees” and how 
many might have been labelled as economic migrants.’^ ’ In fact, the anti-communist 
refugee policies of the West during this period encouraged refugee flows, and in this 
way, they had a role in the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and in the 
Eastern European states, which was the desired end. However, there is no doubt that 
they distorted the refugee system in the period'^^’ and created distmst for its purposes.
Rogers, “The Future”, op.cit., pp. 1123-1124; and Loescher, Beyond, op. cit., p.21.
' Myron Weiner, “Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods - An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee 
Flows,” International Security, Vol.21, No.l, Summer 1996, p.35; and Loescher, Beyond, op. cit.,
p.21.
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CHAPTER II
REFUGEE PROBLEM IN THE POST-COLD WAR
2. 1. THE NATURE OF THE REFUGEE PROBLEM
The end of the Cold War, it was widely expected, would lead to a general 
reduction of armed conflicts that was fuelled by superpower rivalry. First of all, it was 
assumed that with the disappearance of the East-West ideological tension,, the 
underlying reason for such wars would also vanish. Secondly, it was believed that the 
reduction of superpower support for states and opposition groups in developing 
countries would bring many conflicts to an end, or at least to diminish in intensity. 
Thirdly, it was expected by some that a ‘peace dividend’ stemming from global 
disarmament might lead to higher flows of development assistance to the poorer 
countries, enabling them to address their social and economic problems.* Indeed, the 
end of the Cold War did provide valuable opportunities to resolve some of the long­
standing conflicts and also facilitated the return of refugees. It meant a reduction of 
the distorting external influences and their disengagement from some of the major 
internal and regional conflicts, a fact that in the past had intensified conflict and 
produced huge refugee flows.^ 'fhis was the case in Southeast Asia where for over a 
decade, the displaced Indochinese had represented one of the world’s most 
intractable and massive refugee problems. Likewise, throughout Central America, 
refugees had returned or were in the process of returning after revolutionary struggle, 
civil war or repression in much of the region. In South America, the refugee
' UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees: A Humanitarian Agenda. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997, pp.22-23.
 ^Astri Suhrke, “A Crisis Diminished: Refugees in tlie Developing World,” Inlernational Journal, 
Vol.48, No,2, Spring 1993,p.232.
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population from repressive military regimes of the 1970s was rapidly diminishing. In 
Afghanistan, Ethiopia and in Mozambique, refugees were returning home.^
At the same time, however, the end of the Cold War and the political changes 
in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union unleashed and intensified internal 
conflicts -particularly ethnic ones- on a scale rarely seen before. Since 1991, the 
international community has been confronted with numerous emergencies in Iraq, 
Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda, each of which has produced more than 
one million refugees.'* At the same time, violence in Central Asia and the Caucasus 
created smaller but difficult refugee problems. Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of 
Haitians were obliged to leave their country.’ Indeed, very recently, with the break­
out of the Kosova crisis, more than 800,000 refugees were produced who tripd to 
find refuge in Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Turkey and to a lesser degree in 
various European countries and the USA.
During the Cold War years, virtually any strong local ruler could obtain 
assistance from one or the other superpower and many built a repressive regime 
based on foreign weapons and ethnic favoritism. As the Cold War ended and the 
superpowers departed, the arms that they had supplied previously to these regimes or 
opposition movements provided the weaponry for the ethnic and tribal wars that 
erupted in the post-Cold War era.** This was the disintegrative dynamic that had been 
witnessed both in Somalia and Liberia, two countries which had been amongst the 
largest recipients of US military aid in sub-Saharan Africa during the 1980s.’ 
Moreover, the end of the Cold War, it is argued, removed some of the constraints
’ ibid., p.215.
' Sadako Ogata, “Mixed Migration: Strategy for Refugees and Economic Migrants,” Harvard 
Internaiional Review, Vol.l7, No.2 Spring 1995, p.31.
 ^ Suhrke, “A Crisis”, op. cit,, p.216.
Roberta Cohen and F.M. Deng, “Exodus Within Borders,” Foreign AJfairs, Vol.77, No.4, July- 
August 1998, p. 13.
Suhike, “A Crisis”, op. c it , p.228; and CohcuADcng, “Exodus", op. cit., p. 13.
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that the two major powers often placed upon other states. While authoritarian rulers 
could no longer depend upon one or the other of the superpowers to supply them 
with arms, finances or protection, they also no longer needed to be concerned that 
one of the powers would intervene upon seeing its national interests at risk. In the 
post-Cold War period, authoritarian governments can be said to be freer to repress 
their opponents, and minorities are freer to launch secessionist movements. 
Authoritarian regimes can engage in repression with little concern that there will be 
external sanctions.” Today, a good number of states, primarily but not exclusively in 
Africa, Asia and the Middle East, remain under authoritarian forms of government. In 
many instances, moreover, such states have come under relatively little pressure to 
reform, usually because the world’s more prosperous countries are more concerned 
with maintaining opportunities lor trade and investment than with pressuring 
authoritarian regimes to improve democracy and human rights.^
The break-up of the Soviet bloc has also led to internal conflicts and massive 
flights similar to the crumbling of the Ottoman and Habsburg empires at the end of 
the First World War and the colonial empires at the end of the Second World War. In 
fact, the disintegration of empires has always been accompanied by the emergence of 
new ethnic identities, ethnic conflicts within states, and movements for autonomy and 
self-determination.*'^ One reason for this phenomenon is that empires are often 
governed by creating internal boundaries to divide ethnic communities. Most 
successor states, therefore, are ethnically mixed, with ethnic groups divided by an 
international border, a condition which gives rise to secessionist and irredentist
* Myron Weiner, “Bad Neighbors, Bad Neigliborhoods - An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee 
Flows,” Inlernatioiml Security, Vol.21, No.l, Summer 1996, p.33.
’ UNHCR, The State, op, cit., p.l7,
Myron Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis - Challenge to States and to Human Rights. New 
York; HarperCollins College Publishers, 1995, pp.6-7.
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claims. A second reason is that empires often provide privileges to selected ethnic 
communities to create loyalties in the military, in the bureaucracy, and among trading 
communities. A legacy for the successor states is often animosity between the ethnic 
majority from which the new rulers are drawn and the former privileged classes who 
belong to an ethnic minority. Successor states often have weak institutions, 
economies that are in ruins, unemployed young men, and an ideological void readily 
filled by ethno-nationalist appeals." Indeed, the process of creating a supranational 
identity and absorbing non-members into a dominant group includes the possibility of 
conflict among groups, which may be violent since it requires the destruction or 
suppression of national identities of at least some citizens and each may lead to 
resistance. When violence erupts, there is a high possibility that people will flee 
because they are on the wrong side, be it political, ethnic or religious.*^ As an evident 
example for this argument, three regions, which had been relatively stable until the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union can be pointed out, which are now areas where 
conflict and refugee flows prevail: the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.
After the Cold War, the formation of new boundaries in these regions with 
the collapse of the federal structures resulted in a change in ethnic balance and led to 
an environment prone to tension, conflict and refugee generation. The most dramatic 
example of this has been witnessed in the former Yugoslavia with the Bosnian-Croat 
and Serb confrontations, and recently the Kosova crisis, as well as the severe crises in 
the ex-Soviet countries, especially in the Caucasus region such as the Armenian- 
Azerbaijan conflict."
" Weiner, “Bad Neighbors”, op. cit., p.29.
Charles B. Keely, “How Nation-States Create and Respond to Refugee Flows,” International 
Migration Review, Vol.30, No.4, Winter 1996, p. 1054.
İhsan D. Dağı, “İnsan Hakları, Sığınmacılar Sorunu ve Uluslararası Güvenlik,” Yeni Türkiye, C.4, 
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Elsewhere, vast inequalities in wealth, land ownership, and power have been 
at the root of conflict. In Rwanda and Burundi, high population density and limited 
fertile land worsened the tensions between Hutus and Tutsis. In other cases, struggles 
between governments and minorities have produced mass displacement.*'’
Furthermore, the rise of religious fundamentalism in today’s world has 
brought along the potential for tension and clashes at the national level. For instance, 
the pressure on the different religious groups and on the Muslims caused by the 
Hindu radicalism has established a reason for asylum. Likewise, the radical Islamic 
movement which has gained power in Sudan has caused opposition, even clashes 
with the Christians living in the southern parts and has caused the flow of refugees to 
the neighboring countries. In the recent years, the clashes between the radical Islamic 
movements and government forces and the pressure that this has caused upon the 
civilian population, have destroyed the state of security within countries, and thus 
strengthened the demand for asylum.’’
In conclusion, it would not be erroneous to suggest that the 1990s have 
represented a new era for refugees. In a time of rising nationalism and the consequent 
violent fragmentation of existing states and formation of new national entities, 
conflicts can be even more destabilizing and destructive than was during the old East- 
West division. At present, the most common form of warfare in the developing world 
and Eastern European is internal conflict”*, fuelled by state disintegration, the 
increasing availability of modern weaponry, sharp socio-economic inequalities and
' ’ Coltcn and Deng, “F-xodns”, op. cit., p.I3.
Dağı, “İnsan”, op. cit., p.l255.
For an elaboration of the causes of refugee flows, please refer to Weiner, “Bad Neighbors and Bad 
Neighborhoods - An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Flows,” IiUermtional Security, Vol.21, 
No.l, Summer 1996, pp.9-29; Suhrke, Zolbcrg &. Aguayo, Escape from Violence - Conflict and the 
Refugee Crisis in the Developing World. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989; and Loescher, 
Beyond Charity: International Cooperation arid the Global Refugee Crisis, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993. pp. 13-1.S, 18-20.
.S2
human rights abuses. It should also be noted that one unanticipated consequence of 
the demise of superpower interests in the Third World is that conflicts in these 
regions have become harder to mediate, and national resistance forces have attained 
the potential to create internal anarchy and to disrupt interstate relations.*’
2. 2. THE SHIFT OF FOCUS TO THE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AND TO
ROOT CAUSES OF REFUGEE FLOWS
The world’s response to the problem of forced displacement -and UNHCR’s 
role in relation to that problem- has changed significantly during the past decade. 
Until the mid to late 1980s, the international community was primarily concerned 
with cross-border refugee movements, and devoted most of its efforts to providing 
refugee populations with protection and assistance in the countries of asylum to 
which they had fled. During this period, there was a broad international consensus 
that UNHCR could only respect its humanitarian and non-political status by confining 
its activities to the countries of asylum, and by responding to refugee movements 
after they had taken place. Any effort to address the problems of human insecurity 
and displacement within countries of origin, it was agreed, would have involved the 
organization in activities which fell beyond the scope of its mandate. However, in 
recent years, a number of factors have combined to bring about a fundamental 
reassessment of this traditional approach to the refugee problem.**
First of all, there emerged increasing concern of host and donor countries 
about the financial and other costs of providing refugees with indefinite protection 
and assistance, and a growing unwillingness to admit large numbers of displaced
”  Gill Loescher, Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis. New 
York: Oxford Uniyersity Press, 1993, p.91.
UNHCR, The State, op. cit., pp.39-40.
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people. For instance, the director of the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) stated that in 1994-95, 28 crises (crises caused by the combination of civil 
and political conflicts and natural disasters) required the international community to 
spend $4 billion in humanitarian assistance and $5 billion in peacekeeping. It was 
argued that it does not make sense for the international community to continue to 
pour resources into emergency relief and post-crisis rehabilitation while it neglects 
basic causes that produce terrible upheavals and mass displacements. Secondly, 
there was a grbwing awareness that refugee movements can constitute a serious 
threat to the integrity, economic, political, social and cultural security and stability of 
nations which may then have its repercussions at the regional and international levels.
Combined with the fact that the military and strategic value of refugee 
populations in the post-Cold War period has changed, an alternative strategy was 
devised to attempt to influence countries whose internal conditions have led people to 
flee, and to enable those who have fled to return home. It was believed that if 
governments and international institutions could successfully prevent or resolve 
conflicts that create massive refugee flows, then the humanitarian principles that 
underlie the international regime for the protection of refugees -a regime that works 
best when the number in need of protection is small- could be more easily sustained.^”
In fact, one of the reasons behind the fact that the issue of human rights has 
become an essential issue in the foreign policy objectivés of the European Union and 
other Western countries is the search for a solution to the refugee crises. It is 
anticipated that in a world dominated by political regimes which respect human and
”  Alan Do\\ly and Gill Loeschcr, “Refugee Flow,s as Grounds for International Action,” 
Inlernntionnl Security, Vol.21, No. 1, Summer 1996, p.44.
20 Weiner, “Bad Neighbors ’, op. cit., pp.5-6.
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minority rights, the number of asylum-seekers waiting at the doorsteps of Western 
countries should decline.^*
As a result of these and other developments, it has been proposed that the 
traditional right to asylum, as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and other international instruments, should be joined by another: the “right to 
stay” in one’s own country and community, in conditions of physical, material, legal 
and psychological security. While this right has not been formalized in international 
law, the UN Human Rights Commission has affirmed it.^ ^
Today, the UN is willing to scrutinize the human rights records of a wide 
range of countries, and there is in general a greater readiness to question a country’s 
right to do as it will with its citizens - a readiness to put limits on sovereignty. Strong 
actions have been and may be undertaken to avert new forced migrations or to 
protect and assist populations that were displaced within their home countries. This 
new policy stance represents an important change: from a reactive one, when the 
international community was essentially waiting until refugees reached an asylum 
country (where they would then be protected and assisted), or an inactive one (with 
respect to many of the internally displaced), to a more proactive stance in which the 
focus is quite explicitly on the countries of origin.^^
In fact, a debate on “root causes” of refugee flows was launched in the United 
Nations system back in 1980. The UN Commission on Human Rights commissioned 
a study of “human rights and mass exoduses”. The report was prepared by Sadruddin 
Aga Khan, the former High Commissioner for Refugees, and was presented at the 
end of 1981. It included a number of specific proposals for dealing with situations
D<ığı, “İnsan”, op. cit., p.l258. 
UNHCR, The State, op. cit., p.40.
23 Rosemary Rogers, “The Future of Refugee Flows and Policies,” International Migration Review, 
VoUCy, No.4, Winter 1992, p .l l l3
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that are prone to generating refugees, such as setting up an early-warning system to 
identify potential conflict areas, and appointing a special representative and observer 
groups who could intervene in such cases. '^'
In another move led by the former West Germany, the General Assembly in 
1982 established a Group of Governmental Experts on International Cooperation to 
Avert New Flows of Refugees (the “New Flows” group). Jts mandate was to examine 
the causes of refugee flows and to suggest ways of handling them. The final report of 
this group, submitted in 1986, recognized the “great political, economic and social 
burdens of massive flows of refugees upon the international community as a whole, 
with dire effects on the developing countries, particularly those with limited resources 
of their own.” Accordingly, it recommended intervention by the international 
community through the good offices of the Secretary-General, refugee-prevention 
actions by appropriate UN bodies (including the Security Council), and better use of 
aid programs to deter massive displacements. The adoption of the final report by the 
General Assembly marked, in the words of one UNHCR official, an “emerging 
consensus on the legitimacy of taking action in the country of origin”, so that people 
would not have to flee.^’
However, the involvement with “root causes” of refugee flows and the 
turning attention towards the country of origin accelerated during the post-Cold War 
era due to the developments that have been mentioned in the above section. It was 
during this era that new key words have emerged in the international community like 
“root causes”, “safety zones”, “safe havens”, “prevention”, “in-country protection”, 
“humanitarian assistance”, “human rights” which are all more polite synonyms for 
various types of interventions in the internal affairs of states. “The language of
24 Dowty and Loescher, “Refugee”, op. cit., pp.52-53. 
ibid.
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sovereignty has increasingly been replaced with notions of international solidarity and 
the language of intervention.”^^
There is a variety of instruments and alternative strategies for addressing the 
conditions within countries that actually or potentially generate large-scale refugee 
flows. These include early warning, preventive diplomacy and ensuring respect for 
human rights. UNHCR itself has started to develop strategies and approaches 
intended to address the root causes of refugee flows before they start and to reduce 
or contain population movements which have already begun.
The creation of early-warning mechanisms for situations likely to generate 
refugee flows -especially on violation of human rights- within countries is one of the 
strategies.^* Early warning modelling is a method of forecasting humanitarian crises 
before their onset by identifying the underlying causes of past refugee flows. The 
rationale of an early warning system is that identification will allow preventive 
measures to be taken to reduce the likelihood of refugee flight. Thus, in order to 
anticipate, assist and prevent refuge flows, those causes and triggering events of flight 
have to be identified and monitored. Obviously, precise information on human rights 
violations can provide a basis for building an early warning system. Also, by 
monitoring human rights within countries, the international community may be able 
to put pressure on countries that violate human rights.
Early warning of potential reftigee flows has received wide attention from 
international agencies, NGOs, and academicians. The Deputy Secretary General for 
Humanitarian Affairs has the mandate to develop early warning capacity. NGOs on
Weiner, The Global, op. cit., p. 164.
Gil Loescher, “The International Refugee Regime: Stretched to the Limit?,” Journal o f  
International Affairs, Vol.47, No.2, Winter 1994, pp.365-66.
Weiner, The Global, op. cit., p. 165.
Clair Apocada, “Human Rights Abuses: Precursor to Refugee Flight?,” Journal o f Refugee 
Studies, V o l.ll, No.l, 1998, p.81.
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the ground, multilateral agency otficials, diplomats, intelligence agents and journalists 
all provide early warning signals. While most people may be surprised by a refugee 
flow, professionals who monitor such things are hardly ever surprised. The scope and 
speed of events, however, cannot always be accurately anticipated. Efforts to provide 
early warning need refining to provide not just the knowledge that something is about 
to happen, but also information on the timing, size and characteristics of unfolding
events.^”
However, it should be noted that early warning is not the same as a political 
decision to react. The refligee flows from Somalia were long predicted. The fact that 
civil war would break out in Bosnia unless it was addressed was clear to many 
interested and involved parties in the region. It was not the lack of information that 
prevented action as events unfolded. The international community’s recent problems 
with refligee flows were not due primarily to lack of information. Lack of political 
consensus on what to do, unwillingness to commit resources and military personnel, 
and the cost of gaining domestic political support generally explain the lack of or 
delay of preemptive action in Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia and elsewhere - not the 
absence of advanced warning. It should be noted that early warning is not a substitute 
for policy about what to do in the face of refugee flows. The commitment to cany 
out that policy, and the leadership to earn domestic support for foreign policy 
initiatives is also what is needed.^*
Humanitarian assistance to internally displaced populations disturbed by 
human or natural disasters and the establishment of “safety zones” within the 
countries of internally displaced persons or for communities threatened by violence
Keely, “How”, op. cit., p.l062. 
ibid.
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32under international protection also pose as prevention methods for refugee flows. 
The objective of such efforts is to enable such people to remain in safety in their 
home countries and prevent these internally displaced populations from becoming 
international refugees.
These strategies mentioned above point out to the supportive role that the 
international community could play in the prevention of further refiigee flows, fhere 
are also the deterrent methods by which countries that generate refugee flows are 
threatened to be denied development assistance and foreign investment, and to be 
restricted on travel and trade so that states that violate the human rights of its citizens 
or become security threats to their neighbors are pressurized.^^ For instance, the 
prospect of inclusion in the European Union (EU) and NATO or of free trade 
agreements with the EU are incentives to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union to meet a specific set of economic and political 
conditions, including the liberalization of their economies, respect for individual 
rights and fair treatment for minorities.
However, these deterrent policies to effect political change are not always 
implemented to the full extent, partly because there are costs for domestic exporters, 
investors and consumers, partly because they are difficult to enforce, and partly 
because their ultimate effects are not always certain. Indeed, the US and European 
trade embargo on Serbia, the US trade embargo on Cuba, and restrictions on trade 
with Iraq and Iran have had little impact on the human rights policies of these 
countries. However, in certain cases, such embargoes have turned out to be effective
Weiner, The Global, op. cit., p.l65.
Myron Weiner and Rainer Munz, “Migrants, Refugees and Foreign Policy: Prevention and 
Intervention Strategies”, Third World Quarterly, Vol.18, No.l, March 1997, p.31. 
ibid., p.46.
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in the long run ”  Finally, at the extreme, there is the strategy of military intervention 
into a country’s internal affairs, a topic which will be elaborated in the following 
chapter.
In this context, it should be noted that prevention is not easy because it is a 
political fiinction. It touches upon issues of sovereignty, whether in the context of 
early warning, preventive diplomacy or conflict resolution. UNHCR has to look to 
the Security Council and other political bodies to act on early warning signals and 
initiate to prevent or resolve emerging conflicts.^*’
In conclusion, there is truth in saying that the international community has 
currently placed an increasing stress on human rights in general, and the “right to 
stay” in particular to eliminate the root causes of refugee flows in some cases. 
However, it should not go without noting that there is concern that the new focus on 
the country of origin may be at the expense of refugee protection. It is argued that the 
emphasis on the right to stay should not serve to undermine a person’s “right to 
leave”. I n  other words, the emphasis on prevention and return as well as on the 
obligations of the country of origin must not detract in any way from or be allowed to 
undermine the responsibility of the receiving country and the fundamental importance 
of principles for the protection of refugees, and the institution of asylum must be 
safeguarded.^*
In fact, the new “right to remain” has received harsh criticism from certain 
scholars, It is argued that this so-called new right is meaningless as a “new” right 
because if already-recognized rights, like freedom from cruel or inhuman treatment
ibid.,p.31.
Sadako Ogata, “Growing Emphasis Being Placed on Provision of Humanitarian Assistance”, UN 
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were in fact respected, the “right to remain” would be redundant. It is also stated that 
if there is the political willingness to attack not only the symptoms of human rights 
violations -which is displacement- but rather the real root causes, the human rights 
mechanism of the UN and regional agencies should be empowered and the rights 
which have already been articulated should be made present in people’s lives.
As an important cornerstone in the debate about the shifting attention to 
“countries of origin”, it is further argued that both material assistance and human 
rights reporting as activities in countries of origin can be better accomplished by 
organizations other than UNUCR. In order to maintain its mandate, UNHCR should 
consider refocussing on countries of asylum rather than countries of origin. The 
quality of asylum differs greatly from state to state, and more effort must be directed 
to ensuring uniform respect for human rights standards in countries of asylum. 'I'he 
conditions of refugees in countries of asylum should be the primary concern of 
UNHCR. Countries of origin must continue to receive economic development, 
humanitarian, technical and political assistance to eliminate the sources of refugee 
generation. But organizations other than the UNHCR, organizations with mandates 
expressly incorporating such activities, are better able to manage this. For instance, 
within the UN system, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP and WHO, and also NGOs undertake 
and sometimes duplicate humanitarian activities for which UNHCR also claims 
responsibility. It is argued that by extracting itself from countries of origin, UNHCR 
will satisfy the “non-political” and “humanitarian” requirements in its Statute and 
avoid issues of political nature.''*’
James C. Hathaway, “New Directions to Avoid Hard Problems: The Distortion of the Palliative 
Role of Refugee Protection,” Journal o f Refugee Studies, Vol.8, No.3, 1995, p.294.
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2. 3. REFUGEE PROBLEM POSING A THREAT TO SECURITY AND
STABILITY
With the end of the Cold War, the concept of ‘security’ has taken on an 
entirely new dimension. Traditionally, security has been defined in terms of power 
relations between states, specifically in terms of preserving the territorial integrity of 
the state or the physical safety and continuity of a particular government in the face 
of external and internal military threats. In the post-Cold War era, a new approach to 
national security sees the concept in terms of three dimensions. The ‘strategic’ 
dimension adheres to the traditional view of security, i.e. the ability of the state to 
defend itself militarily against external aggression. The ‘regime’ dimension is the 
capacity of the government to protect itself from internal threats arising from 
domestic disorder and conflict. The ‘structural’ dimension addresses the balance 
between a state’s population and its resource capacities such as food, water, living 
space. This balance is upset when population demands on resources become too great 
and the government is unable to manage or contain them. In fact, a refligee influx 
potentially threatens all three security dimensions of host countries, either by creating 
new security threats or by aggravating existing ones.'"
In today’s world, war, persecution, and the consequent population flows are 
not just the refugees’ problems; they are also perceived to be a major problem by 
practically every state and community in the world. Because people are supposed to 
be under the protection and normally within the boundaries of their own state, any 
large, uncontrolled movement of people beyond their borders threatens international 
stability. On the one hand, it is thought that instability and radical changes generate
Karen Jacobsen, “Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments to Mass Refugee 
Influxes,” International Migration Review, Vol.30, No.3, Fail 1996, pp.671-72; and Loescher, 
Beyond, op. cit., pp.24-25.
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refligee flows, on the other hand, thé problem of refugees breeds further instability
42and security concerns.
The hopes of millions of refugees for freedom from violence and repression 
are matched by the fears of many governments and their citizens that a mass influx of 
refligees will endanger social and economic security -particularly in countries already 
suffering from economic underdevelopment-, upset a precarious ethnic balance, 
weaken the national identity and destabilize the political system.They fear that they 
are now being invaded not by armies and tanks but by refugees and migrants who 
speak other languages, worship other gods, belong to other cultures, and whom they 
fear, will take their jobs, occupy their land, be a burden on the welfare system, 
threaten their way of life, their environment and even their political system.'*“' fhal is 
why, in recent years, refugee and migration issues, once solely the concern of 
ministries of labor and immigration, have become recognized as affecting a country’s 
security and stability and for this reason have engaged the attention of heads of states, 
cabinets, and key ministries in defence, internal security, and external relations. I'he 
most dramatic example of international migration affecting the security of a state was 
the exodus of East Germans to Austria through Czechoslovakia and Hungary in July 
and August 1989. The flow precipitated the decision of the German Democratic 
Republic to open its Western borders, which in turn resulted in a massive migration 
westward, the subsequent fall of the East German government, and the absorption of 
the German Democratic Republic by the Federal Republic of Germany. It was flight, 
not invasion, that ultimately destroyed the East German state.“*^
Keely, “How”, op. cit., p. 1057; and Dağı, “İnsan”, op. cit., p. 1250.
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Similarly, the profound impact of refugee movements on regional and 
international politics and security has been displayed during the Great Lakes crisis of 
1993-1997 when the cross-border movement of refugees between Eastern Zaire and 
Rwanda -including soldiers and militia posing as refugees- contributed to a major 
regional crisis, the overthrow of a government and the emergence of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. As a result, the politics of Central Africa have been 
transformed.'*^
Four broad categories of situations can be identified in which refugees may be 
perceived as a threat to the country that produces them, to the country that receives 
them, or to the relations between sending and receiving countries:
a. Refugees as Opponents ofthe Home Regime
An international conflict arises when a country classifies individuals as 
refugees with a well-founded fear of persecution, thereby accusing and condemning 
their country of origin for engaging in persecution. Hence, the host country’s 
decision to grant refugee status often creates an adversary relationship with the 
country that produces the refugees. The receiving country may have no such intent, 
but even where its motives are humanitarian, the mere granting of asylum can be 
sufficient to create an antagonistic relationship.'*^
Moreover, a refugee-receiving country may actively support the refugees in 
their struggle to change the regime of their country of origin. For instance, the United 
States armed Cuban refugees in an effort to overthrow the Castro regime at the Bay 
of Pigs, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, China and the United States armed Afghan refugees
Jeremy Ginifer, “Protecting Displaced Persons Through Disarmament,” Survival, Vol.40, N0.2, 
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in order to force Soviet troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, Palestinian refugees 
received Arab support against Israelis. The examples are numerous. Refligee- 
producing countries may thus have good reason for perceiving threat due to an 
alliance between the adversary countries and the refugees.'**
Another dimension of this situation is that refugees sometimes actively lobby 
in the host countries in order to compel those governments to adopt specific foreign 
policies towards their home countries. For instance, in the United States, the presence 
of nearly one million Cuban refugees, most of whom opposing the Castro regime, has 
clearly made the normalization of the US-Cuban relations more difficult.In such 
cases, the home county may hold the host country responsible for their activities. 
Thus, struggles that might otherwise take place only within a country become 
internationalized if the country has a significant overseas population.’“
b. Refugees as a Political Risk to the Host Country
Governments are often concerned that refugees to whom they give protection 
may turn against them if they are unwilling to assist the reftigees in their opposition to 
the government of their country of origin. The receiving country takes the risk that 
refugees will attempt to direct the host country’s policies towards the sending 
country. For instance, the support of Iraqi invaders by Palestinians in Kuwait was an 
asset to Iraq since some of the 400,000 Palestinians in Kuwait held important 
positions in the Kuwaiti administration. The decision after the war by the Kuwaiti
''* ibid., pp.23-24.
Loescher, Bevond. op. cit., p.26.
50 Weiner, “A Security Perspective”, op. cit., pp.23-24.
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government to expel Palestinians reflected its view that Palestinians had become a 
security threat.^*
Likewise, there have been situations that refugees have launched terrorist 
attacks within their host country, smuggled arms, allied with the domestic opposition 
against host governments’ policies, participated in drug traffic, and in other ways 
eroded governments’ willingness to admit refugees. For instance, Palestinians, Sikhs, 
Croats, Kurds, Armenians, Sri Lankan Tamils, and Northern Irish, among others, 
have been regarded with suspicion by intelligence and police authorities of other 
countries and their requests for asylum have been scrutinized not only for whether 
they have a well-founded fear of persecution, but for whether their presence might 
constitute a threat to the host country. Such fears, it should be noted, are sometimes 
exaggerated, and governments have often gone to extreme lengths to protect 
themselves against such threats, but these fears are nonetheless not always without 
foundation, especially in the context of an increase in international terrorism.*^
c. Refugees perceived as a Threat to Cultural Identity
Refugee movements often threaten inter-communal harmony and undermine 
major societal values by changing the ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic 
composition of host populations. In countries with racial, ethnic, religious or other 
splits -like in most countries- a refugee influx can place a great strain on the system. 
Mass influxes can endanger social and economic stability, particularly in countries 
where ethnic rivalries may be strong, where the central government is weak and 
consensus on the legitimacy of the political system is lacking, and where essential
' Myron Weiner, Security, Stability and International Migration,” International Security, Vol. 17, 
No.3, Winter 1992/93, p. 109.
Weiner, “A Security Perspective”, op. cit., p.24.
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resources are limited. A large influx with ties to a particular domestic group can upset 
the internal balance and even threaten the existing system.”
Refugees typically seek to preserve their own cultural heritage and national 
identity in line with their dream of an eventual return to their country of origin, thus 
complicating their integration into the host society. This attitude in turn reinforces 
xenophobic and racist feelings among some segments of the host population.”  Yet, 
with the rise of xenophobic sentiments in public, many governments fear the 
establishment of anti-migrant or anti-refugee political parties that could threaten the 
regime. Under such circumstances, governments themselves may pursue anti­
migration policies in apprehension of public reactions.*’
d. Refugees perceived as a Social or Economic Burden
Societies may react to refugees because of the economic costs they impose or 
because of their expected social behavior such as criminality, welfare dependency, or 
delinquency. Societies may be concerned because the people entering are so 
numerous and so poor that they create a substantial economic burden by straining 
housing, education, and transportation facilities. In advanced industrial societies, 
services provided by the welfare state to refugees may generate local resentment. In 
less developed countries, refugees may illegally occupy private or government lands, 
they may use firewood, consume water, produce waste and in other ways come to be 
regarded as an ecological threat.*  ^Moreover, it has been the case that in parts of Asia 
and the Middle East, an influx of refugees has been accompanied by a vast increase in
Dowty and Loescher, “Refugee”, op. eit., p.48. 
ibid.
”  Weiner, “Security, Stability”, op. cit., p. 114. 
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the flow of arms and drugs, which contributed to domestic instability and to the rise 
in crime and violence in the host countries.
There is no doubt that in today’s world, the existence of about 50 million 
people who are displaced either within their own country or in other countries does 
not only constitute a humanitarian tragedy, but also threatens national, regional and 
international stability and security. Therefore, sensitivity shown to violations of 
human rights is not just a moral and a political concern, but a necessity in the search
58for peace and security.
indeed, the states and international organizations who have observed the 
global effects of human rights violations have started to put the issue of reftigees on 
their agenda. The United Nations, the Security Council, The European Union and 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have started to take 
increased interest in matters of democracy, human rights, minority rights. In the 
same line, how countries treat their own populations -once regarded primarily as an 
internal affair- has become an issue of international relations not simply because 
human rights issue is now a global concern, but because governments that violate the 
human rights of its citizens, persecute their minorities or are unable to halt a civil 
conflict create refugee burdens for others which in turn disrupts stability and
security.60
2. 4. POLICY RESPONSES OF REFUGEE-RECEIVING STATES
The international framework for dealing with refugees was partly accepted by 
Western powers only in so far as it served, or did not run counter to their geopolitical
”  Loescher, Bevond. op. cit., pp.24-25. 
Dağı, “İnsan”, op. cit., p.l251. 
ibid., p. 1252.
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interests. Thus, an increase in the number of refugees who were not automatically a 
product of the Cold War was not so welcomed in the post-Cold War era.^‘ I'he end 
of the Cold war, the breakdown of communism, and the ongoing transition of 
Eastern Europe nations from planned to market economies and from authoritarian 
rule to liberal democracy, implied that refugees from Eastern Europe had ceased to 
constitute a foreign policy asset for the West. This change in the role of refugee issues 
in the West-East relations, in fact, seriously decreased the willingness of host nations 
in the West to admit asylum seekers.^^
Moreover, in the bipolar world of the Cold War, states were often interested 
in maintaining a close alliance with one or other of the superpowers than with 
neighboring and nearby states. When the Cold War came to an end, and there were 
no longer two superpowers competing for the support of other states, developing 
countries have shown a much greater interest in establishing a good working and 
trading relationship with countries in the same region. In this new political context, 
refugees tend to be a negative rather than a positive value. Even if the granting of 
asylum is supposed to be a humanitarian act, there is no doubt that it can act as an 
irritating element between countries of origin and countries of asylum^  ^ as has been 
explained in the previous section.
In such a context, it is not surprising that contemporary Western refligee 
policies are increasingly perceived as part of Realpolitik, rather than as ‘pure’ 
humanitarian issues. Host states fear losing control of their national borders and of 
the ‘right of entry’. Mass refugee flows are thus perceived as a challenge to the
Alex CunlifFe, “The Refugee Crises; A Study of the United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees,” Political Studies, Vol.43, No.2, June 1995, p.285.
“  Janina W. Dacyl, “Europe Needs a New Protection System for ‘Non-Convention’ Refiigecs,” 
InternatiomlJournal o f Refugee Law, Vol.7, No.4, October 1995, p.587.
“  UNHCR, The State, op. cit., p.77.63
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concept of state sovereignty, and hence as a threat to the modern nation-sale system. 
These have also been perceived as a challenge to host states’ vital national interests, 
defined in terms of national identity, economic balance, or even domestic political 
stability. Altogether, this implies that refugee issues are no longer regarded as merely 
humanitarian, ‘low’ politics issues, but instead have increasingly been incorporated 
into the agendas o f ‘high’ politics.^“'
Although only a small fraction of today’s refugees have sought asylum in the 
Western world, the official reaction to these “irregular movements”, as they are 
termed, has been to label them as “fortune seekers”, or “economic migrants”, 
undeserving protection under the 1951 Convention. Governments of these countries 
have introduced increasingly restrictive policies at their borders and developed 
mechanisms in order to prevent them from arriving in the first place.
Accordingly, the world’s richest and most powerful states have taken a lead in 
eroding the right of asylum and undermining the principles of refugee protection. 
When the very countries responsible for establishing the international refugee regime 
begin to challenge its legal and ethical foundations, then it is hardly surprising that 
other states, especially those with far more pressing economic problems and much 
larger refugee populations, have decided to follow in the same line. Increasingly, 
when low-income countries close their borders to refugees, they tend to justify their 
actions by referring to the precedents which have already been set by the more 
affluent states. The world’s poorer countries feel that they are expected to bear too 
great a responsibility for the world’s refugees and that they are required to observe 
standards which the industrialized states themselves no longer attempt to respect.
Dacyl, “Europe”, op. cil., pp.584-85.
B.E. Harrell-Bond, “The Protection of Refugees in the ‘LeastDeveloped’ States.” in Tlie Liviim 
law of Nations by G. Alfredsson and P.Macalister-Smith (eds.), Arlington: N.P. Engel, 1996, p.48. 
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During the recent years, the West has been building barriers and adopting 
deterrent measures to curb new arrivals. The result of such measures is that, besides 
being difficult to obtain asylum, it is now becoming increasingly difficult even to 
reach a point at which application can be made.^’
There are several categories of responses that the West has adopted in order 
to deal with the refugee problem which has reached to a crisis level in the post-Cold 
War world:
a. Introduction of Deterrent Policies
In an attempt to limit the number of asylum seekers at its source, the 
governments of the industrialized states have extended visa requirements to the 
nationals of many countries that produce -or which threaten to produce- significant 
numbers of asylum seekers and irregular migrants. Sanctions, usually in the form of 
fines, have also been imposed upon airlines and shipping companies responsible for
ft
the arrival of passengers who lack the necessary documents. At the same time, 
asylum seekers leaving their countries by boat (Cubans, Haitians and Albanians being 
the most prominent examples) have been interdicted at sea and were returned to their 
country of origin, or held on another territory until their status was determined. In 
some cases, new arrivals have been prevented from disembarking and have been sent 
straight back to their own or another country. Certain states have established 
detention centers at international airports. More commonly, governments have 
introduced accelerated asylum procedures with limited or even non-existent right of 
appeal, intended to facilitate the speedy removal of people who are deemed to have 
‘fraudulent’ or ‘manifestly unfounded’ claims to refugee status.^*
Loescher, Bevond. op. cit., p.97,
“  UNHCR, The State, op. cit., p.l91.
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Within the European Union, a number of agreements have been reached at 
the intergovernmental level that aim to restrict future entry of asylum-seekers and 
refugees. The Schengen Agreement of 1985 established a common prototype visa for 
EU members. The agreement seeks to eliminate borders within the EU by abolishing 
land frontier controls and checks at airports for flights between signatory states of the 
Schengen Convention. It also provides for the establishment of a common border 
police, and judicial cooperation with respect to the adjudication of asylum claims. In 
addition, a second agreement, the Convention Determining the State Responsible for 
Examining Applicants for Asylum Lodged in One of the Member States of the 
European Communities (commonly known as the Dublin Convention) of 1990 
provides for the harmonization of asylum claims within the EU. Once a claim has 
been adjudicated by one European Union signatory state, the decision applies within 
the entire Union .The  Dublin Convention articulates the notion of responsible state 
in an effort to deal with the complications of increasing, and often multiple, asylum 
applications lodged in different member states. This concept attempted to minimize 
the occurrence of “refugees in orbit” or “asylum shopping” by prohibiting multiple 
and subsequent asylum applications in various member states.^ ®
Against the imposition of deterrent measures, there are certain criticisms. I'oi 
instance, it is argued that the visa requirement and sanctions imposed on airlines that 
carry passengers without proper travel documents could prevent genuine asylum 
seekers from leaving their country since they might not be able to obtain passports 
from their home governments or officially seek visas from countries to which they
Colleen V. Thourez, “New Directions in Refugee Protection,” The Fletcher Forum o f World 
Affairs, Vol.22, No.2, Summer/Fall 1998, p.96.
Emek M. Ucarer, The Global Refugee Regime: Continuity and Change,” Boğaziçi Journal 
Vol.lO, No.1-2, 1996, pp.18-19.
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want to flee7’ In fact, these requirements are in contradiction with Article 14 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states that “Everyone has the right to 
seek and enjoy asylum in other countries from persecution.” Moreover, refiigees wlio 
attempt to cross the outer frontiers of the Schengen countries on their own initiative 
would come up against a provision establishing sanctions for the unauthorized 
crossing of the outer frontiers, outside the official crossing points and opening times. 
This provision could easily conflict with Article 31 of the Refugee Convention, which 
forbids criminal sanctions for illegal frontier crossing by refugees.
b. Restrictive Interpretation of the Refugee Definition
Most governments and asylum judges interpreting government policy towards 
asylum have adhered to a more restricted notion of persecution with an apprehension 
that a broader interpretation would vastly increase the number of the world’s refugees 
at a time when the numbers were tried to be curbed.’^
In fact, although the Convention’s refugee definition creates a nearly 
universal base in international law for the determination of refugee status, it has 
resulted in significantly different acceptance rates in Western countries. The one 
common factor shared by these rates is their downward trend during the past decade. 
Restrictive interpretations are increasingly evident and many countries that used to 
interpret persecution broadly, no longer do so. Consequently, asylum seekers who
Weiner, The Global, op. cit., p.52.
’^Roel Fernhout, “Europe 1993 and its Refugees,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol.16, No.3, July 
1993, p.495.
Tom J. Farer, “How the International System Copes with Involuntary Migration: Norms, 
Institutions and State Practice,” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol.l7, No.l, February 1995, p.97.
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once were accepted as Convention refligees may now be denied refijgee status 
though their individual circumstances are identical.’“*
The disparities in the application of the Convention’s refugee definition 
among Western states mirror the lack of a shared interpretation and understanding of 
the definition itself, a confusion as to who merits international protection and the 
states’ search for a balance between the perception of their own national interests and 
their international legal obligations.’^
c. Support for Iii-Counti7 Protection
1'he international community has put a recent emphasis on “in-counlry 
protection”, driven by the growing reluctance of states to admit large numbers of 
reftigees. According to some critics, the willingness of UNHCR and other 
humanitarian organizations to embrace this new approach of working in countries of 
origin has legitimized the increasingly restrictive attitude of states towards reiugees 
and asylum seekers.’*^ This policy is also referred to as ‘refugee containment’ whose 
precedence had been set at the end of the Gulf War in 1991 when about 2 million 
Iraqi Kurds and Shiites were impeded from crossing the border of their country by 
the military intervention of the coalition forces. Acting through the UN, governments 
have engaged in similar arrangements to provide assistance and protection to would- 
be refiigees in their country of origin in Somalia and former Yugoslavia.”
Eduarda Arboleda & Ian Hoy, “The Convention Refugee Definition in the West: Disharmony of 
Interpretation and Application,” InternatkmalJournal o f Refugee Law, Vol.5, No.I, 1993, pp 79- 
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d. The Introduction of the ‘Safe Country’ Concept
States have devised the notion of ‘safe countries of origin’ in order to 
facilitate the process of identifying asylum-seekers who have ‘manifestly unfounded 
claims’ and to channel them into accelerated asylum procedures. Acting on both 
individual and collective levels, governments in Western Europe have determined that 
citizens of certain countries are unlikely to have a genuine claim to refugee status 
because persecution is rare in those states.’*
Human rights advocates have criticized this approach due to its inherent 
danger since there is an evident potential for persecution to occur in any state, 
however democratic it may be. It could also be that a country regarded as safe at one 
time might later engage in persecution. Moreover, it is argued that once the 
European states establish a list of countries which fall into this category, they may be 
subject to influences such as foreign policy considerations and/or factors such as the 
number of asylum-seekers from a particular country. They may be tempted to include 
their closest allies and important trade partners to the list or face the risk that those 
countries which are excluded from the list view their exclusion as a politically hostile
79act.
In fact, according to international refugee law, the concept of ‘safe country’ 
does not exist. It is argued that to resort to such a concept in dealing with 
applications for refugee status would introduce a de facto geographical limitation and 
a de facto reservation to the refugee definition of Article 1A of the Refugee 
Convention of 1951. It would also threaten the principles laid down in Articles 3 and 
33 of the Convention (non-discrimination and non-refoulement). This concept is one
UNHCR, The State, op. cit., pp. 191-92.
”  Weiner, The Global, op. cit., p.5(); UNHCR, The State, op. cit., pp.204-205; and Fernhout, 
“Europe”, op. cit., p.501.
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element to be taken into consideration with many others in a determination procedure 
along with many others. There is nothing particularly new in the use of the term. 
However, what is new, and potentially dangerous, is the incorporation of this notion 
in a mechanism in which certain nationalities are excluded from entering any 
determination procedure.*”
e. Introduction of Temporary Protection Status
Until quite recently, people who have been granted refugee status in the 
industrialized states have normally been allowed to stay and settle permanently in 
their country of asylum, even if there has been a fundamental improvement in the 
human rights situation in their countiy of origin. There was a tentative move away 
from this approach in the 1980s, when the industrialized states began to grant various 
forms of ‘humanitarian status’ to asylum seekers who were in need of international 
protection, giving them a temporary right to remain in the country.*’
Although those individuals who get temporary refugee status may not qualify 
for refugee status in the strict sense of the 1951 Convention, it is generally recognized 
that they need international protection until they can safely return to their place of 
residence. Moreover, in contrast to lengthy asylum procedures and the political, 
financial and legal difficulties in granting refugee status to a massive number of 
applicants, temporary protection schemes grant temporary residence to individuals in 
need of international protection as a result of civil war, ethnic strife or other 
unsettling conditions through a fact procedure.*^
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In fact, this concept has been used in earlier cases such as during the relief 
efforts for the Vietnamese boat people of the 1970s and 1980s or for the Afghan 
refugees in the 1980s, but it has been brought to the fore especially in the course of 
the war in former Yugoslavia and the population displacements that ensued.“^
The initial request for offering temporary protection occurred when thousands 
of Croats fled to neighboring countries in 1991. On 29 July 1992, the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees formally called upon the international community to 
grant temporary protection to individuals fleeing former Yugoslavia. Accordingly, 
some 800,000 individuals, most of them in Germany, had been granted such 
protection by 1995 in Europe.'*'* The provision of temporary protection in place of 
more elaborate asylum procedures was designed to address the urgent needs of those 
fleeing the conflict, some of whom might not be able to prove the requisite criterion 
of individual persecution under the international refugee treaties '*^ Temporaiy 
protection status was also politically acceptable to the countries of refuge since they 
are of limited duration, return oriented and more flexible and naturally less permanent 
than asylum.*** In this sense, as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has 
observed, “temporary protection is an instrument which balances the protection needs 
of people with the interests of states receiving them.”“’
The temporary protection principle has had some broader benefits in terms of 
defending the principles of international protection in a situation of mass influx With 
the introduction of temporary protection. Western states have adopted a broader 
humanitarian obligation to provide a place of safety to people who have fled from a
ibid.
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war-torn state. Temporary protection has also helped to reassert the principle oi' 
international responsibility sharing. By admitting a substantial number of refugees 
from former Yugoslavia, the countries of Western Europe provided a concrete 
demonstration of their commitment to the principle of international protection and 
thereby provided a positive example to actual and potential host countries in other 
parts of the world. If the European states had not provided protection to people from 
Bosnia and other parts of former Yugoslavia during that time, the whole basis of the 
international refugee regime would have been seriously undermined.**
f. Provision of Economic Assistance to Other Refugee-Receiving
Countries
Economic assistance can also be used by governments as a policy response to 
refugee flows in order to persuade other governments to retain refugees and confine 
the refugee problem within a region. This is in fact done on the pretext that refugees’ 
needs are best served in the supposedly more culturally compatible regions in which 
they have lived.*®
For instance, the United States and France have been willing to provide 
economic assistance to Thailand on the condition that the Thais would hold 
Vietnamese refugees rather than permit them to seek entrance into the USA and 
France. UNHCR and other international agencies, financed largely by the West and 
Japan, provide resources to refugee receiving countries -especially in Africa- not only 
as an expression of humanitarian concern, but also as a means of enabling refugees to
ibid., p.210.
Harrell-Bond, “The Protection”, op. cit., p.48.
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remain in the country of first asylum rather than attempting to move elsewhere, such 
as to advanced industrial countries.®“
-!>Ig. Intervention with Refugee-Producing Countries
Receiving countries may employ a variety of intervention strategies towards 
the sending country in order to curb the number of people entering its territory. 
Diplomatic pressures, including coercive diplomacy may be exerted. Coercive 
diplomacy to compel a country to halt actions that are forcing its people to flee may 
be more effective when there are collective international sanctions. There is also the 
extreme sanction of armed intervention to change the political conditions within the 
sending country so that reftigee flow is halted. The Kurdish uprising in Iraq after the 
Gulf War provides an example of armed intervention to deal with an unwanted 
refugee flow. As Kurdish refugees started to enter Turkey, the Turkish government 
made it clear that it was unwilling to add to its own Kurdish population and thus used 
its troops to seal the border. Hence, the USA, Britain and other allies in the war used 
their military power to force Iraq to place the Kurdish region under allied protection 
and the intervention enabled the Kurds to return.®^
It should be noted that simply building new barriers around Western countries 
will not make the refugee problem go away. Restrictive measures taken unilaterally 
by Western States do not solve the problem but pass it on to some other country to 
resolve, thus contributing to inter-state tensions, and a breakdown in the international 
refugee regime. Furthermore, the restrictive measures do not discriminate between 
illegal aliens and bonafide refugees.®  ^ Moreover, there is now a growing consensus
Weiner, “A Security Perspective”, op. cit., p.31.
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that the restrictive asylum practices introduced by many of the industrialized states 
have converted what was a relatively visible and quantifiable flow of asylum seekers 
into a covert movement of irregular migrants that is even more difficult for states to 
count and control. There is also widespread agreement that such irregular movements 
are increasingly arranged and organized by professional human traffickers.'^“'
The restrictive measures have thus driven migration underground, prompting 
it to assume forms that pose a growing threat to the very societies that such practices 
were intended to protect. While precise statistics on this issue are inherently difficult 
to collect, there is reason to believe that people who would have a perfectly good 
claim to refugee status now no longer bother to submit an asylum application, fearing 
that they might me arrested, detained and ultimately deported. The net result of the 
asylum and migration policies has thus been an expansion of the marginalized, 
excluded and criminalized underclass in developed societies."^
There is no magical international solution to the problem of uncontrolled 
refugee flows, and concerted international political action on these multifaceted and 
complex issues is not easy.^ *' Although it is recognized that governments have a 
legitimate interest in protecting the safety and stability of their respective societies, 
they also have an obligation to uphold the traditions of asylum and 
humanitarianism."’ The way forward in this difficult situation is to resolve or prevent 
the problems of displacement by adopting an integrated approach in which foreign 
policy, human rights policy, relief and development policies are formulated to address 
the underlying causes of the problem while at the same time preserving the practice
94
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of asylum.'^ ** fhe real test of such an approach must be tlie extent to which such 
measures safeguard human rights and are consistent with humanitarian standards - 
rather than the extent to which they reduce the number of people submitting claims to 
refugee status. As authors of the international law relating to refugees, governments 
in Europe and other affluent regions have a historical and a moral responsibility to 
uphold the right of asylum. If they do not, then protection standards in other parts of 
the world will almost inevitably decline as well.^ "^
98 Locschcr, Beyond, op. cit., p. 127.
’ UNHCR, The Slate, op. cil., pp.203-204.
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CHAPTER HI
ISSUES OF CONCERN TO THE EXISTING IN l ERNATIONAL
REFUGEE REGIME
3. 1. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
The end of the Cold War phenomenon, a resurgence of ethnic, communal 
and religious conflicts and violence accompanying them and the emergence o f ‘failed 
states’ have led many to give support to outside intervention in a stale’s internal 
conflicts. Today, traditional notions of sovereignty are being challenged, placing 
refugee issues much higher on the international agenda and creating new 
opportunities for international action.*
The changes in the conceptualization of sovereignty has played an important 
role in the intervention attempts of the United Nations. Although the classical 
understanding of sovereignty makes a distinction between internal and external alVairs 
of a state, the current global relations undermine the validity of such a distinction. 
The erosion of sovereignty virtually eveiy state experiences, shakes the theoretical 
and practical pillars of the principle of non-intervention. It is now the common 
argument that those states who violate the human rights of their citizens and who 
create massive refugee flows with their policies undermine their legitimacy both at the 
national and international level. The state, whose reason of existence is basically to 
guarantee the protection of its citizens in fact loses its basic pillar by engaging in acts 
of human rights violations.^
' A. Dowly and G. Loeschcr, “Refugee Flows as Grounds for International Action,” Internatiomil 
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Today, the definition of sovereignty is broadened to include responsibility A 
state can claim the prerogatives of sovereignty only so long as it carries out its 
internationally recognized responsibilities to provide protection and assistance to its 
citizens. It is argued that failure to do so and forcing the same citizens to flee from 
their country call into question the very basis of their sovereignty and should 
therefore legitimize intervention of the international community.
Another supportive argument in this regard is that as a basic principle of 
international law, a state cannot rely on the provisions of its own laws in defence 
against a claimed breach of international obligations; that is, international law lakes 
precedence where they conflict. It would follow, therefore, that as refugee flows 
impose massive burdens on other states, domestic jurisdiction related to such issues 
would come under increased challenge. It is argued that a country that forces its 
people to flee or takes actions that compel them to leave in a manner that threatens 
regional peace and security has in effect internationalized its internal affairs, and 
provides a justification for policy-makers in other states to act directly upon the 
source of the threat.'*
Although there is a well-established principle of international law which 
stipulates that no state has any right of intervention on behalf of non-nationals who 
are victims of human rights violations in another state, there is one exception to the 
principle of non-intervention as enshrined in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. 
Accordingly, “ ...this principle (principle of non-intervention) shall not prejudice the 
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.” The Security Council 
under Article 39 determines whether there is a threat to the peace or breach of the
 ^R. Cohen and F.M. Deng, “Exodus within Borders,” Foreign Affairs, Vol.77, No.4, July-August 
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peace, or there is an act of aggression, and decides upon measures to be taken to 
maintain or restore international peace or security.’
In fact, a variety of ‘internal’ actions by states are increasingly regarded by 
other states as threats. The spewing of nuclear waste and other dangerous materials 
into the atmosphere and the contamination of waterways which then flow into other 
countries are no longer regarded as internal matters. In the same spirit, a country that 
forces its citizens to leave or creates conditions that induce them to leave has 
internationalized its internal actions.^ In such a case, claim of ‘sovereignty rights’ do 
not constitute a defence against outside intervention.
The offending government cannot legitimately object to intervention as a 
violation of sovereignty because the real violation of sovereignty is the government’s 
mistreatment of its own citizenry. The widespread violation of human rights carried 
out by government, tolerated by that government or carried out when the 
government is incapable of stopping it, almost always leads to internal displacement 
and eventual refugee flows across borders. The probability is high that human rights 
violations will lead to refligee flows which threaten the stability of receiving 
countries. This provides an argument justifying self-defensive actions permitted under 
the UN Charter since it acknowledges that provoking refugee flows can rise to the 
equivalent of aggression.’
As a matter of political realism, a significant increase in the flow of refugees 
or of unwanted illegal economic migrants is likely to lead the governments of 
population-receiving countries to consider various forms of intervention to change
’ Subrata Roy Chowdhury, “A Response to the Refugee Problems in Post-Cold War Era: Some 
Existing and Emerging Norms of International Law,” InternationalJournal o f Refugee Low, Vol.7. 
No. 1, 1995, p. 115.
® Myron Weiner, “A Security Perspective on International Migration,” The Fletcher Forum of World 
Affairs, Vol.20, No.2, Summer/Fall 1996, p.32.
’ Charles B. Keely, “How Nation-States Create and Respond to Refugee Flows,” International 
Migration Review, Vol.30, No.4, Winter 1996, p.l060.
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the domestic factors that force or induce people to leave their homeland. If a people 
violate the boundaries of a neighboring country, then they and their government 
should expect others to intervene in their internal affairs.*
The Security Council of the United Nations has authority under the UN 
Charter to intervene through either non-military actions (article 41) or with militaiy 
force (article 42). Non-military intervention could take the form of active diplomacy, 
pressures on a country through threats or positive inducements to change certain 
policies, public condemnation of certain behaviors, economic sanctions, an extensive 
use of human rights monitors, creation of humanitarian zones or corridors for 
providing assistance, and peace-keeping efforts.^ The final extent of intervention is to 
take military measures.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the international community has on a 
number of occasions deployed multinational military forces in armed conflicts, with 
the objective of protecting or assisting displaced and war-affected populations within 
their country of origin. In an effort to meet these objectives, two basic strategies have 
emerged. First, such forces have been used to protect humanitarian activities and to 
facilitate the delivery of emergency assistance -an approach adopted in Somalia from 
1992-94, throughout the war in former Yugoslavia and in eastern Zaire during the 
1994 Rwandese refugee crisis. Secondly, multinational forces have been used to 
implement what had become known as the ‘safe area’, ‘safety zone’ or ‘safe haven’ 
strategy. In general terms, this entails the use of such forces to protect a given 
geographical area from a surrounding situation of armed conflict and violence.
* Weiner, “A Security”, op. cit., p.33.
 ^Rosemarie Rogers, The Future of Refugee Flows and Policies,”, International A'ligration Review, 
Vol.26, No.4, Winter 1992, p.l 126.
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thereby safeguarding the security of people who are living in or returning to that 
zone.’*^
As the number of refugees has grown in this decade, Western governments as 
well as those in Africa and elsewhere have become less welcoming to those in flight. 
Their focus have shifted to keeping people in their homelands." The international 
community’s willingness to intervene militarily to protect and assist forced migrants 
and to prevent the creation of still larger numbers has been illustrated in this decade 
by the intervention in the Liberian civil war by the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), in Iraq by a multilateral force led by the United States to 
protect the Kurdish and Shiite populations through the creation of safety zones in the 
north and south of the country, in the former Yugoslavia by UN peacekeeping forces, 
in Somalia again by a multilateral force led by the United States'^, in Rwanda by 
France, in Haiti by the USA and very recently in Kosovo by NATO.
Following the end of the Gulf War in 1991, Iraqi suppression of widespread 
uprising in northern Kurdish areas created fears that the entire Kurdish population 
would be uprooted, a particularly grave prospect for neighboring Turkey with its own 
Kurdish unrest. Accordingly, upon the precedent-setting resolution 688 of the 
Security Council of 5 April 1991 which declared refugees to be a matter of 
international peace and security, international forces were deployed to Kurdish areas 
to protect the population, Iraqi forces were withdrawn from the same areas, and a de 
facto autonomous Kurdish area was established that allowed Kurdish refugees to 
return to safe havens in Iraqi Kurdish territory." With this event.
UNHCR, The Slate of the World’s Refugees: A Humanitarian Agenda. New York; Oxford 
University Press: 1997, pp. 131, 134.
” Cohen and Deng, “Exodus”, op. cit., p.l4.
Rogers, “The Future”, op. cit., p. 1126.
Dowty and Loescher, “Refugee”, op. cit., pp.65-66.
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a precedent had been set for military intervention in the domestic 
affairs of a state for the purposes of protecting a minority 
population from the repression of its own government. A new 
option to the traditional three solutions for refugees had been 
created, that is, preventing the refugees from crossing an 
international border in the first place by ‘humanitarian 
intervention’, and then creating safe havens protected by foreign 
military forces within the national homeland of refugees.
Some have argued that Security Council Resolution 688, which created safe
havens for Kurds in northern Iraq, provided an important humanitarian precedent
that could have far-reaching consequences for traditional notions of state sovereignty.
It provided a rare instance of a UN-sanctioned military intervention to protect a
minority within a country, without its government’s acquiescence. The intervention
resolution did not directly use human rights violation as the grounds for intervention.
Instead, it was justified by Chapter VII of the UN Charter; Actions with Respect to
Threats to the Peace, Breaches of Peace and Acts of Aggression.'^
The creation of safe havens in northern Iraq was deemed by the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees as a rare example of a successful humanitarian
intervention. But the intervention took place only to block a mass population
movement rather than because Iraq was committing serious human rights violations
against the Kurdish people.
A second case of UN-authorized unilateral intervention was that of the United 
States in Haiti in September 1994 which again clearly involved refugees as a major 
factor. At the time, the number of illegal refugees in the USA grew to about three 
hundred thousand. Apprehensions grew about this number growing much larger. 
Concerns were also raised about the costs of maintaining the refligees at the
Howard Adelman, “The Ethics of Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of the Kurdish Refugees,” 
Public Affairs Quarterly, Vol.6, No.l, January 1992, p,75; cited in Dowly and Loescher, “Refugee”, 
op. cit., p.66.
'^Nazare A. Abell, “Politics, Migration and Intervention,” Peace Review, Vol.8, No.4, December 
1996, p.536. 
ibid., p.537.
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Guantanamo Bay safe haven, which was housing about 20,000 Haitian refugees. In 
response to these fears, military intervention in Haiti became a possibility. The 
continuing arrival of Haitian refligees was conceptualized as a threat to regional 
stability and to US borders. Thus, Resolution 940 of the Security Council authorized 
military action to bring President Aristide back to power. It stated that the Security 
Council was “Gravely concerned by the significant further deterioration of the 
humanitarian situation in Haiti, in particular the continuing escalation by the illegal Je 
facto regime of systematic violations of civil liberties, the desperate plight of Haitian 
refligees...” It determined that the situation constituted a threat to international peace 
and security. The military intervention occurred seemingly to restore Aristide’s 
elected government. But ultimately, the USA conducted the intervention for political 
reasons: largely to stop the massive outflow of Haitian refugees to the US shores. 
Even so, most Haitians seemed to welcome the intervention. The willingness to use 
superior force reduced local violence and promoted the efforts of relief officials and 
human rights monitors.’’
Another case of UN-authorized unilateral intervention involved the French 
armed intervention in Rwanda in mid-1994 to secure a safe zone inside Rwanda for 
humanitarian purposes. Yet, humanitarian intervention was significantly different in 
the Rwandan case than for Iraq and Haiti. The international community reacted 
slowly and with disinterest to Rwandan events, taking action very late. Even when 
the Hutus began to flee into Zaire by the hundreds of thousands, and then by millions, 
the US administration avoided involvement. The fact was that in Rwanda, no political 
imperative existed for pursuing serious policies to resolve the crisis. Except for 
France, the major Security Council powers took little interest in a small Central
17 ibid., p.538.
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African country in an area marginal to their economic and political/strategic 
concerns.'*
In fact, the emerging concept of humanitarian intervention to keep refugees 
from crossing a border was an attractive idea to a First World in which refugees had 
lost much of their ideological appeal, once they could no longer be categorized as 
victims of communist regimes. Moreover, neighboring countries in the developing 
world were not willing to receive large numbers of refugees that put great pressure 
on local resources, particularly the environment, which were already under severe 
stress. Therefore, to take aid to refugees within their own countries instead seemed to 
many as the preferred solution. At the same time, for the refugees themselves, 
protection and assistance close to their home meant less disruption, provided that the 
protection was truly effective.'*^
Moreover, institutionally, the United Nations was better equipped than before 
to internalize the refugee problem by devising the concept of humanitarian 
intervention. Freed from its Cold War paralysis, the Security Council could act with 
unity. Except for China, the developing countries were not represented among the 
permanent five and were therefore not in a position to veto interventionist policies 
which they increasingly feared would be used against them - despite the humanitarian 
label attached to them.^ ® The consensus in the Security Council underpinned 
collective interventionist policies which previously would have been impossible. 
Simultaneously, the refugees who earlier had been the human consequence of great 
power rivalries lost much of their political significance. Increasingly, they were 
viewed simply as burdens. Under the conditions, the institutional response of the
ibid., p.539.
”  Astri Suhrke, “A Crisis Diminished: Refiigees in the Developing World,” IniernaiionalJoumal,
Vol.48, No.2, Spring 1993, pp.235-36. 
ibid., p.236.
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United Nations was to pursue strategies of cost reduction. UNHCR followed the 
same course. Internalization of the refugee problem was a principal response, despite 
its clear interventionist aspects and the uncertain implications for the potential 
refugees themselves.^'
A problem with humanitarian intervention is that to date, the international 
community has devised no systematic strategies for humanitarian intervention. 
International response to situations in which human rights violations are involved is 
largely ad hoc. It is emphasized that there is the need to agree on a set of principles 
and criteria for humanitarian intervention so that it cannot be manipulated by 
interested parties or abused by strong states against the weak.^^
It is a fact that humanitarian intervention is likely to occur in nations that 
directly affect Western political, strategic and economic interests. The threat of 
unmanageable and undesirable population flows, rather than the seriousness of 
human rights violations, now seems especially influential. However, if any 
humanitarian intervention is justified, then the UN must develop far more principled 
and far less political grounds for doing so.^ ^
As there are no fixed principles that determine fundamental questions 
regarding intervention, the West’s new inclination towards intervention is being 
viewed with scepticism by the Third World countries who are apprehensive that the 
West could use this new approach as a weapon against them. The fact that the West 
insists on concentrating on minority rights creates questions especially in those 
countries which have a multi-ethnic social structure. They perceive the approach of 
the West as a threat directed to the principles of national unity and state integrity.
ibid., p.239.
Emily Copeland, “Global Refugee Policy: An Agenda for the 1990s,” International Migration 
Review, Vol.26, No.3, Fall 1992, p.997.
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90
One of the reasons behind this apprehension is the Security Councirs conlun ci sial 
representativeness. They fear that the power of the Security Council would be used in 
line with the interests of its permanent members who have the veto power .
Moreover, these Third World countries believe that the UN Security Council 
takes “international peace and security” seriously only when events involve the 
national interests of the five permanent member states, especially the USA and its 
Western allies. Aggression across borders and government violence against 
populations do not always provoke international intervention. For instance, the 
Kurdish situation in Northern Iraq prompted an immediate international response 
while Rwanda and Bosnia did not. Humanitarian intervention occurs most often in 
countries where domestic conflicts might produce huge refugee flows that might 
destabilize neighboring states, especially in regions that the West deems strategically 
important.^^ Such uneasiness of the Third World countries again points out to the 
urgent need to develop appropriate norms and guidelines that will govern 
international organizations’ and individual states’ behaviors with respect to 
humanitarian intervention.^®
One other concern raised with regard to the newly emerging concept of 
humanitarian intervention is related to the institution of asylum. It is stressed that the 
international community should not use intervention as an excuse for not helping 
those who manage to escape from situations of conflict and human rights violations. 
In other words, the institution of asylum must be safeguarded as a basic right 
regardless of new approaches that may be devised.^’
Dağı, “İnsan”, op. cit., p.l260.
Abell, “Politics”, op. cit., p.536.
Rogers, “The Future”, op. cit., pp. 1126-27. 
Copeland, “Global”, op. cit., p.997.
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IIL2. INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE
Internally displaced are people who have been forced to flee from their homes 
or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the 
effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human 
rights or natural disasters. The important point is that they do not cross an 
internationally recognized state border^* due to reasons such as the nature of the 
threat affecting people’s security; the escape routes available to them and their 
proximity to international borders, city centers and other places of potential refuge, 
the financial resources and other assets which they possess, the location of their 
family and community members, and the availability of protection and assistance from 
both national and international organizations.^^
It is not easy to ascertain the number and location of the world’s internally 
displaced people. Unlike the collection of refugee statistics, a task undertaken by 
UNHCR, no single UN agency has assumed responsibility for the collection of figures 
on internally displaced populations. Governments are often unwilling to admit the 
presence of such populations on their territory, which indicate the state’s failure to 
protect its citizens. In addition, there is evidence to suggest that a large proportion of 
the world’s internally displaced people do not live in highly visible places, but are 
mingled with family members and friends, often in urban areas where they can enjoy 
a higher degree of anonymity.^“ Despite these difficulties in identifying the number of 
internally displaced, there is a broad international consensus that the global 
population of internally displaced people is around 25 to 30 million; up to 16 million 
in Africa, six or seven million in Asia, around 5 million in Europe (predominantly in
Maria Stravropoulou, “Displacement and Human Rights: Reflections on UN Practice,” Human 
Rights Quarterly, Vol.20, No.3, August 1998, p.519.
UNHCR, The State, op. cit., p.l05.
ibid., p.l04.
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the former Yugoslavia and the Caucasus region) and up to three million in the 
Americas. These masses in flight -who, unlike refugees, have not crossed an 
international border- now constitutes the newest global crisis.^*
In the 1990s, the concept of ‘internally displaced people’ has become a 
frequently used term in the humanitarian vocabulary. Indeed, the recent emergence of 
the approach of focusing less on the situation of refugees in countries of asylum and 
more on the plight of vulnerable populations in countries of origin, has pushed this 
issue to the top of the humanitarian agenda.^^
When people flee from a situation of violence and persecution, those who go 
to another country may enjoy better protection than those who remain in the country 
of origin. Indeed, people who are unable to escape from zones of active conflict - 
such as those trapped in the Chechen capital of Grozny or the Liberian town of 
Tubmanburg- are sometimes confronted with greater danger than those who are able 
to move across a border. As the UN Secretary-General pointed out in 1996, “it is 
inadmissible that those who have managed to cross the border should benefit from 
the rules of international refugee law, while at times only several hundred meters 
away, those who were not able to leave their country remain unprotected.”“
Yet, those internally displaced populations cannot appeal to international legal 
standards governing refugees, even if they fear persecution or other serious harm. 
Thus, while outnumbering and having simitar protection needs as refugees, internally 
displaced people have no guarantee of protection nor any of the civil, social and 
economic entitlements set forth in the refugee treaties.^ "* Thus, no specific
UNHCR, The State, op. cit., p.l05; and Cohen and Deng, “Exodus”, op. cit., p.I2.
UNHCR, The State, op. cit., p.99.
”  B. Boutros-Ghali, UN Press Release SG/SM/5866, January 1996; cited in UNHCR, The State, op. 
cit., p .ll3 .
Arthur C. Helton, “Displacement and Human Rights: Current Dilemmas in Refugee Protection,” 
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international organization is formally mandated to protect, assist and find solutions 
for the internally displaced.
A prominent reason for this situation is that internally displaced people remain 
under the jurisdiction of their own state which therefore involves political 
connotations, particularly state sovereignty and non-intervention in domestic affairs. 
Even if a single agency were to be given a statutory role with regard to the internally 
displaced, many governments with significant populations of internally displaced 
people would undoubtedly resist its interference in their domestic affairs and reject its 
presence on their territory.^^
In 1991, the Economic and Social Council examined a report on refugees, 
and returnees which also dealt with the issue of internally displaced people. The 
report found that with respect to the protection of the human rights of the internally 
displaced, the involvement of UN human rights bodies was necessary since there was 
no institution or mechanism specifically mandated to protect them like the way 
UNHCR did regarding the protection of refugees. The following year, at the request 
of the Commission on Human Rights, the Secretariat prepared a report on internally 
displaced persons, examining the causes and consequences of their displacement and 
the relevant human rights standards. The Commission examined the report at its 1992 
session and appointed a Representative of the Secretary-General, whose first mandate 
was to prepare a comprehensive study of the human rights issues relating to the 
internally displaced and possible alternatives for addressing their protection needs. 
The Representative of the Secretary-General presented his comprehensive study to 
the Commission in 1993, in which he identified the need for more analysis of the
Gill Loescher, “The International Refugee Regime: Stretched to the Limit?,” Journal o f  
International Affairs, Vol.47, No.2, Winter 1994, p.368; and UNHCR, The State, op. cit., p.l 16.
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applicable normative standards as well as a statement of guiding principles or a 
declaration to guide the treatment of the internally displaced.
The Representative has been authorized to monitor displacements worldwide, 
undertake fact-finding missions, begin dialogues with governments, and make 
proposals for strengthening legal and institutional protection for the internally 
displaced. He has raised international awareness and mobilized support from 
governments, foundations, academia, and the legal and'NGO communities, d'he 
position’s effectiveness, however, is limited because it is voluntary and part-time. It 
has no operational authority and minimal human and material resources at its 
disposal. Moreover, to date, the international community has focused on providing 
food, shelter, and medical supplies. Yet displaced persons have regularly pointed out 
that security is as great a priority for them as food. Providing relief to such people 
while ignoring the fact that they are being beaten or raped has led some to call the 
victims the “well-fed dead.” ’^
However, it is also a fact that occasionally, at the request of the Secretary- 
General and/or the General Assembly of the United Nations, UNHCR extends its 
mandate to such displaced persons under a “good offices” jurisdiction (e g. in Sudan 
and former Yugoslavia), which is based on the UNHCR Statute. The statute provides 
UNHCR with a mandate for assistance and protection outside the framework of 
international refugee treaties.^*
Although internally displaced people are in principle entitled to protection of 
their own national laws, they also benefit from the provisions of international human 
rights law and of international humanitarian law when they aire in situations of armed
Stavropoulou, “Displacemcnl”, op. cit., p.529. 
Cohen and Deng, “Exodus”, op. cil., p.l5.
Helton, “Displacement”, op. cit., p.381; and Copeland, “Global”, op. cit., p.995.
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conflict. So when UNHCR is called upon to extend humanitarian assistance and 
protection to the internally displaced, it invokes these internationally recognized 
norms as a legal basis for its involvement.
In the past, and still to a large extent today, UNHCR’s involvement with the 
internally displaced has often been in the context of the voluntary repatriation of 
refugees, where return movements and rehabilitation and reintegration programs 
have included both returning reftigees and displaced persons in circumstances where 
it was neither reasonable nor feasible to treat the two categories differently.“**^ By 
recognizing that the problems of the internally displaced and of refugees are 
manifestations of the same phenomenon of forced displacement, UNHCR has 
increasingly considered activities on behalf of the internally displaced to be 
inseparable components of an overall strategy of prevention and solutions. In Sri 
Lanka, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the countries of the former Yugoslavia, the 
Horn and Central Africa, Liberia, Mozambique and Central America which are 
examples of UNHCR involvement with the internally displaced, the link between 
internal and external displacement is obvious and the need to address the internal 
situation in order to satisfactorily resolve the external refugee problem is clear.“"
Concerning UNHCR’s activities on behalf of the internally displaced, the UN 
General Assembly has listed a number of factors to be taken into account. Most 
importantly, it set out two mandatory requirements: first, a specific request from the 
Secretary-General or a competent organ of the United Nations (i.e. the General
Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, “Protection Aspects of UNHCR 
Activities on Behalf of Internally Displaced Persons,” Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 1-2, 
Spring/Summer 1995, p.l83. 
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Assembly, the Security Council or ECOSOC), and second, the consent of the
42concerned state.
Moreover, it was acknowledged that given the magnitude of the problem of 
displacement worldwide, it would be impossible for UNHCR to take responsibility for 
the internally displaced in every situation. Thus, in 1993, UNHCR established a set of 
guidelines to clarify the conditions under which it would undertake activities for the 
internally displaced. First of all, the guidelines state that UNHCR may take primary 
responsibility for the internally displaced when such people are present in or going 
back to the same areas as returning refugees. Secondly, as exemplified in locations 
such as eastern Zaire and northern Afghanistan, UNHCR may work with the 
internally displaced if they are living alongside a refugee population and have a 
similar need for protection and assistance. Thirdly, as in Bosnia, UNHCR may extend 
its services to the internally displaced in situations where the same factors have given 
rise to both internal and external population movements, and when there are good 
reasons for addressing those problems by means of a single humanitarian operation. 
Fourthly and finally, UNHCR may become involved in situations of internal 
displacement where there is a potential for cross-border movement and where the 
provision of protection and assistance to the internally displaced may enable them to 
remain in safety in their own country.“’^
However, it is further emphasized that the application of the above-mentioned 
conditions cannot be expected to be automatic. Even in situations which appear to 
meet these guidelines, request for UNHCR involvement on behalf of the internally 
displaced must be carefully assessed with regard to the organization’s capacity at any
ibid., p. 180.'
UNHCR, The State, op. cit., p. 117.
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given time to respond eflectively in a particular situation while continuing to meet 
urgent needs for humanitarian assistance and protection elsewhere.
It should be noted that UNHCR’s activities on behalf of internally displaced 
people have caused a degree of concern. For instance, some commentators have 
pointed out that the organization’s criteria allow it to pick and choose the situations 
of internal displacement with which it wants to become involved, therefore causing a 
lack of predictability in international response.One other concern involves flinding. 
If UNHCR were to expand its mandate to cover all internally displaced people, the 
organization would then be responsible for at least twice as many people as it is now, 
when it already finds it difficult to fund its most urgent activities on behalf of 
recognized refugees. There are also other substantive concerns. It has been suggested 
that by working with displaced po[)ulations in their own country, UNHCR increases 
the risk that assistance to such populations would be used as an excuse by 
neighboring and nearby states to close their borders to potential refugees, thereby 
undermining the institution of asylum .
Furthermore, problems could arise for UNHCR when it seeks to protect and 
assist refugee populations in a given countiy -and has to work with that country’s 
government to accomplish this task- and at the same time seeks to protect and assist 
the internally displaced that the same government has created from among its own 
population.“'® In other words, in countries where externally and internally displaced
É
people co-exist and the latter are subject to their governments’ hostility, trying to
ibid., p. 118.
Rogers, “The Future”, op. cit., pp. 1136-37.
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keep dialogue with the government over its treatment of the internally displaced may 
compromise cooperation in assisting and protecting the externally displaced.·*^
Today, internal displacement is high on the international human rights 
agenda. However, although this issue is essential with regard to human rights 
concerns and should receive unwavering attention, there is still the other side of the 
coin. It is argued that an over-eagerness to promote international involvement in 
situations of internal displacement could have the unintended consequence of 
undermining the notion of state responsibility. The restoration and strengthening of 
national protection capacities is thus an essential first step in the effort to safeguard 
the security of internally displaced people and to resolve the problem of internal 
displacement. In other words, involvement with internally displaced people should 
not camouflage the fact that UNHCR and other international organizations can only 
play a supportive role but they cannot be a substitute for governments in the 
protection of their own citizens.'**
3.3. CHALLENGES FACING UNHCR
a. Inadequacy of its Existing Resource Base
The most significant institutional vveakness of UNHCR as the core of the 
international refligee regime is its dependence on voluntary contributions to cany out 
its programs. The international community created an organization, UNHCR, which 
could be drawn into operations to protect and assist large numbers of refugees 
without giving it a clear financial mandate. The financial implications were limited in 
the early years when resource requirements were relatively small. As the number of
Tom J. Farer, “How the International System Copes with Involuntary Migration: Norms, 
Institutions and State Practice,” Human Rights Quarterly, Vol.l7, No.l, February 1995, p.86. 
UNHCR, The State, op. cit., p.l21; and Executive Committee, “Protection”, op. cit., p.l91.
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refugee movements multiplied, the gap between needs and likely resources went up 
to crisis proportions. Some states staggered or delayed their payments and UNHCR 
found it increasingly difficult to raise revenue. Indeed, in 1990, the High 
Commissioner of the time complained about the “crippling effect” of the unstable and 
unpredictable nature of the funding of UNHCR’s activities. It was stated that living 
on a month-to-month, sometimes week-to-week basis, it was not only uneconomical, 
but it also made UNHCR a much less responsible and effective organization.
Less than 5 per cent of the UNHCR’s annual expenditures are covered by the 
UN regular budget; the remainder of its handing and resources come from voluntary 
contributions, mainly from national governments most of which are developed states 
(the United States, Western European countries, Japan, Canada and Australia). While 
having resources is critical for the organization to be genuinely operational, this 
process has, of course, created dependency on a small number of developed states for 
which they are rewarded with permanent membership on the agency’s governing 
body.^ *’
Each year, UNHCR’s Executive Committee approves a General Program 
budget, comprising activities financed through the annual program, the Emergency 
Fund, and appeals to all UN members for the resources needed to cover the program 
year. The primary allocation of these resources goes to the traditional areas of the 
High Commissioner’s competence: emergency relief, voluntary repatriation, 
integration into host societies, and resettlement. In addition to its General Program 
budget, UNHCR, at the request of the Secretary-General or the UN General 
Assembly, undertakes Special Programs. These include major new and unforeseen
Alex Cunliffe, “The Refugee Crises; A Study of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees,” Political Studies, Vol.43, No.2, June 1995, pp.284-85.
“  James C. Hathaway, “New Directions to Avoid Hard Problems: The Distortion of the Palliative 
Role of Refugee Protection,” Journal o f Refugee Studies, Vol.8, No.3, 1995, p.291.
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emergency operations and transportation and rehabilitation assistance to refugees and 
displaced people who have returned to their homes. Special Programs are the subject 
of specific fund-raising appeals to interested governments and are financed from trust 
funds framed by particular purposes and conditions. Thus, UNHCR must raise funds 
for each new refugee problem.*’
However, the continuation of assistance from donor governments is neither 
reliable nor always in the most appropriate form. In addition, funding is frequently 
provided late and is often set aside for particular uses with political connotations.*“
Moreover, UNHCR’s dependence on voluntary contributions forces it to 
adopt policies that reflect the interests and priorities of the major donor countries. 
Politics and foreign policy priorities cause donor governments to favor some reftigee 
groups over others. During the 1980s, for example, international aid per Afghan 
refugee in pro-Western Pakistan was more than three times higher than that allocated 
to Afghan reftigees in anti-Western Iran.*^
The High Commissioner herself also accepts the fact that foreign policy 
considerations are reflected during funding priorities and that some projects are better 
funded than others. She provides the example that the Yugoslavian operation was 
heavily funded by European states and that Cambodia by Japan which in fact reflects 
a kind of geopolitical interest. *'*
The situation being such, UNHCR has often either become subservient to the 
polices of powerful donors or become immobilized, thereby damaging its credibility 
as an effective and impartial advocate for refiigees. During the 1980s, for instance.
Gill Loescher, Beyond Charity: International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis." New 
York: Oxford Uniyersity Press, 1993, p. 131.
Loescher, “The International”, op. cit., p.368.
Loescher, Beyond, op. cit., p.l37.
*'' Sadako Ogata, “The Eyolution of UNHCR,” Journal o f International Affairs, Vol.47, No.2, 
Winter 1994, p.422.
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UNHCR objected to the US policy of returning Salvadorans to their homelands and 
criticized the substandard conditions of collective accommodation centers for asylum 
seekers within the Federal Republic of Germany. But in both instances, the High 
Commissioner could exercise only very limited influence, because American and 
German donations form an essential portion of the UNHCR budget. Criticism was 
met with threats to cut off funding. In the 1990s, the United States and West 
European governments have continued to override UNHCR protests and disregard 
criticism on their forcible repatriation of thousands of Haitians and Albanians.”
Obviously, the High Commissioner lacks the financial independence and 
institutional strength to challenge such states or to embark upon programs without 
the cooperation of host governments. As a result, the world’s principal refligee 
protection agency is prevented from bringing up criticism either about donor or host 
governments’ policies.”
In fact, in the post-Cold War era, governments of industrialized stated are less 
influenced politically by refugee situations, which they view as local or regional 
problems of little or no foreign policy or security value. Funding is now more likely 
to be cut back in favor of the domestic priorities of these industrialized states. Major 
powers are reluctant to provide funds for humanitarian programs when internal 
conflicts in aid-recipient countries continue without any prospect of ending. Thus, 
despite the clear link in situations involving displacement and regional security, there 
is weak donor interest in funding a comprehensive strategy for dealing with refugees 
and internally displaced people.”
Loescher, Bevond. op. cit., pp. 137-38. 
ibid., p. 138.
Loesclier, “The International”, op. cit., p.368.
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All the while, UNHCR is increasingly being asked by the United Nations to 
bear more responsibility and leadership in a growing number of international crises, 
but, as explained, with diminishing resources. Although the UNHCR serves twice the 
number of refugees now than it did in the previous decade, the financial support 
levels for General Programs of UNHCR have remained virtually unchanged. The 
lack of funds has threatened to reduce and postpone repatriation programs,overall
cancel needed improvements in refugee activities, and make attempts to avert new 
flows of refugees.^*
In light of these points, it should be noted that as a first step towards 
improving its effectiveness, UNHCR must be given a resource base that will permit 
more autonomous operations. Donor governments must resist setting aside funds to 
promote their political priorities. Refugees, as a persistent feature of international life, 
require sustained financial allocations and sustained attention by the international 
community. Consideration should be given to funding UNHCR by assessed rather 
than voluntary contributions, thereby acknowledging the permanent character of the 
refugee problem and the need to deal with the issue systematically.
b. Inadequacy of its Existing Mandate
As an organization which is part of the broader United Nations system, which 
is guided (and largely financed) by states, which normally relies on the authorization 
of host governments to establish operations in the field, and which is ultimately 
incapable of obliging other actors to respect international refugee law, UNHCR does 
not enjoy complete freedom of action.®”
Locscher, Beyond, op. cit., p.l36. 
ibid., p. 138.
UNHCR, The State, op. cit., p.80.
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UNHCR operates under a recommendatory and formally non-binding legal 
mandate. In one sense, obligations of states resides in an undefined duty to 
‘cooperate’ with UNHCR. There is no expressly recognized obligation of states to 
address refugee problems to UNHCR, or any other international institution, or to 
abide by any particular procedure.^' The non-existence of a supranational authority to 
enforce the rules of the international refugee regime aggravates this situation.
Furthermore, the international refugee instruments leave it up to governments 
to devise refugee determination procedures with respect to their administrative, 
judicial and constitutional provisions. States consider these procedures as aspects of 
their national sovereignty and have been unwilling to transfer this authority to 
UNHCR or to any other international body.^^
Thus, UNHCR’s activities on behalf of refugees are generally limited to 
providing material assistance, citing violations of international law, and publicly 
condemning those violations. The organization has limited influence in persuading 
host states to protect refugees, given that it needs these governments’ permission to 
maintain existence in their territories. Because the office has no power to force 
countries to provide refugees with even minimal humanitarian treatment, the High 
Commissioner’s major weapons for urging nations to abide by international refugee 
law do not go beyond diplomatic pressure and moral appeals.^^
However, it should be recognized that international and regional peace, 
security, human rights, and economic structures must be strengthened with broader 
mandates and financial support, if they are to become more constructive, 'fhe
Janina W. Dacyl, “Europe Needs a New Protection System for ‘Non-Convention’ Refugees,” 
International Journal o f Refugee Law, Vol.7, No.4, October 1995, p.604.52 - - —
63
Loescher. Beyond, op. cit., p. 140. 
ibid., pp. 138-39.
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humanitarian mandate of UNHCR cannot be sufficient by itself to achieve these long- 
run goals which also have political implications.
c. The Need for Further International Cooperation
It is hard to disagree with Francis Fukuyama who remarked that one of the 
principal points of collision in the coming decade will be the issue of refugees. He 
states that “the movement of large populations fleeing countries that are poor to ones 
that are rich and secure will constitute one of the chief forms of global 
interdependence in the years to come.” “^*
It is a fact that with its dependence on voluntary contributions to carry out 
activities and its need to obtain the approval of host governments before intervening, 
UNHCR cannot resolve the problems of refugees, returnees and internally displaced 
people solely by itself More attention must be focused on a range of players 
including development agencies, human rights institutions, peacekeeping and conflict 
resolution mechanisms and the other relief organizations, all of which must be 
involved in finding new approaches to resolve conflicts and accompanying 
displacements.®’
It should be recognized that promoting respect for fundamental human rights, 
economic and social development and the maintenance of peace and security are 
goals which can be achieved with the cooperation and coordination of a wide range 
of governmental, inter-governmental and non-governmental actors.®® Furthermore, a 
more effective division of labor is needed among the actors involved in responding to
cited in (no reference is given) Sadruddin Aga Khan, “Population Movement: Its effect on 
European Stability,” in G. Alfredsson and P. Macalister-Smith (eds.), The Living Law of Nations. 
Arlington: H.P.Engel, 1996, p.5.
Loescher, “The International”, op. cit., p.369.
“  Sadako Ogata, “Mixed Migration: Strategy for Refugees and Economic Migrants,” Harvard 
International Review, Vol.l7, No.2, Spring 1995, p.31.
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refugee emergencies. The UN General Assembly took an important first step in 
December 1991 in creating the Office of the Emergency Relief Coordinator, charged 
with providing a focal point, within governments and between governmental and 
non-governmental organizations for communication during UN emergency relief 
operations. Also, the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs was 
created which was an essential step in clarifying and assigning responsibilities to UN 
agencies in complex emergencies.^’
Increased cooperation between actors involved in refugee matters could aim 
at several issues such as developing a common definition of the concept of de facto 
refugee; agreements on responsibilities of the first asylum country; concerted action 
towards development assistance in areas in need and where human rights violations 
threaten to generate refugees; and initiating action towards mediation and 
conciliation in cases of internal conflict. Furthermore, establishing an embargo on 
arms sales to areas likely to erupt into armed conflict, with the almost inevitable result 
of creating refugees, and establishing in the international community greater 
intolerance towards regimes that violate human rights and generate refugees, may be 
of utmost help.®* It is obvious that if these objectives which definitely require further 
international cooperation, could be achieved, it would have substantial positive 
consequences on the global refligee crisis.
d. The Need for Development Activities
Not only the question of providing protection and finding solutions for the 
refugees is an issue of concern to the international refugee regime, but there is also
Loescher, “The International”, op. cit., p.370.
Peter Nobel, “Blurred Vision in the Rich World and Violations of Human Rights - A Critical 
Assessment of the Human Rights and Refugee Linkages,” Bulletin o f Human Rights, 91/1 1992 
p.84.
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the aftermath of refugee-producing situations. Repatriation of refugees when 
conditions which had drawn them out of their countries had disappeared, is not a 
sufficient end by itself Just as critical is the support for the reconstruction of their 
lives after return. Unless displaced populations can go back to their homes and enjoy 
a reasonable degree of security in their own community, and unless economic 
prospects are established in these countries, the transition from war to peace may in 
some situations be delayed or even political instability and new displacements may
69occur.
An expanded role for international development and financial institutions in 
post-conflict reconstruction could influence the way these societies reintegrate 
displaced populations. A global reconstruction fund would be an important step for 
the success of such transitions.^“
Refugees frequently return to areas where land mines are abundant and much 
of the infrastructure has been destroyed. Some of the necessary rebuilding must occur 
immediately. In order to mitigate the serious economic and social difficulties 
encountered by returnees and other people in war-torn societies, it is recognized that 
closer coordination between the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and 
UNHCR should be established. In fact, cooperation between UNDP and UNHCR has 
already taken place in “Quick Impact Projects” (QIPs) which are small-scale 
initiatives that can be implemented at low cost, with considerable speed and with the 
participation of the local community. Such initiatives normally include the 
reconstruction of schools and health centers, the installation of water wells and 
handpumps, as well as the repair of roads, bridges and other parts of the
UNHCR, The State, op. cit., p.l43; and Morton J. Abramowitz, “Exodus: The World Refugee 
Crisis,” Foreign Policy, No.95, Summer 1994, p.l83.
Cohen and Deng, “Exodus”, op. cit., p.l6.
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infrastructure. One objective of QIPs is to provide immediate resources in areas 
which have been devastated by war and which are confronted with the need to absorb 
large numbers of returning refugees and displaced people. By implementing projects 
which are of benefit to the population as a whole, which require the participation of 
the local community, and which require former enemies to work together, the 
organization has also attempted to avert any conflict between the new arrivals and the 
resident population.^*
However, far greater reconstruction needs must be met over the long term. 
The need for removing land mines alone represents a formidable challenge. Also, for 
refugees returning to rural areas, the issue of available land is very important. Without 
this issue settled, many refugees will not be able to start a new life.’^
Moreover, there are issues concerning human resources and needs. Refugees 
returning to agriculture often lack the opportunity to use their skills for years or even 
decades. Their children may have known no other life than that in refugee camps. 
Another issue is the physical and mental health of the returnees. They will need 
adequate medical care, and not all will be able to provide for themselves. These all 
need to be addressed.”
Although there have been efforts for UNDP-UNHCR coordination in the 
issue of reintegrating returning refugees, far more effective inter-agency planning, 
consultation and implementation are required. The roles and responsibilities of the 
UNDP and UNHCR in such efforts continue to be determined on an ad hoc, 
situation-by-situation basis. The task of the overall rehabilitation of displaced 
communities must be carried out by UNDP, or by other UN agencies, which can
UNHCR, The State, op. cit., p.l73; and Rogers, “The Future”, op. cit., pp.l 129-30. 
Rogers, “The Future”, op. cit., pp. 1129-30.
73 ibid., p.1130
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more appropriately deal with reconstmction and development. This requires a full 
transfer of responsibility from UNHCR to UNDP after the immediate emergency 
relief phase is over.^“*
e. Need for Human Rights Enforcement
Greater development assistance alone is not enough to create safe conditions 
for those returning home: international cooperation must also ensure democratization 
and respect for human rights.
Indeed, the place of human rights in post-conflict peace-building goes without 
mention. It is stated that the humanitarian mandate that has been vested in UNHCR 
to protect and assist the displaced victims of war and persecution would be 
meaningless if these people were to become the “victims of peace.” To achieve a 
humanitarian solution is not just to achieve a humane settlement; the task involves 
reinstating people’s rights, dignity, and autonomy as responsible citizens.’^
It should be noted that in any society recovering from violent conflict, the 
most important human rights players are the authorities of states whose residents have 
been forced to flee or have otherwise suffered from the conflict. Those states, not the 
international community, bear the ultimate responsibility for protecting the human 
rights of their populations. Local governments, civic groups and indigenous 
nongovernmental organizations are also important tools for reconciliation and for 
disseminating a culture of human rights and peace among diverse segments of the 
population. At the same time, the international community, especially the human
Loescher, “The International”, op. cit., pp.371-72.
Sadako Ogata, “Refugee Movements and Respect for Human Rights,” Mediterranean Quarterly, 
Vol.7, No.3, Summer 1996, p.20.
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rights organizations must help governments get back on their feet and avert a 
recurrence of armed conflict.^^
Efforts can be made to monitor and promote human rights and establish a 
“culture of peace”, to strengthen the capacity of official institutions, to hold free and 
fair elections, to address the problem of accountability for previous human rights 
violations; to build a strong civil society, to reform the security services, to reinstate 
education and health facilities, and to assist the children affected by war. All of these 
peace-building activities must be carried out simultaneously if displaced populations 
are to be effectively and sustainably reintegrated in their own society.’’
ibid., p.22.
UNHCR, The State, op. cit., p.l74.
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CONCLUSION
As it can be deducted from this thesis, the refugee problem is no longer a First 
World problem as it was in the late 1940s, nor just a Third World problem as many 
people have seen it in the last three decades. It is now a truly global problem whose 
effects transgress national borders, just like terrorism, drugs, AIDS and pollution. The 
humanitarian, legal and political implications that the refugee problem simultaneously 
brings forth are indicative of the fact that this problem is sure to present a formidable 
challenge in the approaching millenium just as it did since the beginning of this 
decade.
In the face of this challenge, UNHCR, which constitutes the core of the 
international refugee regime, is confronted with many difficulties. First of all, it is 
operating under a number of constraints which are predominantly political and 
financial as have been explained in the last chapter. Given the situation, it is argued 
that any stance adopted by UNHCR towards refugee issues is constrained both by the 
scope of its mandate and the willingness of governments to cooperate with it. 
UNHCR has been accused of formulating its refugee policies in line with donor, 
rather than refugee interests. For instance, the organization has been criticized for 
promoting voluntary repatriation as the most desirable of the three durable solutions 
to the refugee crises.. The emphasis upon promoting repatriation is perceived to be in 
line with the ambitions of donor governments who are concerned about restricting 
numbers and reducing their financial obligations.*
Being an organization which is mandated to defend refugee rights, UNHCR 
has an obligation to uphold the principles of international protection, to ensure that
’ Alex Cunliffe, “The Refugee Crises: A Study of the United Nations High Conunission for 
Refugees,”, Political Studies, Vol.43, No.2, June 1995, pp.288-89.
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slates respect their obligations under international law, and to make the necessary 
public and private representations when governments and other actors put refugees at 
risk. Yet, it is impeded from realizing such actions to the Hill extent due to the 
constraints with which it is confronted. To give one example, reiligee-producing 
states are included in the membership of UNHCR’s Executive Council As a result, 
on more than one occasion, the Executive Committee has prevented UNHCR from 
condemning the actions of refugee-producing states which have committed hostilities 
towards its citizens. As clear from this example, even the daily operational activities 
of UNHCR are potentially subject to political pressures from member states.“
Furthermore, UNHCR suffers from the fact that the international refugee 
regime was built after the Second World War to address a far different kind of world. 
International instruments governing worldwide refugee protection, i.e. the 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its subsequent protocol amending 
certain provisions of it, rested on the premise that the bulk of refugees were fleeing 
from some form of persecution, in most cases, communist governments, and could 
not return home. They were therefore allowed entrance into other countries. Today, 
the majority of the millions of refugees have fled from their homes not because of 
individual persecution, but because of violent conflict and the destruction of the civil 
order. Once across the border, they find little possibility of obtaining new citizenship 
or even gaining semi-permanent admission to some countries.^
Moreover, during the 1990s, UNHCR has been confronted with one refugee 
emergency following another in rapid, sometimes overlapping succession. Relligee 
crises in Iraq, Bosnia, Kenya, Bangladesh, Nepal, the Caucasus, Tajikistan, Benin,
 ^B.E. Harrell Bond, “The Protection of Refugees in the ‘Least Developed’ States,” in Tlic Living 
Law of Nations by G.Alfredsson and P. Macalister-Smith (cds.), Arlington: N.P.Engel, 1996, p.52. 
 ^Morton 1. Abramowitz, “Exodus; The World Refugee Crisis,” Foreign Policy, Vol.95, Sununer 
1994, p.177.
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Ghana, Rwanda and recently in Kosovo, have strained the capacities of UNHCR 
almost to the breaking point. At the same time, UNHCR has been trying to resolve 
the long-standing refugee problems of the previous decade primarily through 
repatriation in a context of continuos instability and insecurity. Also, in the post-Cold 
War era, UNHCR is becoming increasingly involved in providing assistance and 
protection to internally displaced people.The growing scale and complexity of the 
refugee problem during this era has really challenged UNHCR’s capacity to cope 
with them. All the while, the organization also had to deal with the growing 
unwillingness of traditional donor governments to support the system in terms of 
finance and upholding the institution of asylum.
In the face of increasing refugee numbers, UNHCR was also confronted with 
receiving-countries’ pressure for it to concentrate more on the root causes of refugee 
flows and shift its attention to countries of origin, rather than meeting the needs of 
those refugees who had already left their countries. When UNHCR was intended to 
be an agency with a strictly humanitarian mandate, it found it questionable to adapt 
itself to this situation where it was asked to pursue political ends; lhal is, finding 
solutions to causes of refugee flows in countries of origin.
As well as the changing nature of the refugee problem in the 1990s, another 
reason for the difficulties that UNHCR has been going through is directly related with 
the stance of individual states regarding the refugee matters. It should be recognized 
that the task of protecting refugees is ultimately the responsibility of states and other 
political actors. Of course, UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations have an 
important role to play in this area, whether by acting as advocates of the refugee 
cause, monitoring the situation of exiled populations, providing them with material
Gill Loescher. Beyond Charity: Intcrniitional Cooperation and the Global Refimec Crisis. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 127-28.
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assistance or ensuring that they are able to repatriate on a voluntary basis. But there is 
a severe limit to what such organizations can do in situations where retugees are 
prevented from crossing a border, where they are subjected to armed attacks and 
where they are expelled from their country of asylum.^
The global refugee problem is not going to disappear soon. The urge to seek 
asylum in a world where people experience threats to their security and where they 
cannot enjoy their basic human rights is deemed to prevail. As long as they live in 
such conditions, people will continue to move to more secure areas, whatever 
obstacles may be placed on their way.
Today, the refugee problem requires political approaches outside the mandate 
of UNHCR. As it had been emphasized, the refugee crisis is not solely a humanitarian 
problem as it had been in the past Providing humanitarian aid to populations in flight 
is not the solution to the problem. It has attained the characteristics of a political 
problem which therefore necessitates political solutions with the contribution of 
international actors.
In this context, UNHCR can continue to play a major role, either by 
providing emergency aid and technical support or by offering legal protection to 
asylum seekers. It can also serve as a forum to bring governments and international 
agencies together to consult on international responses and to achieve more effective 
cooperation on refugee issues. However, it cannot be expected to resolve the political 
causes of refugee problems. It should be the responsibility of other international 
actors with different mandates to cope with that problem. All the while, states should 
me more willing to accord more autonomy to UNHCR in order for it to be able to 
standardize refugee determination and protection.
 ^UNHCR, The State of the World’s Rcfimccs: A Hiiinanitarian Agenda, New York; Oxford 
University Press, 1997, p.97.
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The main role of UNHCR should be to uphold the institution of asylum. It 
should not be forgotten that asylum continues to have great importance for people 
whose lives and freedom are at risk and who can only find security by seeking refuge 
in another country. Until permanent solutions can be found to the plight of people in 
countries where conflict and human rights violations continue, keeping the asylum 
door open will save lives.
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APPENDIX A
STATUTE OF THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES
United Nations General Assembly, 14 December 1950
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
1. The United Nations High Commissioner for Reftigees, acting under the authority 
of the General Assembly, shall assume the function of providing international 
protection, under the auspices of the United Nations, to refugees who fall within the 
scope of the present Statute and of seeking permanent solutions for the problem of 
reftigees by assisting Governments and, subject to the approval of the Governments 
concerned, private organizations to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of such 
refligees, or their assimilation within new national communities.
In the exercise of his functions, more particularly when difficulties arise, and for 
instance with regard to any controversy concerning the international status of these 
persons, the High Commissioner shall request the opinion of the advisory committee 
on refugees if it is created.
2. The work of the High Commissioner shall be of an entirely non-political character; 
it shall be humanitarian and social and shall relate, as a rule, to groups and categories 
of refugees.
3. The High Commissioner shall follow policy directives given him by the General 
Assembly or the Economic and Social Council.
4. The Economic and Social Council may decide, after hearing the views of the High 
Commissioner on the subject, to establish an advisory committee on refugees, which 
shall consist of representatives of States Members and States non-members of the 
United Nations, to be selected by the Council on the basis of their demonstrated 
interest in and devotion to the solution of the refugee problem.
5. The General Assembly shall review, not later than at its eighth regular session, the 
arrangements for the Office of the High Commissioner with a view to determining 
whether the Office should be continued beyond 31 December 1953.
CHAPTER II
FUNCTIONS OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
6. The competence of the High Commissioner shall extend to:
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A. (i) Any person who has been considered a refugee under the Arrangements of 12 
May 1926 and of 30 June 1928 or under the Conventions of 28 October 
1933 and 10 February 1938, the Protocol of 14 September 1939 or the 
constitution of the International Refugee Organization.
(ii) Any person who, as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and 
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is 
unable or, owing to such fear or for reasons other than personal 
convenience, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; 
or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear or for reasons other than 
personal convenience, is unwilling to return to it.
Decisions as to eligibility taken by the International Refugee Organization 
during the period of its activities shall not prevent the status of refugee being 
accorded to persons who fulfil the conditions of the present paragraph;
The competence of the High Commissioner shall cease to apply to any person 
defined in section A above if:
(a) He has voluntarily re-availed himself of the protection of the country of his 
nationality; or
(b) Having lost his nationality, he has voluntarily re-acquired it; or
(c) He has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the 
country of his new nationality; or
(d) He has voluntarily re-established himself in the country which he left or 
outside which he remained owing to fear of persecution; or
(e) He can no longer, because the circumstances in connexion with which he 
has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, claim, grounds other than those 
of personal convenience for continuing to refuse to avail himself of the protection of 
the country of his nationality. Reasons of a purely economic character may not be 
invoked; or
(f) Being a person who has no nationality, he can no longer, because the 
circumstances in connexion with which he has been recognized as a refugee have 
ceased to exist and he is able to return to the country of his former habitual residence, 
claim grounds other than those of personal convenience for continuing to refuse to 
return to that country;
B. Any other person who is outside the country of his nationality, or if he has no 
nationality, the country of his former habitual residence, because he has or had well- 
founded fear of persecution by reason of his race, religion, nationality or political 
opinion and is unable or, because of such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of the government of the country of his nationality, or, if he has no 
nationality, to return to the country of his former habitual residence.
7. Provided that the competence of the High Commissioner as defined in paragraph 6 
above shall not extend to a person;
(a) Who is a national of more than one country unless he satisfies the 
provisions of the preceding paragraph in relation to each of the countries of which he 
is a national; or
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(b) Who is recognized by the competent authorities of the country in wliich he 
has taken residence as having the rights and obligations which are attaclied to the 
possession of tlie nationality of that country; or
(c) Who continues to receive from other organs or agencies of the United 
Nations protection or assistance; or
(d) In respect of whom there are serious reasons for considering that he has 
committed a crime covered by the provisions of treaties of extradition or a crime 
mentioned in article VI of the London Charter of the International Militaiy Tribunal 
or by the provisions of article 14, paragraph 2, of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.
8. The High Commissioner shall provide for the protection of refugees falling under 
the competence of his Office by:
(a) Promoting the conclusion and ratification of international conventions for 
the protection of refugees, supervising their application and proposing amendments 
thereto;
(b) Promoting through special agreements with Governments the execution of 
any measures calculated to improve the situation of refugees and to reduce the 
number requiring protection;
(c) Assisting governmental and private efforts to promote voluntary 
repatriation or assimilation within new national communities;
(d) Promoting the admission of refugees, not excluding those in the most 
destitute categories, to the territories of States;
(e) Endeavouring to obtain permission for refugees to transfer their assets and 
especially those necessary for their resettlement;
(f) Obtaining from Governments information concerning the number and 
conditions of refugees in their territories and the laws and regulations concerning 
them;
(g) Keeping in close touch with the Governments and inter-governmental 
organizations concerned;
(h) Establishing contact in such manner as he may think best with private 
organizations dealing with refugee questions;
(i) Facilitating the co-ordination of the efforts of private organizations 
concerned with the welfare of refligees.
9. The High Commissioner shall engage in such additional activities, including 
repatriation and resettlement, as the General Assembly may determine, within the 
limits of the resources placed at his disposal.
10. The High Commissioner shall administer any funds, public or private, which he 
receives for assistance to refugees, and shall distribute them among the private and, as 
appropriate, public agencies which he deems best qualified to administer such 
assistance. The High Commissioner may reject any offers which he does not consider 
appropriate or which cannot be utilized. The High Commissioner shall not appeal to 
Governments for funds or make a general appeal, without the prior approval of the 
General Assembly. The High Commissioner shall include in his annual report a 
statement of his activities in this field.
11. The High Commissioner shall be entitled to present his views before the General 
Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and their subsidiary bodies. The High
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Commissioner shall report annually to the General Assembly through the Economic 
and Social Council; his report shall be considered as a separate item on the agenda of 
the General Assembly.
12. The High Commissioner may invite the co-operation of the various specialized 
agencies.
CHAPTER III
ORGANIZATION AND FINANCES
13. The High Commissioner shall be elected by the General Assembly on the 
nomination of the Secretary-General. The terms of appointment of the High 
Commissioner shall be proposed by the Secretary-General and approved by the 
General Assembly. The High Commissioner shall be elected for a term of three years, 
from 1 January 1951.
14. The High Commissioner shall appoint, for the same term, a Deputy High 
Commissioner of a nationality other than his own.
15. (a) Within the limits of the budgetary appropriations provided, the staff of the 
Office of the High Commissioner shall be appointed by the High Commissioner and 
shall be responsible to him in the exercise of their functions.
(b) Such staff shall be chosen from persons devoted to the purposes of the 
Office of the High Commissioner.
(c) Their conditions of employment shall be those provided under the staff 
regulations adopted by the General Assembly and the rules promulgated thereunder 
by the Secretary-General.
(d) Provision may also be made to permit the employment of personnel 
without compensation.
16. The High Commissioner shall consult the Government of the countries of 
residence of refugees as to the need for appointing representatives therein. In any 
country recognizing such need, there may be appointed a representative approved by 
the Government of that country. Subject to the foregoing, the same representative 
may serve in more than one country.
17. The High Commissioner and the Secretary-General shall make appropriate 
arrangements for liaison and consultation on matters of mutual interest.
18. The Secretary-General shall provide the High Commissioner with all necessary 
facilities within budgetary limitations.
19. The Office of the High Commissioner shall be located in Geneva, Switzerland.
20. The Office of the High Commissioner shall be financed under the budget of the 
United Nations. Unless the General Assembly subsequently decides otherwise, no 
expenditure other than administrative expenditures relating to the functioning of the 
Office of the High Commissioner shall be borne on the budget of the United Nations
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and all other expenditures relating to the activities of the High Commissioner shall be 
financed by voluntary contributions.
21. The administration of the Office of the High Commissioner shall be subject to the 
Financial Regulations of the United Nations and to the financial rules promulgated 
thereunder by the Secretary-General.
22. Transactions relating to the High Commissioner's funds shall be subject to audit 
by the United Nations Board of Auditors, provided that the Board may accept 
audited accounts from the agencies to which funds have been allocated. 
Administrative arrangements for the custody of such funds and their allocation shall 
be agreed between the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General in accordance 
with the Financial Regulations of the United Nations and rules promulgated 
thereunder by the Secretary-General.
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APPENDIX B
CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES’
Done at Geneva; 28 July 1951
Adopted by the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of 
Refugees and Stateless Persons, Geneva: 2-25 July 1951 
Entered into force: 22 April 1954
PREAMBLE
The High Contracting Parties,
Considering that the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights approved on 10 December 1948 by the General Assembly have 
affirmed the principle that human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms 
without discrimination,
Considering that the United Nations has, on various occasions, manifested its 
profound concern for refugees and endeavoured to assure refugees the widest 
possible exercise of these fundamental rights and freedoms.
Considering that it is desirable to revise and consolidate previous international 
agreements relating to the status of refugees and to extend the scope of and 
protection accorded by such instruments by means of a new agreement.
Considering that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain 
countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations 
has recognized the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved 
without international co-operation.
Expressing the wish that all States, recognizing the social and humanitarian nature of 
the problem of refugees will do everything within their power to prevent this problem 
from becoming a cause of tension between States,
Noting that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is charged with the 
task of supervising international conventions providing for the protection of refugees, 
and recognizing that the effective co-ordination of measures taken to deal with this 
problem will depend upon the co-operation of States with the High Commissioner,
Have agreed as follows: *
* Turkey signed the Convention on 24 August 1951 and ratified it on 30 March 1962.
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CHAPTER 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1
Delinition of the term "Refugee"
A. For the purposes of tlie present Convention, the term "refugee" shall apply to any 
person who:
(1) Has been considered a refugee under the Arrangements of 12 May 1926 and 30 
June 1928 or under the Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10 February 1938, the 
Protocol of 14 September 1939 or the Constitution of the International Refugee 
Organization;
Decisions of non-eligibility taken by the International Refugee Organization during 
the period of its activities shall not prevent the status of refugee being accorded to 
persons who fulfil the conditions of paragraph 2 of this section;
(2) As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to a well- 
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of 
his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the 
country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing 
to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
In the case of a person who has more than one nationality, the term "the country of 
his nationality" shall mean each of the countries of which he is a national, and a 
person shall not be deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of his 
nationality if, without any valid reason based on well-founded fear, he has not availed 
himself of the protection of one of the countries of which he is a national.
B. (1) For the purposes of this Convention, the words "events occurring before 1 
January 1951" in Article 1, Section A, shall be understood to mean either
(a) "events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951"; or
(b) "events occurring in Europe or elsewhere before 1 January 1951", and 
each Contracting State shall make a declaration at the time of signature, ratification 
or accession, specifying which of these meanings it applies for the purpose of its 
obligations under this Convention.
(2) Any Contracting State which has adopted alternative (a) may at any time extend 
its obligations by adopting alternative (b) by means of a notification addressed to the 
Secretaiy-General of the United Nations.
C. This Convention shall cease to apply to any person falling under the terms of 
Section A if:
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(1) He has voluntarily re-availed himself of the protection of the country of his 
nationality; or
(2) Having lost his nationality, he has voluntarily re-acquired it, or
(3) He has acquired a new nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of his 
new nationality; or
(4) He has voluntarily re-established himself in the country which he left or outside 
which he remained owing to fear of persecution; or
(5) He can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he has 
been recognized as a refligee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself 
of the protection of the country of his nationality;
Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling under Section A( 1) of 
this Article who is able to invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous 
persecution for refusing to avail himself of the protection of the country of 
nationality;
(6) Being a person who has no nationality he is, because of the circumstances in 
connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, able 
to return to the country of his former habitual residence;
Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to a refugee falling under section A(l) of 
this Article who is able toinvoke compelling reasons arising out of previous 
persecution for refusing to return to the country of his former habitual residence.
D. This Convention shall not apply to persons who are at present receiving from 
organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance.
When such protection or assistance has ceased for any reason, without the position of 
such persons being definitively settled in accordance with the relevant resolutions 
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, these persons shall ipso 
facto be entitled to the benefits of this Convention.
E. This Convention shall not apply to a person who is recognized by the competent 
authorities of the country in which he has taken residence as having the rights and 
obligations which are attached to the possession of the nationality of that country.
F. The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to 
whom there are serious reasons for considering that:
(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against 
humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in 
respect of such crimes;
(b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of 
refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee;
(c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations.
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Every refugee has duties to the country in which he finds himself, which require in 
particular that he conform to its laws and regulations as well as to measures taken for 
the maintenance of public order.
Article 3
Non-discrimination
The Contracting States shall apply the provisions of this Convention to refugees 
without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin.
Article 4 
Religion
The Contracting States shall accord to refugees within their territories treatment at 
least as favourable as that accorded to their nationals with respect to freedom to 
practise their religion and freedom as regards the religious education of their children.
Article 5
Rights granted apart from this Convention
Nothing in this Convention shall be deemed to impair any rights and benefits granted 
by a Contracting State to refugees apart from this Convention.
Article 6
The term "in the same circumstances"
Article 2
G eneral obligations
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "in the same circumstances" implies 
that any requirements (including requirements as to length and conditions of sojourn 
or residence) which the particular individual would have to fulfil for the enjoyment of 
the right in question, if he were not a refugee, must be fulfilled by him, with the 
exception of requirements which by their nature a refugee is incapable of fulfilling.
Article 7
Exemption from reciprocity
1. Except where this Convention contains more favourable provisions, a 
Contracting State shall accord to refugees the same treatment as is accorded to aliens 
generally.
2. After a period of three years' residence, all refugees shall enjoy exemption from 
legislative reciprocity in the territory of the Contracting States.
3. Each Contracting State shall continue to accord to refugees the rights and benefits 
to which they were already entitled, in the absence of reciprocity, at the date of entry 
into force of this Convention for that State.
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4. The Contracting States shall consider favourably the possibility of according to 
reftigees, in the absence of reciprocity, rights and benefits beyond those to which they 
are entitled according to paragraphs 2 and 3, and to extending exemption from 
reciprocity to refugees who do not fulfil the conditions provided for in paragraphs 2 
and 3.
5. The provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3 apply both to the rights and benefits referred 
to in Articles 13, 18, 19, 21 and 22 of this Convention and to rights and benefits for 
which this Convention does not provide.
Article 8
Exemption from exceptional measures
With regard to exceptional measures which may be taken against the person, property 
or interests of nationals of a foreign State, the Contracting States shall not apply such 
measures to a refugee who is formally a national of the said State solely on account 
of such nationality. Contracting States which, under their legislation, are prevented 
from applying the general principle expressed in this Article, shall, in appropriate 
cases, grant exemptions in favour of such refugees.
Article 9
Provisional measures
Nothing in this Convention shall prevent a Contracting State, in time of war or other 
grave and exceptional circumstances, from taking provisionally measures which it 
considers to be essential to the national security in the case of a particular person, 
pending a determination by the Contracting State that that person is in fact a refugee 
and that the continuance of such measures is necessary in his case in the interests of 
national security.
Article 10
Continuity of residence
1. Where a refugee has been forcibly displaced during the Second World War and 
removed to the territory of a Contracting State, and is resident there, the period of 
such enforced sojourn shall be considered to have been lawful residence within that 
territory.
2. Where a refugee has been forcibly displaced during the Second World War from 
the territory of a Contracting State and has, prior to the date of entry into force of 
this Convention, returned there for the purpose of taking up residence, the period of 
residence before and after such enforced displacement shall be regarded as one 
uninterrupted period for any purposes for which uninterrupted residence is required.
Article 11 
Refugee Seamen
In the case of refugees regularly serving as crew members on board a ship flying the 
flag of a Contracting State, that State shall give sympathetic consideration to their
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establishment on its territory and the issue of travel documents to them or their 
temporary admission to its territory particularly with a view to facilitating their 
establishment in another country.
CHAPTER II
JURIDICAL STATUS
Article 12 
Personal status
1. The personal status of a reiligee shall be governed by the law of the country of his 
domicile or, if he has no domicile, by the law of the country of his residence.
2. Rights previously acquired by a refugee and dependent on personal status, more 
particularly rights attaching to marriage, shall be respected by a Contracting State, 
subject to compliance, if this be necessary, with the formalities required by the law of 
that State, provided that the right in question is one which would have been 
recognized by the law of that State had he not become a refugee.
Article 13
Movable and iniinovable property
The Contracting States shall accord to a refugee treatment as favourable as possible 
and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the 
same circumstances, as regards the acquisition of movable and immovable property 
and other rights pertaining thereto, and to leases and other contracts relating to 
relating to movable and immovable property.
Article 14
Artistic rights and industrial property
In respect of the protection of industrial property, such as inventions, designs or 
models, trade marks, trade names, and of rights in literary, artistic, and scientific 
works, a refugee shall be accorded in the country in which he has his habitual 
residence the same protection as is accorded to nationals of that country. In the 
territory of any other Contracting State, he shall be accorded the same protection as 
is accorded in that territory to nationals of the country in which he has his habitual 
residence.
Article 15
Right of association
As regards non-political and non-profit making associations and trade unions the 
Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory the most 
favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country, in the same 
circumstances.
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Article 16 
Access to courts
1. A refiigee shall have free access to the courts of law on the territory of all 
Contracting States.
2. A refugee shall enjoy in the Contracting State in which he has his habitual 
residence the same treatment as a national in matters pertaining to access to the 
Courts, including legal assistance and exemption from cautio judicatem solvi.
3. A refugee shall be accorded in the matters referred to in paragraph 2 in countries 
other than that in which he has his habitual residence the treatment granted to a 
national of the country of his habitual residence.
CHAPTER HI
GAINFUL EMPLOYMENT
Article 17
Wagc-eaniing cmployinciit
1. The Contracting State shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory the 
most favourable treatment accorded to nationals of a foreign country in the same 
circumstances, as regards the right to engage in wage-earning employment.
2. In any case, restrictive measures imposed on aliens or the employment of aliens 
for the protection of the national labour market shall not be applied to a refugee who 
was already exempt from them at the date of entry into force of this Convention for 
the Contracting State concerned, or who fulfils one of the following conditions;
(b) He has completed three years' residence in the country,
(c) He has a spouse possessing the nationality of the country of residence. A 
refugee may not invoke the benefits of this provision if he has abandoned his spouse
(c) He has one or more children possessing the nationality of the country of 
residence.
3. The Contracting States shall give sympathetic consideration to assimilating the 
rights of all refugees with regard to wage-earning employment to those of nationals, 
and in particular of those refugees who have entered their territory pursuant to 
programmes of labour recruitment or under immigration schemes.
Article 18 
Self-employment
The Contracting States shall accord to a refugee lawfully in their territory treatment 
as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable that that accorded to 
aliens generally in the same circumstances, as regards the right to engage on his own 
account in agriculture, industry, handicrafts and commerce and to establish 
commercial and industrial companies.
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1. Each Contracting State shall accord to refugees lawfolly staying in their territory 
who hold diplomas recognized by the competent authorities of that State, and who 
are desirous of practising a liberal profession, treatment as favourable as possible and, 
in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same 
circumstances.
2. The Contracting States shall use their best endeavours consistently with their laws 
and constitutions to secure the settlement of such refugees in the territories, other 
than the metropolitan territory, for whose international relations they are responsible.
A rticle 19
Liberal professions
CHAPTER IV 
WELFARE
Article 20 
Rationing
Where a rationing system exists, which applies to the population at large and 
regulates the general distribution of products in short supply, refugees shall be 
accorded the same treatment as nationals.
Article 21 
Housing
As regards housing, the Contracting States, in so far as the matter is regulated by 
laws or regulations or is subject to the control of public authorities, shall accord to 
refugees lawfully staying in their territory treatment as favourable as possible and, in 
any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same 
circumstances.
Article 22 
Public education
1. The Contracting States shall accord to refugees the same treatment as is accorded 
to nationals with respect to elementary education.
2. The Contracting States shall accord to refugees treatment as favourable as possible, 
and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the 
same circumstances, with respect to education other than elementary education and, 
in particular, as regards access to studies, the recognition of foreign school 
certificates, diplomas and degrees, the remission of fees and charges and the award of 
scholarships.
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Article 23 
Public relief
The Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory the 
same treatment with respect to public relief and assistance as is accorded to their 
nationals.
Article 24
Labour legislation and social security
1. The Contracting States shall accord to refugees lawfully staying in their territory 
the same treatment as is accorded to nationals in respect of the following matters:
(a) In so far as such matters are governed by laws or regulations or are 
subject to the control of administrative authorities; remuneration, including family 
allowances where these form part of remuneration, hours of work, overtime 
arrangements, holidays with pay, restrictions on home work, minimum age of 
employment, apprenticeship and training, women's work and the work of young 
persons, and the enjoyment of the benefits of collective bargaining;
(b) Social security (legal provisions in respect of employment injury, 
occupational diseases, maternity, sickness, disability, old age, death, unertiployment, 
family responsibilities and any other contingency which, according to national laws or 
regulations, is covered by a social security scheme), subject to the following 
limitations:
(i) There may be appropriate arrangements for the maintenance of 
acquired rights and rights in course of acquisition;
(ii) National laws or regulations of the country of residence may 
prescribe special arrangements concerning benefits or portions of 
benefits which are payable wholly out of public funds, and 
concerning allowances paid to persons who do not fulfil the 
contribution conditions prescribed for the award of a normal 
pension.
2. The right to compensation for the death of a refugee resulting from employment 
injury or from occupational disease shall not be affected by the fact that the residence 
of the beneficiary is outside the territory of the Contracting State.
3. The Contracting States shall extend to refugees the benefits of agreements 
concluded between them, or which may be concluded between them in the future, 
concerning the maintenance of acquired rights and rights in the process of acquisition 
in regard to social security, subject only to the conditions which apply to nationals of 
the States signatory to the agreements in question.
4. The Contracting States will give sympathetic consideration to extending to 
refugees so far as possible the benefits of similar agreements which may at any time 
be in force between such Contracting States and non-contracting States.
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CHAPTER V
ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES
Article 25
Administrative assistance
1. When the exercise of a right by a refugee would normally require the assistance of 
authorities of a foreign country to whom he cannot have recourse, the Contracting 
States in whose territory he is residing shall arrange that such assistance be afforded 
to him by their own authorities or by an international authority.
2. The authority or authorities mentioned in paragraph 1 shall deliver or cause to be 
delivered under their supervision to refugees such documents or certifications as 
would normally be delivered to aliens by or through their national authorities.
3. Documents or certifications so delivered shall stand in the stead of the official 
instruments delivered to aliens by or through their national authorities, and shall be 
given credence in the absence of proof to the contrary.
4. Subject to such exceptional treatment as may be granted to indigent persons, fees 
may be charged for the services mentioned herein, but such fees shall be moderate 
and commensurate with those charged to nationals for similar services.
5. The provisions of this Article shall be without prejudice to Articles 27 and 28.
Article 26
Freedom of movement
Each Contracting State shall accord to refugees lawfully in its territory the right to 
choose their place of residence to move freely within its territory, subject to any 
regulations applicable to aliens generally in the same circumstances.
Article 27 
Identity papers
The Contracting States shall issue identity papers to any refugee in their territory who 
does not possess a valid travel document.
Article 28 
Travel documents
1. The Contracting States shall issue to refugees lawfully staying in their territory 
travel documents for the purpose of travel outside their territory unless compelling 
reasons of national security or public order otherwise require, and the provisions of 
the Schedule to this Convention shall apply with respect to such documents. The 
Contracting States may issue such a travel document to any other refugee in their 
territory; they shall in particular give sympathetic consideration to the issue of such a
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travel document to refugees in their territory who are unable to obtain a travel 
document from the country of their lawful residence.
2. Travel documents issued to refugees under previous international agreements by 
parties thereto shall be recognized and treated by the Contracting States in the same 
way as if they had been issued pursuant to this article.
Article 29 
Fiscal charges
1. The Contracting States shall not impose upon refugee duties, charges or taxes, of 
any description whatsoever, other or higher than those which are or may be levied on 
their nationals in similar situations.
2. Nothing in the above paragraph shall prevent the application to refligees of the 
laws and regulations concerning charges in respect of the issue to aliens of 
administrative documents including identity papers.
Article 30 
Transfer of assets
1. A Contracting State shall, in conformity with its laws and regulations, permit 
refugees to transfer assets which they have brought into its territory, to another 
country where they have been admitted for the purposes of resettlement.
2. A Contracting State shall give sympathetic consideration to the application of 
refugees for permission to transfer assets wherever they may be and which are 
necessary for their resettlement in another country to which they have been admitted.
Article 31
Refugees unlawfully in the country of refuge
1. The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry 
or presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or 
freedom was threatened in the sense of Article 1, enter or are present in their territory 
without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the 
authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.
2. The Contracting States shall not apply to the movements of such refugees 
restrictions other than those which are necessary and such restrictions shall only be 
applied' until their status in the country is regularized or they obtain admission into 
another country. The Contracting States shall allow such refugees a reasonable 
period and all the necessary facilities to obtain admission into another country.
Article 32 
Expulsion
1. The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their territory save on 
grounds of national security or public order.
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2. The expulsion of such a refugee shall be only in pursuance of a decision reached in 
accordance with due process of law. Except where compelling reasons of national 
security otherwise require, the refugee shall be allowed to submit evidence to clear 
himself, and to appeal to and be represented for the purpose before competent 
authority or a person or persons specially designated by the competent authority.
3. The Contracting States shall allow such a refugee a reasonable period within which 
to seek legal admission into another country. The Contracting States reserve the 
right to apply during that period such internal measures as they may deem necessary.
Article 33
Prohibition of expulsion or return ('’refoulement")
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion.
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refligee 
whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the 
country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a 
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.
Article 34 
Naturalization
The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and 
naturalization of refiigees. They shall in particular make every effort to expedite 
naturalization proceedings and to reduce as far as possible the charges and costs of 
such proceedings.
CHAPTER VI
EXECUTORY AND TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
Article 35
Co-operation of the national authorities with the United Nations
1. The Contracting States undertake to co-operate with the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or any other agency of the United Nations 
which may succeed it, in the exercise of its flinctions, and shall in particular facilitate 
its duty of supervising the application of the provisions of this Convention.
2. In order to enable the Office of the High Commissioner or any other agency of the 
United Nations which may succeed it, to make reports to the competent organs of the 
United Nations, the Contracting States undertake to provide them in the appropriate 
form with information and statistical data requested concerning:
(a) the condition of refugees,
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(b) the implementation of this Convention, and
(c) laws, regulations and decrees which are, or may hereafter be, in force 
relating to refugees.
Article 36
Information on national legislation
The Contracting States shall communicate to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations the laws and regulations which they may adopt to ensure the application of 
this Convention.
Article 37
Relation to previous Conventions
Without prejudice to Article 28, paragraph 2, of this Convention, this Convention 
replaces, as between parties to it, the Arrangements of 5 July 1922, 31 May 1924, 12 
May 1926, 30 June 1928 and 30 July 1935, the Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 
10 February 1938, the Protocol of 14 September 1939 and the Agreement of 15 
October 1946.
CHAPTER VII 
FINAL CLAUSES
Article 38
Settlement of disputes
Any dispute between parties to this Convention relating to its interpretation or 
application, which cannot be settled by other means, shall be referred to the 
International Court of Justice at the request of any one of the parties to the dispute.
Article 39
Signature, ratification and accession
1. This Convention shall be opened for signature at Geneva on 28 July 1951 and shall 
hereafter be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It shall be 
open for signature at the European Office of the United Nations from 28 July to 31 
August 1951 and shall be re-opened for signature at the Headquarters of the United 
Nations from 17 September 1951 to 31 December 1952.
2. This Convention shall be open for signature on behalf of all States Members of the 
United Nations, and also on behalf of any other State invited to attend the 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons or to 
which an invitation to sign will have been addressed by the General Assembly. It 
shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
3. This Convention shall be open from 28 July 1951 for accession by the States 
referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article. Accession shall be effected by the deposit of 
an instrument of accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
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Article 40
Territorial application clause
1. Any state may, at the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare that this 
Convention shall extend to all or any of the territories for the international relations 
of which it is responsible. Such a declaration shall take effect when the Convention 
enters into force for the State concerned.
2. At any time thereafter any such extension shall be made by notification addressed 
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and shall take effect as from the 
ninetieth day after the day of receipt by the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
of this notification, or as from the date of entry into force of the Convention for the 
State concerned, whichever is the later.
3. With respect to those territories to which this Convention is not extended at the 
time of signature, ratification or accession, each State concerned shall consider the 
possibility of taking the necessary steps in order to extend the application of this 
Convention to such territories, subject, where necessary for constitutional reasons, to 
the consent of the governments of such territories.
Article 41 
Federal clause
In the case of a Federal or non-unitary State, the following provisions shall apply:
(a) With respect to those Articles of this Convention that come within the 
legislative jurisdiction of the federal legislative authority, the obligations of the 
Federal Government shall to this extent be the same as those of Parties which are not 
Federal States,
(b) With respect to those Articles of this Convention that come within the 
legislative jurisdiction of constituent States, provinces or cantons which are not, 
under the constitutional system of the federation, bound to take legislative action, the 
Federal Government shall bring such Articles with a favourable recommendation to 
the notice of the appropriate authorities of States, provinces or cantons at the earliest 
possible moment.
(c) A Federal State Party to this Convention shall, at the request of any other 
Contracting State transmitted through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
supply a statement of the law and practice of the Federation and its constituent units 
in regard to any particular provision of the Convention showing the extent to which 
effect has been given to that provision by legislative or other action.
Article 42 
Reservations
1. At the time of signature, ratification or accession, any State may make reservations 
to articles of the Convention other than to Articles 1, 3, 4, 16(1), 33, 36-46 inclusive.
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2. Any State making a reservation in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article may 
at any time withdraw the reservation by a communication to that effect addressed to 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 43 
Entry into force
1. This Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the day of 
deposit of the sixth instrument of ratification or accession.
2. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of the sixth 
instalment of ratification or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the 
ninetieth day following the date of deposit by such State of its instrument or 
ratification or accession.
Article 44 
Denunciation
1. Any Contracting State may denounce this Convention at any time by a notification 
addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. Such denunciation shall take effect for the Contracting State concerned one year 
from the date upon which it is received by the Secretary-General of the United 
Niations.
3. Any State which has made a declaration or notification under Article 40 may, at 
any time thereafter, by a notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
declare that the Convention shall cease to extent to such territory one year after the 
date of receipt of the notification by the Secretary-General.
Article 45 
Revision
1. Any Contracting State may request revision of this Convention at any time by a 
notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. The General Assembly of the United Nations shall recommend the steps, if any, to 
be taken in respect of such request.
Article 46
Notifications by the Secretaiy-General of the United Nations
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform all Members of the United 
Nations and non-member States referred to in Article 39:
(a) of declarations and notifications in accordance with Section B of Article 1;
(b) of signatures, ratifications and accessions in accordance with Article 39;
(c) of declarations and notifications in accordance with Article 40;
(d) of reservations and withdrawals in accordance with Article 42;
(e) of the date on which this Convention will come into force in accordance 
with Article 43;
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(f) of denunciations and notifications in accordance with Article 44;
(g) of requests for revision in accordance with Article 45.
IN FAITH WHEREOF the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this 
Convention on behalf of their respective Governments.
DONE at GENEVA, this twenty-eighth day of July, one thousand nine hundred and 
iifly-one, in a single copy, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic 
and which shall remain deposited in the archives of the United Nations, and certified 
true copies of which shall be delivered to all Members of the United Nations and to 
the non-member States referred to in Article 39.
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APPENDIX C
PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES*
Adopted by United Nations General Assembly; 16 December 1966
Signed by the President of the General Assembly and by the Secretary-General; 31
January 1967
Entered into force; 4 October 1967, in accordance with Article VIII
The States Parties to the present Protocol,
Considering that the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva 
on 28 July 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the Convention) covers only those persons 
who have become refugees as a result of events occurring before 1 January, 1951,
Considering that new refugee situations have arisen since the Convention was 
adopted and that the refugees concerned may therefore not fall within the scope of 
the Convention,
Considering that it is desirable that equal status should be enjoyed by all refugees 
covered by the definition in the Convention irrespective of the dateline 1 January 
1951,
Have agreed as follows.
Article 1
General provision
1. The States Parties to the present Protocol undertake to apply Articles 2 to 34 
inclusive of the Convention to refugees as hereinafter defined.
2. For the purpose of the present Protocol, the term "refugee" shall, except as regards 
the application of paragraph 3 of this Article, mean any person within the definition 
of Article 1 of the Convention as if the words "As a result of events occurring before 
1 January 1951 and . . . "and the words". . a result of such events", in Article 1 A (2) 
were omitted.
3. The present Protocol shall be applied by the States Parties hereto without any 
geographic limitation, save that existing declarations made by States already Parties 
to the Convention in accordance with Article 1 B (l)(a) of the Convention, shall, 
unless extended under Article 1 B (2) thereof, apply also under the present Protocol.
’ Turkey acceded to the Protocol on 3 1 July 1968.
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Article 2
Co-operation of the national authorities with the United Nations
1. The States Parties to the present Protocol undertake to co-operate with the Office 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or any other agency of the 
United Nations which may succeed it, in the exercise of its functions, and shall in 
particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the provisions of the 
present Protocol.
2, In order to enable the Office of the High Commissioner, or any other agency of the 
United Nations which may succeed it, to make reports to the competent organs of the 
United Nations, the States Parties to the present Protocol undertake to provide them 
with the information and statistical data requested, in the appropriate form, 
concerning;
(a) The condition of refugees;
(b) The implementation of the present Protocol;
(c) Laws, regulations and decrees which are, or may hereafter be, in force 
relating to refugees.
Article 3
Information on national legislation
The States Parties to the present Protocol shall communicate to the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations the laws and regulations which they may adopt to 
ensure the application of the present Protocol.
Article 4
Settlement of disputes
Any dispute between States Parties to the present Protocol which relates to its 
interpretation or application and which cannot be settled by other means shall be 
referred to the International Court of Justice at the request of any one of the parties 
to the dispute.
Article 5 
Accession
The present Protocol shall be open for accession on behalf of all States Parties to the 
Convention and of any other State Member of the United Nations or member of any 
of the specialized agencies or to which an invitation to accede may have been 
addressed by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Accession shall be effected 
by the deposit of an instrument of accession with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations.
Article 6 
Federal clause
In the case of a Federal or non-unitary State, the following provisions shall apply;
(a) With respect to those articles of the Convention to be applied in 
accordance with Article I, paragraph 1, of the present Protocol that come within the
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legislative jurisdiction of the federal legislative authority, the obligations of the 
Federal .Government shall to this extent be the same as those of States Parties which 
are not Federal States;
(b) With respect to those articles of the Convention to be applied in 
accordance with Article I, paragraph 1, of the present Protocol that come within the 
legislative jurisdiction of constituent States, provinces or cantons which are not, 
under the constitutional system of the federation, bound to take legislative action, the 
Federal Government shall bring such articles with a favourable recommendation to 
the notice of the appropriate authorities of States, provinces or cantons at the earliest 
possible moment;
(c) A Federal State Party to the present Protocol shall, at the request of any 
other State Party hereto transmitted through the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, supply a statement of the law and practice of the Federation and its 
constituent units in regard to any particular provision of the Convention to be applied 
in accordance with Article I, paragraph 1, of the present Protocol, showing the extent 
to which effect has been given to that provision by legislative or other action.
Article 7
Reservations and declarations
1. At the time of accession, any State may make reservations in respect of Article IV 
of the present Protocol and in respect of the application in accordance with Article I 
of the present Protocol of any provisions of the Convention other than those 
contained in Articles 1, 3, 4, 16 (1) and 33 thereof, provided that in the case of a 
State Party to the Convention reservations made under this Article shall not extend to 
refugees in respect of whom the Convention applies.
2. Reservations made by States Parties to the Convention in accordance with Article 
42 thereof shall, unless withdrawn, be applicable in relation to their obligations under 
the present Protocol.
3. Any State making a reservation in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article may 
at any time withdraw such reservation by a communication to that effect addressed to 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
4. Declarations made under Article 40, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Convention by a 
State Party thereto which accedes to the present Protocol shall be deemed to apply in 
respect of the present Protocol, unless upon accession a notification to the contrary is 
addressed by the State Party concerned to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations. The provisions of Article 40, paragraphs 2 and 3, and of Article 44, 
paragraph 3, of the Convention shall be deemed to apply mutatis mutandis to the 
present Protocol.
Article 8 
Entry into force
1. The present Protocol shall come into force on the day of deposit of the sixth 
instrument of accession.
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2. For each State acceding to the Protocol after the deposit of the sixth instrument of 
accession, tlie Protocol shall come into force on the. date of deposit by such State of 
its instrument of accession.
Article 9 
Denunciation
1. Any State Party hereto may denounce this Protocol at any time by a notification 
addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. Such denunciation shall take effect for the State Party concerned one year from the 
date on which it is received by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 10
Notifications by the Secretary-General of the United Nations
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform the States referred to in 
Article V above of the date of entry into force, accessions, reservations and 
withdrawals of reservations to and denunciations of the present Protocol, and of 
declarations and notifications relating hereto.
Article 11
Deposit in the archives of the Secretariat of the United Nations 
*
A copy of the present Protocol, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and 
Spanish texts are equally authentic, signed by the President of the General Assembly 
and by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, shall be deposited in *the archives 
of the Secretariat of the United Nations. The Secretary-General will transmit certified 
copies thereof to all States Members of the United Nations and to the other States 
referred to in Article V above.
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APPENDIX
GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2198 (XXI) 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
The General Assembly,
Considering that the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, signed at Geneva 
on 28 July 1951, covers only those persons who have become refligees as a result of 
events occurring before 1 January 1951,
Considering that new refugee situations have arisen since the Convention was 
adopted and that the refugees concerned may therefore not fall within the scope of 
the Convention,
Considering that it is desirable that equal status should be enjoyed by all refugees 
covered by the definition in the Convention, irrespective of the date-line of 1 January 
1951,
Taking note of the recommendation of the Executive Committee of the Programme 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees that the draft Protocol 
relating to the Status of Refugees should be submitted to the General Assembly after 
consideration by the Economic and Social Council, in order that the Secretary- 
General might be authorized to open the Protocol for accession by Governments 
within the shortest possible time.
Considering that the Economic and Social Council, in its resolution 1186 (XLI) of 18 
November 1966, took note with approval of the draft Protocol contained in the 
addendum to the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and 
concerning measures to extend the personal scope of the Convention and transmitted 
the addendum to the General Assembly,
1. Takes note of the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, the text of which is 
contained in the addendum to the report of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit the text of the Protocol to the States 
mentioned in article V thereof, with a view to enabling them to accede to the 
Protocol.
1495th plenary meeting, 
16 December 1966.
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